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Professor Mikhail Chernov, Co-chair
In the first chapter of this dissertation, I study the asset pricing implications of heterogeneity
in the financial intermediary sector. To examine the impact of massive balance sheet ad-
justments within the intermediary sector during the Great Recession, I propose a dynamic
model with heterogeneous intermediaries and financial frictions. The model implies that a
significant fraction of risk premia variation can be attributed to the composition of the in-
termediary sector. Asset reallocations, comparable in magnitude to the one observed during
the recent financial crisis, lead to a substantial increase in the risk premia and volatility. An
empirical measure of the composition of the financial sector strongly forecasts future excess
returns with significant additional predictive power beyond many established forecasting
variables in the literature. Moreover, shocks to wealth distribution among intermediaries
have strong explanatory power for the cross-section of assets and are priced with a positive
price of risk.
In the second chapter of this dissertation (with William Mann), we estimate small marginal
costs and large markups at private colleges in the United States. For identification, we
exploit a tightening of credit standards in the PLUS loan program, which decreased enroll-
ment, revenues, and expenditures at private colleges with low-income students. We estimate
that markups represented more than half of charges for students disqualified by the change.
ii
Markups were higher at for-profit schools, and in states with fewer public schools and lower
education spending. Our results contrast prior estimates of small markups in higher edu-
cation. We conclude that the positive relationship between federal student aid and rising
tuition costs, the so-called Bennett Hypothesis, arises due to imperfect competition between
colleges.
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CHAPTER 1
Heterogeneous Intermediary Asset Pricing
The financial sector witnessed a massive restructuring of its balance sheet during the Great
Recession: Over the period from the first quarter of 2008 to the fourth quarter of 2009, which
includes the most dramatic episode of the crisis in the fall of 2008, (i) broker-dealers drasti-
cally reduced asset holdings by approximately $1.7 trillion (a 35% drop) while commercial
banks increased total asset by nearly $1 trillion (a 7.5% rise), and (ii) broker-dealers reduced
leverage by about 47% while bank holding companies increased leverage by approximately
72%. This evidence is at odds with canonical intermediary asset pricing models which fea-
ture a representative financial sector. This work makes two main contributions. First, I
extend the existing frameworks to explain these massive asset flows. Second, I apply my
model to study its empirical asset pricing implications for time-series predictability and the
cross-section of assets.
To explain these large asset flows and resolve the puzzling evidence presented above, I
present a dynamic asset pricing model with two key features: (i) intermediaries heterogeneous
in their risk-bearing capacity, and (ii) state-dependent margin constraints. I show that the
composition of the intermediary sector, captured by one of model’s two state variables,
has important asset pricing implications beyond the health of the overall financial sector
previously considered in the literature. I quantify the importance of this heterogeneity for
the level and variation of the risk premium.
Guided by my model, I present two main empirical results that transcend the specific
2008 crisis episode. First, the wealth share of broker-dealers in the financial sector, a measure
of the composition of the intermediary sector, strongly forecasts future market excess returns
with additional predictive power beyond many popular forecasting variables in the literature.
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Second, this measure of heterogeneity has strong explanatory power for the cross-section of
asset: Shocks to the relative wealth share of broker-dealers in the financial sector, explains the
cross-section of equity and bond returns about as well or better than existing intermediary
asset pricing models.
As a corollary, my model reconciles seemingly contradictory asset pricing evidence from
recent empirical evaluations of representative intermediary-based models. In particular,
Adrian, Etula, and Muir (2014) (henceforth, AEM) and He, Kelly, and Manela (2017)
(henceforth, HKM) find opposite signs for the price of intermediary leverage shocks in the
cross-section of assets (positive and negative, respectively). Importantly, AEM and HKM
measure intermediary leverage in different parts of the financial sector: security broker-
dealers, and bank holding companies, respectively. The economic mechanism of the model,
presented below, implies opposite leverage dynamics for different parts of the financial sector,
resolving this puzzling evidence.
The model features two main ingredients. First, I assume agents differ in their attitudes
toward risk: Two financial intermediaries (labeled A and B) and a household sector (C
agents) in order of increasing risk aversion. I think of A and B intermediaries as broker-
dealers and banks, respectively. This is consistent with the evidence that more aggressive
hedge fund and broker-dealers have higher leverage on their balance sheets compared to
more passive commercial banks. In equilibrium, less risk averse intermediaries hold levered
positions in the risky asset financed by borrowing from the more risk averse agents. Second,
investors face financial frictions in the form of occasionally binding state-dependent margin
constraints. These constraints cap the maximum funding that intermediaries can obtain,
which in turn impacts their asset demand.
Although all agents face margin constraints, in equilibrium, only more aggressive A type
intermediaries face binding constraints. This calibration assumption has empirical support
in the data: Hedge funds and broker-dealers primarily rely on collateralized repo financing
with haircuts, while the commercial banking sector has access to more stable funding sources,
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such as insured deposits and discount window lending from a central bank.1
The primary economic mechanism of the model is as follows: Following a negative shock
more aggressive A type intermediaries face binding margin constraints and are forced to
reduce leverage by selling assets. To clear the risky asset market, the less aggressive B inter-
mediaries take on a larger portion of the asset than they would in the absence of constraints.
The risk premium must increase to compensate them for bearing more risk. Since constraints
are more likely to bind in high marginal utility states where intermediary wealth shares are
low, consistent with empirical evidence, the model generates opposite cyclical dynamics for
leverage of different intermediaries: Procyclical for more aggressive and countercyclical for
less aggressive intermediaries.2
Heterogeneity in intermediaries’ risk appetite and margin constraints are both necessary
to match and understand asset reallocations within the financial sector that are consistent
with observed patterns. In a model with representative intermediaries, only the aggregate
wealth share of the financial sector matters for asset prices. Thus, in the absence of hetero-
geneity among intermediaries, models are unable to match asset flows within the financial
sector. Similarly, in a frictionless setting, an adverse shock reduces intermediaries’ risk-
bearing capacity and results in a fall in prices and a direct increase in leverage for both
regardless of their degree of risk tolerance. Therefore, without margin constraints, both in-
termediaries would lever up and down at the same time, and the model is inconsistent with
empirical evidence on balance sheet adjustments in the financial sector.
My model features occasionally binding, time-varying margin constraints: The level of
margin required in the model is state-dependent; and (inversely) linked to endogenously
determined return volatility resembling an approximate Value-at-Risk (VaR) rule. Since
1In the second quarter of 2018, approximately 36% of total financial assets and 50% of total liabilities
for security broker-dealers are due to lending and borrowing in the repo market, respectively. For private
depository institutions, approximately 73% of total liabilities are comprised of checkable, time and savings
deposits. Source: Financial Accounts of the United States (Flow of Funds).
2As mentioned above, one can think of aggressive and passive intermediaries as broker-dealers (BDs) and
bank holding companies (BHCs), respectively, consistent with the observation that BDs are more likely to
face binding borrowing constraints in bad times than BHCs.
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there is empirical evidence that return volatility is higher in bad times (Schwert (1989), for
example), such an approach is consistent with findings of Gorton and Metrick (2012) that
haircuts tend to rise in crises.
I show that the model’s equilibrium dynamics can be described by two endogenous state
variables: (i) total wealth share of the financial sector (i.e. A and B agents) in the economy,
and (ii) the more aggressive intermediary’s (A types) wealth share as a fraction of the
total financial sector. The former is the main state variable in many recent representative
intermediary-based models.3 The unique feature of the model is the second state variable:
It emphasizes that the composition of the financial sector is a key factor in determining
asset prices. Models with a representative financial sector are silent about the composition
of intermediaries and its asset pricing implications.
Risk tolerant intermediaries (A and B agents) have levered balance sheets by borrowing
from more risk averse households. Leverage increases intermediaries’ exposure to aggregate
shocks: Positive shocks result in their wealth share to increase. Following a negative ag-
gregate shock, the wealth of levered intermediaries falls faster than that of households, and
hence their share of total wealth, the first state variable in the model, declines. Moreover,
since more risk tolerant intermediaries (i.e., A agents) have higher leverage than more risk
averse ones, they are more likely to face binding margin constraints in bad times when they
become tighter. As such, their wealth share in the financial sector, the second state vari-
able of my model, declines as well. A key takeaway from model’s economic mechanism is
that both state variables exhibit procyclical dynamics: In high marginal utility states, both
wealth share of the aggregate financial sector and more aggressive intermediary’s net worth
share in the financial sector are low.
I then examine two quantitative implications of my model. I first use the model to
quantify the asset pricing implications of massive financial flows between intermediaries
observed in the 2008 crisis. Explaining and studying the impact of these massive asset
reallocations are one of the main goals of this study. As mentioned above, during 2008–
3See He and Krishnamurthy (2013), Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2014), Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010),
and Drechsler, Savov, and Schnabl (2018) for a few recent models.
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2009, broker-dealers drastically reduced asset holdings and leverage (by $1.7 trillion and 47%,
respectively), while banks increased both (by $1 trillion and 72%, respectively). My model
implies that a dealer deleveraging episode comparable in magnitude to the one observed
during the crisis leads to an approximately 55% increase in the risk premia and a 5% increase
in volatility. These balance sheet adjustments have no impact on asset prices in existing
models with representative intermediaries.
Second, I show that the composition of the financial sector is responsible for a significant
fraction of risk premia variation beyond the wealth share of the aggregate financial sector.
With an independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) aggregate endowment, variation
in risk premia is only due to the aggregate wealth share as well as the composition of the
financial sector, model’s two state variables. I show that approximately 20% of the variation
in risk premia can be attributed to the wealth distribution among intermediaries, which is a
measure of the composition of the financial sector. Thus, failing to account for heterogeneity
among intermediaries can lead to missing a substantial portion of risk premia variation. This
result implies a novel empirical prediction of the model: The composition of the financial
sector should strongly forecast future excess returns.
Next, I study the empirical implications of the model for time-series predictability and
the cross-section of assets. I show that in addition to wealth share of the entire financial
sector, keeping track of the composition of intermediaries is also crucial for determining risk
premia. I define an empirical proxy for measuring this composition: The ratio of the equity
of security broker-dealers to sum of equities of broker-dealers and holding companies from
the Financial Accounts of the United States (Flow of Funds).
Consistent with my model’s prediction, the composition of the financial sector strongly
and negatively predicts future excess return. Model’s second state variable, which cap-
tures this wealth distribution in the financial sector, exhibits procyclical dynamics: Times
when broker-dealers are relatively more impaired in the financial sector coincide with high
marginal utility states where prices are low and future expected returns are high. I show
that the composition of the financial sector, captured by the wealth share of broker-dealers
in the intermediary sector, is a strong predictor of future excess returns leading to additional
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predictive power beyond many established return forecasting variables in the literature.
Moreover, shocks to the composition of intermediaries, which I denote the heterogeneous
intermediary factor (HIFac), are priced in the cross-section of asset returns with a positive
price of risk: The HIFac alone exhibits strong explanatory power for the cross-section of
equity and bond returns about as well or better than existing intermediary asset pricing
models in AEM and HKM. I further document that including aggregate intermediary lever-
age as a second asset pricing factor increases cross-sectional fit by at least ten percentages
points, depending on whether the factor is leverage shocks for broker-dealers or bank holding
companies.
In addition, I reconcile seemingly contradictory evidence in AEM and HKM by proposing
a unifying general equilibrium framework with heterogeneous intermediaries. Pricing kernels
in AEM and HKM measure marginal utilities of different financial intermediaries: broker-
dealers and bank holding companies, respectively. Given the economic mechanism presented
above, different parts of the financial sector exhibit opposite leverage dynamics. Therefore,
it does not seem surprising that the literature with a representative financial sector arrives
at conflicting asset pricing results.
I provide further evidence that heterogeneity in the financial sector is an important risk
factor. Stock portfolios sorted on their exposure to HIFac (shocks to dealers’ wealth share
in the financial sector) exhibit monotonically increasing excess returns: the highest-beta
quintile has approximately 5% higher annualized excess return relative to the lowest-beta
portfolio. Existing representative intermediary asset pricing models are unable to capture
these results.
Finally, I construct a mimicking portfolio for the heterogeneous intermediary factor from
my model. Mimicking portfolios for representative intermediary factors in AEM and HKM
are unable to fully span the heterogeneous intermediary factor-mimicking portfolio (FMP):
I find large and highly significant alphas when I regress my model’s FMP on AEM’s and
HKM’s FMPs both individually and in bivariate regressions. This result corroborates my
earlier findings: the composition of the financial sector is an important source of risk and
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has pricing information beyond representative intermediary asset pricing factors.
My paper extends macroeconomic models with a financial sector (e.g., He and Krishna-
murthy (2012) and He and Krishnamurthy (2013), Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2014), and
Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010)) to a framework with heterogeneous intermediaries. This liter-
ature builds on financial accelerator models of Bernanke and Gertler (1989), Kiyotaki and
Moore (1997), and Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999) which emphasize the importance
of financial frictions and leverage for persistence and amplification of aggregate shocks.4
The literature traditionally modeled intermediaries as one representative sector. Such an
approach does not allow for the heterogeneity in financial intermediaries, documented in the
data, to play a role in equilibrium.5
A few recent papers focus on the importance of a heterogeneous financial sector. The
paper closest to this work is Ma (2017). In independent, contemporaneous work, he shows
that an SDF estimated from a model with intermediaries heterogeneous in the tightness of
their constraints exhibits higher cross-sectional R2 than AEM and HKM factors. In contrast
to this work, Ma (2017) focuses exclusively on explaining the cross-sectional variation of
asset returns. Moreover, unlike his model where financing constraints are always binding, I
study occasionally binding state-dependent leverage constraints. I also fully characterize the
whole dynamic system instead of simply a log-linearized representation around the steady
state in Ma (2017). Coimbra and Rey (2017) develop a model with intermediaries het-
erogeneous in their Value-at-Risk constraints and limited liability resulting in risk-shifting.
Gertler, Kiyotaki, and Prestipino (2016) extend Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010)’s framework
by incorporating a shadow banking sector alongside retail banks and allow the possibility of
runs. The latter papers do not study the asset pricing implications of heterogeneous inter-
mediaries. I contribute to this literature by showing that the composition of the financial
4See Brunnermeier, Eisenbach, and Sannikov (2012) for a survey of macro-based models with financial
frictions.
5A few other recent models with explicit roles for financial intermediaries include Danielsson, Shin, and
Zigrand (2012), Adrian and Shin (2014), Adrian and Boyarchenko (2015), Moreira and Savov (2017), and
Drechsler, Savov, and Schnabl (2018).
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sector has strong predictive power for excess returns of many assets and it is also priced in
the cross-section of equity and bond returns.
This chapter also contributes to the recent empirical intermediary asset pricing litera-
ture. As noted above, two recent papers, Adrian, Etula, and Muir (2014) and He, Kelly, and
Manela (2017), evaluate the explanatory power of models where representative intermedi-
aries face, respectively, debt and equity constraints for cross-sectional variations in expected
returns. They find opposite signs for the estimated price of risk (and thus conflicting cyclical
dynamics) for intermediary leverage. I reconcile these seemingly contradictory evidence in a
unifying general equilibrium framework where the financial sector is modeled as two sectors
heterogeneous in risk-bearing capacity facing margin constraints.
Finally, this work relates to the extensive literature on asset pricing implications of in-
vestor heterogeneity and portfolio constraints. Dumas (1989), Wang (1996), Bhamra and Up-
pal (2009), Bhamra and Uppal (2009), Longstaff and Wang (2012), Gaˆrleanu and Panageas
(2015), and Santos and Veronesi (2016) study equilibrium in frictionless economies with
two heterogeneous agents and different preference assumptions. Basak and Cuoco (1998),
Kogan, Makarov, and Uppal (2007), Gaˆrleanu and Pedersen (2011), Danielsson, Shin, and Zi-
grand (2012), He and Krishnamurthy (2012) and He and Krishnamurthy (2013), Chabakauri
(2013), and Rytchkov (2014) examine asset pricing implications of exogenous and endogenous
portfolio constraints in economies populated by two heterogeneous agents with one or many
assets where constrained agent have logarithmic or CRRA preferences. I use this general
framework to study the asset pricing implications of large flows within the intermediary sec-
tor. I present a general equilibrium model in an economy populated by three heterogeneous
agents with recursive preferences who face state-dependent borrowing constraints.
1.1 Motivating Evidence
Before presenting the theoretical framework, in this section, I provide motivating evidence on
heterogeneity of the intermediary sector. Empirical evidence from asset reallocations within
the financial sector recorded during the Great Recession seem puzzling through the lens of
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representative intermediary-based models.6 Depending on the type of frictions considered,
models with a representative financial sector can only describe intermediaries who are either
buyers or sellers of assets during a crisis, but not both, implying opposite cyclical dynam-
ics for intermediary leverage: countercyclical in models with equity constraints (He and
Krishnamurthy (2012) and He and Krishnamurthy (2013) and Brunnermeier and Sannikov
(2014)) or procyclical if intermediary faces a debt constraint (Brunnermeier and Pedersen
(2009) and Adrian and Shin (2014)). Intermediaries exhibit heterogeneous behavior in the
cyclical properties of their leverage. Figure 1.1a presents time-series of leverage for different
financial intermediaries: security brokers and dealers (BDs), and bank holding companies
of New York Fed’s primary dealers (BHCs), intermediaries recently studied in AEM, and
HKM, respectively. Broker-dealer’s (book) leverage is calculated from balance sheet data
in Table L.130 of the Financial Accounts of the United States (Flow of Funds) from the
Federal Reserve and is defined as the ratio total financial assets to total equity (total fi-
nancial assets minus total liabilities). BHC leverage is defined as the ratio of total market
assets (book debt plus market equity) to total market equity constructed for publicly-traded
holding companies of the New York Fed’s primary dealer counterparties using data from
CRSP/Compustat and Datastream. Over the period from the first quarter of 2008 to the
fourth quarter of 2009, which includes the Lehman bankruptcy in the fall of 2008, broker-
dealers reduced leverage by approximately 47% (from 35 to 19) while holding companies
increased leverage by approximately 72% (from 22 to 38) during the same period.7
We observe opposite cyclical leverage patterns for different financial intermediaries: BD
leverage is procyclical, while BHC leverage is countercyclical. Over the sample period from
6Evidence of intermediary heterogeneity during the crisis has also been recently documented in the liter-
ature. He, Khang, and Krishnamurthy (2010) and Begenau, Bigio, and Majerovitz (2017) document flows of
financial assets within the intermediary sector during the Great Recession and show that broker-dealers and
hedge funds reduced leverage by selling securitized assets to commercial banks who have access to stable de-
posits. Ang, Gorovyy, and Inwegen (2011) document that hedge funds decreased leverage prior to the onset
of the financial crisis while the leverage of banks and the financial sector continued to increase. Ben-David,
Franzoni, and Moussawi (2012) provide additional evidence of hedge fund deleveraging during the crisis.
7According to He, Khang, and Krishnamurthy (2010), book leverage of commercial banks rose from 10
to between 20 and 32 over the period from 2007Q4 to 2009Q1.
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1970Q1 to 2017Q4, shocks to broker-dealer leverage exhibit a positive correlation of 0.12
(t-stat of 1.82) to innovations in the real GDP, while BHC leverage shocks have a negative
correlation of −0.19 (t-stat of −2.62). Correlations with GDP innovations become stronger
post 2000 with coefficients of 0.37 (t-stat of 3.27) and−0.39 (t-stat of−3.56) for broker-dealer
and holding company leverage, respectively.8
In Figure 1.1b, I plot the quarterly change in total financial assets for security broker-
dealers and private depository institutions (commercial banks) from Tables L.130 and L.110
of the Flow of Funds, respectively. Over the period from the first quarter of 2008 to the
fourth quarter of 2009, broker-dealers, who mainly depend on collateralized repo financing,
massively reduced asset holdings by approximately $1.7 trillion (from $4.9 to $3.2 trillion),
while commercial banks, who have access to more stable deposit financing, increased total
asset by nearly $1 trillion (from $13.4 to $14.4 trillion). This evidence is consistent with
findings of He, Khang, and Krishnamurthy (2010) who document that during the 2008 crisis,
hedge funds and broker-dealers reduce holdings of securitized assets by approximately $800
billion and commercial banks increase holdings of these assets by approximately $550 billion.9
Models with representative intermediaries are unable to capture this heterogeneity within
the financial sector and study its implications for asset prices and the real economy. In the
next section, I present a general equilibrium model with heterogeneous intermediaries and
financial frictions that is consistent with opposite cyclical dynamics of leverage within the
financial sector. My model implies that a dealer deleveraging episode comparable to one
observed during the recent financial crisis, leads to an approximately 55% increase in the
8As discussed in HKM, observed opposite cyclical properties for leverage of different intermediaries above
are unlikely to be entirely attributed to the differences between book- and market-based values for calculating
BD and BHC leverage, respectively. To see this, I calculate holding company book leverage by simply
replacing market equity with book equity in the calculation above. I find that book and market BHC
leverage are in fact strongly positively correlated over the sample period (1970Q1 to 2017Q4) with correlation
coefficient of 0.64 (t-stat of 11.64). Also, both market and book leverage for BHCs are strongly negatively
correlated with book leverage of broker-dealers over the sample period with correlation coefficients of −0.50
(t-stat of −7.89) and −0.24 (t-stat of −3.47), respectively.
9From the fourth quarter of 2007 to the first quarter of 2009, the Federal Reserve and the GSEs increased
holdings of securitized assets by approximately $350 billion. See He, Khang, and Krishnamurthy (2010) for
more details.
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risk premia and a 5% increase in endogenous volatility. I then study model’s asset pricing
implications for time-series predictability and the cross-section of expected returns.
1.2 Model
In this section I present a general equilibrium model featuring heterogeneous intermediaries
and financial constraints. My model reconciles seemingly contradictory results for the sign
of price of intermediary leverage shocks from recent empirical evaluations of representative
intermediary-based models. The model nests key forces behind Brunnermeier and Pedersen
(2009) and He and Krishnamurthy (2012) with two main ingredients: (i) agents differ in
their attitudes toward risk, and (ii) different intermediaries face state-dependent leverage
constraints with varying degree of tightness, while equity issuance is ruled out by assumption.
I consider an endowment economy in continuous time populated by a continuum of
agents whose total mass is one. There are three types of agents: A,B, and C with recursive
preferences and different levels of risk aversion. To ensure the existence of a non-degenerate
stationary wealth distribution, I assume each agent faces an exogenous constant mortality
rate κ > 0. New agents are born at the same rate κ per unit of time with a fraction u¯ as
type A, a fraction v¯ as type B, and a fraction 1− u¯− v¯ as type C. So, the total population
is kept constant (normalized to one). In aggregate, the newborns inherit the wealth of their
deceased parents on a per capita basis. Gaˆrleanu and Panageas (2015) show that under
these conditions, the possibility of exit makes agents more impatient: Their effective time
preference is increased by κ.10
1.2.1 Endowment and Agents
The aggregate endowment Dt evolves according to
dDt
Dt
= µD dt+ σD dZt, (1.1)
10The only purpose of introducing the OLG framework and mortality risk is to make the model stationary.
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where µD and σD are constant parameters and Zt is a standard Brownian motion defined
on a fixed probability space (Ω,F , P ) and a filtration {Ft, t ≥ 0} of sub-σ-algebras of F
satisfying the usual conditions, as defined by Protter (2004).11 The shock dZt is the only
source of uncertainty in the model representing a permanent shock to the aggregate dividend.
I assume that the growth rate of the endowment is positive, µD − σ2D/2 > 0. Without loss
of generality I set D0 = 1. Similar to He and Krishnamurthy (2013) and Brunnermeier and
Sannikov (2014), I assume agents are unable to hedge the aggregate risk.12
To separate the effects of elasticity of intertemporal substitution (EIS) and risk aversion,
I assume all agents have stochastic differential utility as in Duffie and Epstein (1992), the
continuous-time analog of recursive preferences of Epstein and Zin (1989). In particular, an
agent of type i has the lifetime utility Ui,t at time t given by
Ui,t = Et
[∫ ∞
t
fi (Ci,s , Ui,s) ds
]
, (1.2)
where
fi(Ci,t, Ui,t) =
(
1− γi
1− 1/ψi
)
Ui,t
( Ci,t
[(1− γi)Ui,t]1/(1−γi)
)1−1/ψi
− (ρ+ κ)
 . (1.3)
Function fi aggregates over current consumption Ci,t and future utility Ui,t. Parameters
γi and ψi denote agent i’s coefficient of relative risk aversion and EIS, respectively. These
preferences reduce to standard power utility when ψi = 1/γi. All agents are assumed to have
a common subjective discount factor ρ increased by κ as mentioned above.
Agents are heterogeneous in their attitudes toward risk γi. A agents are the most risk
tolerant and C agents are the most risk averse. B agents are more risk tolerant than C types:
γA < γB < γC . I think of A agents representing shadow banks (broker-dealers, hedge funds,
etc.) and B agents as traditional banks, and C agents representing the household sector.
11The filtration represents the resolution over time of information commonly available to investors.
12Di Tella (2017) provides a moral hazard framework where aggregate uncertainty shocks lead to balance
sheet recessions even though agents can write complete contracts on the aggregate state of the economy.
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In equilibrium A and B will have levered balance sheets by borrowing from C agents. The
financial sector (A and B agents) face time-varying margin constraints, which I discuss later
in detail.
1.2.2 Financial Markets and Budget Constraints
All agents can trade a risky asset in fixed supply (normalized to one) and an instantaneous
(from t to t+ dt) risk-free bond in zero net supply which pays the endogenously-determined
interest rate rt. The risky asset is a claim on the aggregate endowment {Dt}, so, the total
return on the risky claim is
dRt =
dPt +Dt dt
Pt
≡ µt dt+ σt dZt, (1.4)
where Pt is the price of the risky claim, µt is its expected return, and σt is its volatility, all
determined in equilibrium. I use the consumption good as the numeraire. I also denote the
dividend-price ratio of the risky asset by Ft = Dt/Pt.
Let Wi,t denote agent i’s wealth and assume Wi,0 > 0 for i ∈ {A,B,C}.13 Let wis be the
share of agent i’s wealth invested in the endowment claim. Then agent i’s financial wealth
evolves according to the following standard dynamic budget constraint
dWi,t
Wi,t
=
(
rt + w
i
s,t (µt − rt)− ci,t
)
dt+ wis,tσtdZt, (1.5)
where ci ≡ Ci/Wi is agent i’s consumption-wealth ratio. The agent earns the risk-free rate,
earns the risk premium on the risky asset, and pays for consumption. The intermediary
leverage is defined as the ratio of asset over equity. Thus, when portfolios weights wAs or w
B
s
exceeds one, the intermediaries operate with leverage by raising debt from households C.
13Throughout the paper, I use terms net worth and equity interchangeably.
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1.2.3 Financial Constraints
I assume agent face a occasionally binding state-dependent margin constraint: At each
moment in time, borrowers are restricted on how much leverage they can use on their balance
sheets. In other words, lenders impose margin requirements to protect themselves against
losses caused by adverse price movements.14Margins are set to shield lenders against adverse
price movements and are widely used in the financial sector to fund levered balance sheets.
They have also been previously studied in the asset pricing literature (see Brunnermeier and
Pedersen (2009), Gaˆrleanu and Pedersen (2011), Chabakauri (2013), and Rytchkov (2014)
for some recent examples).
The tightness of the margin constraint can be determined by the regulators (e.g. Federal
Reserve Regulation T) or by security broker-dealers (e.g. overcollaterlization of repos by a
hedge fund’s prime brokerage).
At any time t, I assume margin constraints restricts agent i’s portfolio weight wis to be
below a certain state-dependent threshold θ¯t
wis,t ≤ θ¯t, (1.6)
where, θ¯t determines the form of margin constraints, which is linked to endogenously-
determined equilibrium objects (e.g. volatility of risk asset returns). Since equilibrium
objects also depend on the state of the economy, margin requirements are state-dependent
as well.
In particular, I assume margin requirements depend on the volatility of the risky asset
return σt, and have the following functional form
θ¯t = m¯
(
1
m¯ασt
)ν
, (1.7)
14In this chapter I abstract from the question of why the intermediaries face dynamic margin constraint
and do not model the contracting problem among agents. Adrian and Shin (2014) provide a microfoundation
for the Value-at-Risk constraint using a moral hazard problem in a static partial equilibrium setting.
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where ν, α, and m¯ are parameters that determine the type and tightness of the constraint,
respectively. When ν = 0, agents face a constant margin requirement: θ¯ = m¯. When
ν = 1, equation (1.7) resembles a Value-at-Risk rule.15 In the latter case, the level of margin
constraint is endogenous since it is inversely linked to the return volatility, which is an
equilibrium object.16
1.2.4 Agents’ Optimization Problems
Since agents are identical within each type and have homothetic preferences, I consider the
problem faced by a representative agent i for i ∈ {A,B,C}. Each agent solves a standard
Merton (1973) dynamic portfolio choice problem subject to margin constraints: agent i
starts with initial wealth Wi,0 > 0, decides how much to consume as a fraction of her wealth,
ci,t, and what fraction of her net worth to invest in risky asset, w
i
s,t, in order to maximize
her value function in (1.2), subject to the dynamic budget constraint (1.5) and endogenous
margin constraints (1.6). So, agent i’s problem is
Vi,t = max
(ci≥0,wis)
Ui,t
s.t.: dynamic budget constraint (1.5) and margin constraint (1.6) (1.8)
and a solvency constraint Wi,t ≥ 0.
1.2.5 Equilibrium
The definition of the competitive equilibrium is standard and is given below.
15Value-at-Risk constraints aim at limiting downside risk and maintaining an equity cushion large enough
so that the default probability is kept below some benchmark level. They are common for banks and other
leveraged financial institutions and are embedded in Basel II and Basel III regulatory frameworks. See
Danielsson, Shin, and Zigrand (2012) and Adrian and Shin (2014) for recent examples.
16In equilibrium, more risk averse C agents lend to levered intermediaries. Thus, given the my calibration,
the constraint can potentially bind only for A and B types. As mentioned above, in my calibration, γA and
γB are chosen such that the constraint only (occasionally) binds for A intermediaries.
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Definition 1. A competitive equilibrium is the set of aggregate stochastic processes adapted
to the filtration generated by Zt: the price of claim on the aggregate endowment P , and the
risk-free interest rate r; and a set of stochastic processes for each agent i: net worth Wi,
consumption Ci, and stock holdings w
i
s; such that:
i. Given the aggregate stochastic processes (Pt, rt), choices
(
Ci,t, w
i
s,t
)
solve agent i’s opti-
mization problem in (1.8).
ii. Markets clear
CA,t + CB,t + CC,t = Dt (goods market) (1.9)
wAs,tWA,t + w
B
s,tWB,t + w
C
s,tWC,t = Pt (stock market) (1.10)
The bond market clears by Walras’ law. Note that bond market clearing implies that the
aggregate wealth in the economy is equal to the value of the endowment claim, i.e.
WA,t +WB,t +WC,t = Pt .
1.3 Model Solution
In order to solve the model, I need to determine how prices, portfolio choices, and consump-
tion processes for all agents depend on the historical paths of the aggregate shock Zt. The
equilibrium can be characterized in a recursive formulation where all equilibrium objects are
functions of two endogenous state variables, defined below. The computation of equilibrium
requires solving the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) partial differential equations of A,B,
and C agents simultaneously. Unfortunately, the system of nonlinear PDEs does not admit a
closed-form solution and I have to rely on numerical techniques. In this section, I first define
my model’s two endogenous state variables and derive their dynamics. I then characterize
agents’ value functions and provide some intuition for their optimal portfolio and consump-
tion policy functions. I define a recursive Markov equilibrium and finally briefly discuss the
numerical algorithm used to solve the PDEs.
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1.3.1 Endogenous State Variables
Because Epstein-Zin preferences are homothetic, the optimal control variables for an agent
are all linear in her wealth. The linear property allows me to simplify the endogenous state
space, from an infinite-dimensional into a two-dimensional space. More precisely, I only
need to keep track of the share of aggregate wealth that belongs to types A and B (the
financial sector), as well as, the wealth share of A agents in the financial sector. I can derive
equilibrium conditions as functions of the following endogenous state variables:
xt ≡ WA,t +WB,t
Pt
, yt ≡ WA,t
WA,t +WB,t
. (1.11)
Since the risk-free asset is in zero net supply, the aggregate wealth in the economy is equal to
the risky asset price Pt. The state variable x is the share of aggregate wealth that belongs to
the financial sector (i.e. A and B agents), and y is the type A intermediaries’ wealth share
as a fraction of the total financial sector.17
The state variable x (total wealth share of the financial sector in the economy), is the
key state variable in recent intermediary asset pricing models with a representative financial
sector (see He and Krishnamurthy (2013), Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2014), and Gertler
and Kiyotaki (2010), for example). If only intermediaries can invest in the risky asset, state
variable x represents the equity capital ratio of the financial sector.18 HKM show shocks to
capital ratio of intermediaries price the cross-section of expected return with a positive price
of risk: intermediary’s marginal value of wealth rises when capital ratio x falls.
State variable y, on the other hand, captures the wealth distribution within the interme-
diary sector. It represents heterogeneity among intermediaries in the sense that it would not
be present in models with a representative financial sector. Distribution of wealth among dif-
ferent intermediaries clearly plays no role in the models with a representative financial sector.
17Note that the definitions in equation (1.11) ensure that the domain of both state variables is [0, 1].
18In this case, because riskless bonds are in zero net supply and the risky asset is assumed to be in unit
supply, total assets of the intermediary sector is equal to the risky asset price P .
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In contrast, in Section 1.6, I show that the distribution of wealth between broker-dealers and
bank holding companies (proxies for A and B agents, respectively) can negatively forecasts
future returns for many asset classes. I also demonstrate that shocks to y are a priced risk
factor in the cross-section of equity and bond returns with a positive estimated price of risk.
I restrict my attention to a Markov equilibrium (defined below) in the state space (x, y) ∈
[0, 1] × [0, 1], where all processes are functions of (xt, yt) only. Proposition 1, characterizes
the dynamics of the two endogenous state variables (x, y).
Proposition 1. The laws of motion for endogenous state variables x and y are given by
dxt = κ (x¯− xt) dt+ xt (µx,t dt+ σx,t dZt) , (1.12)
dyt = κ (y¯ − yt) dt+ yt(1− yt) (µy,t dt+ σy,t dZt) (1.13)
where x¯ = u¯+ v¯ and y¯ = u¯/(u¯+ v¯).
i. The drifts of x and y are given by
µx =
[
ywAs + (1− y)wBs − 1
]
(µ− r − σ2)− ycA − (1− y)cB + F (1.14)
µy =
(
wAs − wBs
)
(µ− r)− cA + cB −
[
ywAs + (1− y)wBs
] (
wAs − wBs
)
σ2 (1.15)
ii. The diffusions of x and y are given by
σx =
[
ywAs + (1− y)wBs − 1
]
σ (1.16)
σy =
(
wAs − wBs
)
σ (1.17)
Proof. See Appendix 1.8.
Given the dividend-price ratio F , the return process for the endowment claim in equa-
tion (1.4) can be rewritten as
dR =
d(D/F )
D/F
+ F dt = µ dt+ σ dZ,
where time subscripts are dropped for notational simplification.
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Using Ito’s lemma, the expected return and volatility of the risky asset will be
µ = µD + F − Fx
F
[κ(x¯− x) + x(µx + σDσx)]− Fy
F
[κ(y¯ − y) + y(1− y)(µy + σDσy)]
+
[(
Fx
F
)2
− 1
2
Fxx
F
]
x2σ2x +
[(
Fy
F
)2
− 1
2
Fyy
F
]
y2(1− y)2σ2y
+
[
2
(
Fx
F
)(
Fy
F
)
− Fxy
F
]
xy(1− y)σxσy (1.18)
σ = σD − Fx
F
xσx − Fy
F
y(1− y)σy (1.19)
Note that from (1.19), a part of the risk from holding the risky asset is fundamental, σD dZt,
and a part is endogenous,
(
−Fx
F
x σx − FyF y(1− y)σy
)
dZt. Equation (1.19) also implies that
the volatility of returns σ exceeds the fundamental volatility σD when price-dividend ratio,
1/F , and the state variables x and y are procyclical, i.e. Fx > 0, Fy > 0, σx > 0, and σy > 0,
which is the case in equilibrium.
The following proposition provides the boundary conditions that the state variable dif-
fusions satisfy.
Proposition 2. The diffusion for state variables (xt, yt) satisfy the following boundary con-
ditions:
lim
x→0
x σx,t = lim
x→1
x σx,t = 0, ∀y ∈ [0, 1]
lim
y→0
y(1− y)σy,t = lim
y→1
y(1− y)σy,t = 0, ∀x ∈ [0, 1]
Proof. See Appendix 1.8.
These boundary conditions will be used later to solve agents’ HJB equations discussed
below.
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1.3.2 Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman Equations
The recursive formulation of agent i’s optimization problem is given by the following HJB
equation
0 = max
ci,wis
fi(ciWi, Vi(Wi, x, y))dt+ Et [dVi(Wi, x, y)] , (1.20)
where Vi is agent i’s value function. With homothetic preferences, the value functions have
the power form. The Following proposition characterizes agents’ value functions.
Proposition 3. The value function of agent i ∈ {A,B,C} has the form
Vi(W,x, y) =
W 1−γii
1− γi Ji(x, y)
1−γi
1−ψi , (1.21)
where Ji is agent i’s consumption-wealth ratio, ci = Ji.
Furthermore, Ji solves the following second-order partial differential equation (PDE)
ρ+ κ =
1
ψi
Ji +
(
1− 1
ψi
)[
r + wis(µ− r)−
γi
2
(
wis
)2
σ2
]
− 1
ψi
{
Ji,x
Ji
[κ(x¯− x) + xµx] + Ji,y
Ji
[κ(y¯ − y) + y(1− y)µy]
+(1− γi)
(
Ji,x
Ji
xσx +
Ji,y
Ji
y(1− y)σy
)
wisσ
}
− 1
2ψi
[(
ψi − γi
1− ψi
)(
Ji,x
Ji
xσx +
Ji,y
Ji
y(1− y)µy
)2
+
Ji,xx
Ji
x2σ2x
+2
Ji,xy
Ji
xy(1− y)σxσy + Ji,yy
Ji
y2(1− y)2σ2y
]
(1.22)
Proof. See Appendix 1.8.
Functions Ji capture agent i’s investment opportunity set. In particular, note that from
(1.21) if
1− γi
1− ψi > 0 (which holds in my calibration), marginal utility of wealth is increasing
in Ji.
The first-order conditions of agent’s recursive problem gives the optimal consumption
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and portfolio choice
ci =
Ci
Wi
= Ji (1.23)
wi,∗s =
µ− r
γi σ2
+
1
γi
(
1− γi
1− ψi
)(
Ji,x
Ji
x
σx
σ
+
Ji,y
Ji
y(1− y)σy
σ
)
(1.24)
The optimal unconstrained portfolio wi,∗s is the standard ICAPM result of Merton (1973):
the first term in (1.24) is the myopic demand of a one-period mean-variance investor and
the second term is the hedging demand capturing the variations in the agent’s investment
opportunity set. The optimal consumption-wealth ratio in (1.23) comes from the standard
envelope condition.
So, from the optimal portfolio in the absence of constraints in (1.24) and the margin
constraint in equation (1.6), the optimal portfolio is
wis,t = min
(
θ¯t, w
i,∗
s,t
)
, (1.25)
where the leverage upper bound θ¯t is defined in (1.7).
1.3.3 Recursive Markov Equilibrium
I derive a Markov equilibrium in state variables xt and yt. That is, I look for an equilibrium
where all equilibrium objects (prices, consumption, and portfolio choices) can be written as
functions of these two state variables. Next I define the Markov equilibrium in state space
(x, y).
Definition 2. A Markov equilibrium in state variables (xt, yt) is the set of functions: marginal
value of wealth Ji(x, y), dividend-price ratio F (x, y), real interest rate r(x, y) and policy func-
tions ci(x, y), w
i
s(x, y) for i ∈ {A,B,C}, and laws of motion for endogenous state variables
µx(x, y), µy(x, y) and σx(x, y), σy(x, y) such that
i. marginal value of wealth Ji solves agent i’s HJB equation, and ci and w
i
s are correspond-
ing policy functions, taking F, r and laws of motion for x and y as given.
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ii. Markets for consumption good and risky asset clear
xy cA + x(1− y) cB + (1− x) cC = F (goods market) (1.26)
xy wAs + x(1− y)wBs + (1− x)wCs = 1 (stock market) (1.27)
iii. The laws of motion for x and y satisfy (1.14)–(1.17).
1.3.4 Numerical Solution
The computation of equilibrium requires solving the HJB equations of the three types of
agents simultaneously. Functions JA(x, y), JB(x, y), and JC(x, y) can be found by solving a
system of second-order partial differential equations (PDEs) in (x, y). To do so, all equilib-
rium objects (e.g. F, σ, µ, σx, µx, σy, µy, etc.) need to be expressed in terms of functions Ji
and their derivative. Unfortunately, the system of nonlinear differential equations does not
admit a closed-form solution and I have to rely on numerical techniques. This is particu-
larly challenging in the presence of model’s two endogenous state variables. I use projection
methods, specifically orthogonal collocation using Chebyshev polynomials (Judd (1992) and
Judd (1998)), to solve for equilibrium. Unlike a log-linearized representation around the
steady state, this method provides a global solution and a full characterization of the whole
dynamic system. In Appendix 1.9, I explain the numerical procedure in detail.
1.4 Calibration and Parameters Choices
Table 1.1 lists the parameter choices used in calibrating the model. I calibrate parameters
to quarterly data.
I choose the drift and diffusion of the aggregate endowment (µD and σD) to match the
mean and volatility of aggregate U.S. consumption data. To match the ratio of broker-dealer
leverage (A intermediaries) to that of banks (B intermediaries), I set the risk aversions of
A, B, and C agents to 2.5, 5.5, and 15, respectively.19 I chose a common value of EIS for all
19From the Flow of Funds data, in my sample period (1970Q1-2017Q4), the average leverage of broker-
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agent types and set ψi = 1.5.
20 The values of γi and ψi imply agent i’s preference for the
early resolution of uncertainty and have been extensively used in the asset pricing literature
to address a number of asset pricing puzzles.21 A value of EIS greater than one implies a
decline in asset prices when the effective risk aversion in the economy increases. I set exit
rate κ to 0.0154 which implies that agents on average live for 65 years which is consistent
with the calibration in Gaˆrleanu and Panageas (2015). The subjective discount rate ρ is set
to 0.001 to achieve reasonable values for the real interest rates of between 2–3% annually.
The parameter m¯ in equation (1.7) determines the constant margin requirements (when
ν = 0), and I set m¯ = 4. When ν = 1, equation (1.7) resembles a Value-at-Risk constraint.
In this case, parameter α determines the tightness of the constraint. I set α = 10 which is
approximately equal to the one-month Value-at-Risk at the 99% level.
1.5 Model Results
In this section, I first present additional properties of the equilibrium with margin constraints
and compare them with the unconstrained economy with the same fundamentals and degree
of heterogeneity among agents. The economy with margin constraints simultaneously ex-
hibits higher risk premium and lower risk-free rate and volatility, compared to the frictionless
benchmark. Although some of these effects have been previously documented in the liter-
ature, my analysis extends these results to an economy with three agents (households and
two heterogeneous intermediaries) and recursive preferences.22 The equilibrium with three
dealers is approximately 2.2 times higher than that of banks, roughly what I get in the model when state
variables are at their unconditional means.
20Bansal and Yaron (2004) and Bansal, Kiku, and Yaron (2012) both use EIS value of 1.5 in their calibra-
tions.
21See, for example, Bansal and Yaron (2004), Hansen, Heaton, and Li (2008), and Bansal and Shalias-
tovich (2013) for resolution of equity premium, value premium, and uncovered interest rate parity puzzles,
respectively.
22For example, Rytchkov (2014) adds margin constraints to an endowment economy with two heteroge-
neous agents and CRRA preferences (similar to the models in Longstaff and Wang (2012) and Bhamra and
Uppal (2014)) to show binding constraints reduce return volatility and risk-free rate, but increase expected
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heterogeneous agents and two endogenous state variables is considerably more challenging
to solve numerically.
In Section 1.5.2, I show, consistent with empirical evidence, the model can generate
different cyclical dynamics for different intermediaries (i.e. A and B agent). Implications
of the heterogeneity in the financial sector (as captured by the wealth distribution among
intermediaries) for variation is risk premia beyond are discussed in Section 1.5.3. Section
1.5.4 studies the impact of a dealer deleveraging episode comparable to the one observed
during the recent financial crisis, for risk premia and volatility. Finally, in Section 1.5.6,
I show how the model reconciles seemingly contradictory evidence for the sign of price of
intermediary leverage shocks in AEM and HKM.
1.5.1 Constrained versus Unconstrained Economy
Unconstrained Benchmark
As a benchmark, I first consider an economy without margin constraints, that is θ¯(xt, yt)→
∞. In the absence of constraints, investors face complete markets and their Euler equa-
tions hold with equality in equilibrium. Without constraint, the economy is very similar to
Gaˆrleanu and Panageas (2015) but with three heterogeneous agents. It can be shown that
without heterogeneity in risk tolerance, the interest rate, consumption-wealth ratio of each
agent (Ji’s), price-dividend ratio, and the price of risk are constant.
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Figures 1.2 presents various equilibrium variables (price-dividend ratio 1/F , volatility
of the risky asset return σ, Sharpe ratio (µ − r)/σ, and risk premium on the endowment
claim µ − r) as a function of the state variable x while the state variable y is fixed at 0.56
(its stochastic steady state). In both figures solid blue lines correspond to the frictionless
economy. Along the horizontal axis in each panel is the state variable xt (the wealth share
of types A and B), which ranges from 0 to 1.
returns and Sharpe ratio.
23These are very general results. For more details, see Gaˆrleanu and Panageas (2015), Rytchkov (2014),
and Longstaff and Wang (2012), for examples.
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The top right panel of Figure 1.2 shows the volatility of returns. Even though fundamental
volatility is constant (σD = 3.5% in my calibration), return volatility is time varying and it
exceeds fundamental volatility in a hump-shaped pattern. As mentioned above and shown
in equation (1.19), a part of the risk from holding the risky asset is fundamental and a part
is endogenous. From equation (1.11), wealth shares of agents A,B, and C in the aggregate
economy are equal to x y, x(1 − y) and 1 − x, respectively. Thus, when (x, y) = (1, 1),
(x, y) = (1, 0), or (x = 0,∀y), the economy is populated by one type of agent (A,B, and
C, respectively) and the volatility of the endowment claim coincides with the fundamental
volatility σD. This can be validated from three-dimensional plots in Figure 1.13 in the
Appendix. The Sharpe ratio and expected excess return µ − r both show countercyclical
behavior as expected: higher risk premium and price of risk during distressed states when
the intermediary sector is undercapitalized (low-x states) and/or broker-dealers deleverage
(when y is low) are low.
The bottom right panel of Figure 1.2 shows that the risk premium largely tracks the
Sharpe ratio. Note that this is the risk premium on a claim to the aggregate endowment,
which has a relatively low volatility (3.5% in the baseline calibration). By comparison, equity
volatility is around 16%. Therefore, the equity premium implied by the model is about five
to six times larger than that of the endowment claim, putting it in the range of standard
estimates in the literature.
When the EIS exceeds one, the substitution effect dominates the income effect so that
greater risk aversion reduces asset demand and valuations fall. In this case the rise in the
risk premium exceeds the fall in the real rate. In contrast, if the EIS is less than one, greater
risk aversion counter-intuitively causes the valuations of risky assets to increase.
Figure 1.3 shows optimal portfolio weights in the risky asset for all three agents. For the
most risk tolerant type A investors it always exceeds one and for the most risk averse type
C agents it is always less than one. B’s optimal portfolio is greater than one for most of
the state space. Thus, without constraints, financial intermediaries (type A and B agents)
borrow from type C investors (households) to take a levered positions in the endowment
claim. As the wealth share of the financial sector get bigger and A agents have more relative
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wealth in the financial sector, they borrow from traditional banks (B agents) as well.
Importantly, in the absence of constraints, the optimal leverage of A and B investors
are both countercyclical : They are higher in bad states when investment opportunities are
more attractive, which is counterfactual. This means when margin constraints are imposed
to limit leverage, they are more likely to bind in high marginal utility states.
The relationship between portfolio weights and the wealth shares of the financial sector
(x) and wealth share of broker-dealers in the financial sector (y) in Figure 1.3 is the result of
market clearing for the risky asset in equation (1.27). When x is close to zero or both x and
y are close to one, a single type of agent (type C in the first case and type A in the second
case) dominates the economy, which reduces the opportunity for risk sharing. In the absence
of constraints, agents of the dominant type must hold all their wealth in the risky asset,
whereas agents of the vanishing type can be satisfied with only a small amount of borrowing
or lending. Thus, when x is near zero, households (C agents) set prices and intermediaries
(A and B types) take high leverage.
Equilibrium with Dynamic Margin Constraints
To study the impact of financial constraints on the equilibrium, I solve the model with the
same fundamentals and heterogeneity as before, but now I assume investors face margin
requirements in the form given in equation (1.7). As noted earlier, margin constraints are
occasionally binding and state-dependent. Although all agents face the margin constraints
in their optimization problems, in my calibration, the wedge between risk aversions γA and
γB is such that constraints occasionally bind only for the most risk tolerant A types and
more risk averse agents (i.e. types B and C) do not face binding leverage constraints, in
equilibrium.24
Consistent with Kogan, Makarov, and Uppal (2007) and Rytchkov (2014), the economy
with margin constraints simultaneously exhibits higher risk premium and Sharpe Ratio and
24The equilibrium will be qualitatively similar if we assume the least risk averse A intermediaries face
tighter margin constraints than more risk averse B types.
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lower risk-free rate and volatility, compared to the frictionless benchmark.25
I focus on two cases: (i) a constant margin constraint with θ¯t = m¯ (ν = 0 in equation 1.7),
and (ii) the case where type A agents face endogenous time-varying constraints (ν = 1) in
the form θ¯t = 1/(ασt), where parameter α determines the tightness of the constraint. In
the second case, margin requirements are determined by a Value-at-Risk-type rule and the
level of margins is endogenous because it is (inversely) related to the return volatility, an
equilibrium object.
Figures 1.2 and 1.3 present various objects for equilibria with constant (dash-dotted
purple line) and state-dependent Value-at-Risk-type (dashed red line) margin constraints.
There are few important observations from these figures. First, the impact of both types
of constraints are qualitatively similar and the only difference is the magnitude. With the
choice of parameters presented in Table 1.1, the time-varying margins are more restrictive
and the effects are stronger with ν = 1 in equation (1.7).
The top left panel of Figure 1.2 shows the impact of margin constraints on the price-
dividend ratio. In my calibration, margin constraints do not substantially decrease asset’s
valuation ratio when they bind, reducing the price-dividend ratio by less than 1% at steady
state relative to the complete-market benchmark.
The top right panel of Figure 1.2 plots the return volatility σ. The impact of constraints
on volatility is unambiguous: portfolio constraints reduce the volatility of the risky asset
return relative to the unconstrained economy. Also the volatility decreases in states where the
constraint actually binds, although the point at which the constraint starts to bind depends
on the form and severity of the constraint. The intuition behind this effect is as follows.
In equilibrium, less risk averse A and B investors (the financial sector) borrow from more
risk averse households and operate with leverage. It is well established in the macro-finance
literature that leverage makes returns more volatile than the fundamental volatility: levered
25Both papers study a two-agent economy with CRRA preferences, whereas my model has three hetero-
geneous agents with recursive preferences and two endogenous state variables which is considerably more
challenging to solve.
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balance sheets amplify an aggregate shock to dividends.26 Binding margin constraints reduce
dynamic risk sharing and leverage in equilibrium, thereby reducing the return volatility. In
my calibration, binding dynamic margin constraints results in the reduction of the return
volatility by approximately 6% at model’s stochastic steady state.
The bottom panels of Figure 1.2 demonstrate that portfolio constraints increase the
Sharpe ratio and risk premium of the endowment claim. This is again a general effect and
does not depend on the form of the constraints. The intuition is straightforward: because
the leverage of the risk tolerant agent (A type) is bounded in the part of the state space
where the margin constraints bind, to clear the market, the more risk averse investors (B and
C types) are forced to take on a larger portion of the risky asset that they would without
constraints. To induce them to buy more, the risk premium should increase. Following
negative risky asset returns, margin constraints bind and broker-dealers (A types) are forced
to sell assets. As a result, to clear the market, the expected returns must increase enough
to entice more risk averse agents to take on a larger supply of the risky asset than before
the shock. Since banks (B types) are not facing binding constraints, as discussed above,
they increase leverage following a negative shock. Thus the model can qualitatively match
the empirical evidence on opposite cyclical patterns of intermediary leverage in the financial
sector documented in Figure 1.1a. At model’s stochastic steady state, binding margin time-
varying constraints causes the Sharpe ratio and risk premium to rise by approximately 39%
and 36%, respectively.
Figure 1.3 also shows the effect of margin constraints on optimal portfolio weights. As
explained above, because A’s leverage is countercyclical in the unconstrained economy, the
margin constraints will bind in states where x and y are low. In the model with margin
constraints, type A agents operate with leverage in all states of the economy, however when
margin constraints bind, leverage is restricted by θ¯t. In other words, the presence of binding
leverage constraints makes broker-dealers’ leverage countercyclical : they are forced to sell
assets and delever in bad states of the economy where constraints bind. To clear the risky
26See Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999), and Brunnermeier and Sannikov
(2014), for example.
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asset market, both B and C investors need to absorb this additional supply and increase
their portfolio weights as we see from dashed and dotted lines in the top right and bottom
left panels of Figure 1.3.
Finally, the middle right panel of Figure 1.3 also shows that margin constraints (re-
gardless of the form) reduce the risk-free rate. This result is also intuitive. In the absence
of constraints, A and B investors operate with leverage by borrowing from type Cs. The
upper bound for leverage for type As reduces the demand for credit, thus lowering the risk-
free rate. In my calibration, when margin constraint binds, the risk-free rate decreases by
approximately 8% in the stochastic steady state (xss, yss) = (0.36, 0.56).
Figure 1.4 illustrates the evolution of model’s two endogenous state variables x and y
in the constrained and frictionless economies. The drift of xt(yt) is positive for low levels
and becomes negative for high values of xt(yt). The points where the drift crosses zero is
the stochastic steady state of the endogenous state variable, the point of attraction of the
system in the absence of shocks. Importantly, from the right panels in Figure 1.4, notice
that the diffusion terms σx and σy are always positive. This implies that following a negative
aggregate shock, both state variables decline, i.e. x and y both exhibit procyclical dynamics
in the model. In Section 1.6.1 below, I verify this also holds in the data. As shown in
Proposition 2, at the boundary points of the state space (x = 0, x = 1, y = 0, and y = 1),
the diffusion of state variables x and y are zero. This can be verified from the top- and
bottom-right panels of Figure 1.4.
The left panels of Figure 1.4 also illustrate that portfolio constraints of both types reduce
the volatility of the state variables. Because the impact of the constraints on the sensitivity
of the price-dividend ratio to the state variables is very small (as shown in the top left panel
of Figure 1.2), a decrease in σx and σy translates into a decrease in the return volatility σ
as presented in the top-right panel of Figure 1.2 (this follows directly from equation (1.19)).
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1.5.2 Cyclical Properties of Intermediary Leverage
Countercyclical Holding Company and Financial Sector leverage, Procyclical
leverage for Broker-Dealers
In this section, I show that the model is able to generate leverage patterns for different in-
termediaries that are consistent with the empirical evidence presented earlier. As mentioned
above and illustrated in Figure 1.3, in the absence of margin constraints, broker-dealers
and bank holding companies both exhibit countercyclical leverage: their optimal leverage is
higher in bad states. However, when broker-dealers face state-dependent margin constraints
inversely dependent on return volatility, their leverage exhibit an (almost) opposite cyclical
behavior. Since return volatility is hump-shaped (see the top right panel of Figure 1.2),
margin constraints cause A type’s leverage to be ∪-shaped when constraints bind. When
the constraints are sufficiently tight, shadow bank leverage is procyclical, consistent with the
empirical evidence from broker-dealers leverage presented in Figure 1.1a (the solid blue line)
and also documented in AEM.
Leverage of the financial sector (types A and B in the model), wFSs , is defined as the
share of sector’s wealth held in the risky assets:
wFSs =
wAsWA + w
B
s WB
WA +WB
= ywAs + (1− y)wBs (1.28)
where state variable y = WA/(WA + WB) is the wealth share of A types in the financial
sector as defined in equation (1.11). We see that the financial sector leverage is the weighted
average of A and B types’ optimal leverage with a time-varying weight equal to the state
variable y ∈ [0, 1]: the wealth share of broker-dealers (A types) in the financial sector.
The left panel of Figure 1.5 presents financial sector’s leverage in the unconstrained
equilibrium and in the model with endogenous margin constraints. As discussed above,
margin constraints reduce financial sector’s leverage when they bind: binding constraints
reduce A type’s leverage causing the return volatility to decrease relative to the frictionless
benchmark.
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The right panel of Figure 1.5 presents intermediary leverage in the equilibrium with
a Value-at-Risk-type state-dependent margin constraint. In the model with margin con-
straints, financial sector and bank holding companies exhibit countercyclical leverage, while
broker-dealers could have procyclical leverage when constraints bind. This is again consistent
with the evidence presented in Figure 1.1a (dashed red line for holding company leverage
and solid blue line for broker-dealer leverage) and also recently documented in the empirical
intermediary asset pricing literature in AEM and HKM.
1.5.3 Heterogeneous versus Representative Intermediaries
Since the aggregate endowment in equation (1.1) is i.i.d. with constant volatility, variation
in risk premia is only due to wealth distributions and intermediation frictions captured by
state variables x and y. State variable x, representing the wealth share of the total financial
sector in the economy, is the main determinant of time-varying risk premia in representative
intermediary models. In my model with a heterogeneous financial sector, however, the
wealth distribution among intermediaries (captured by state variable y) also contributes to
the variation in risk premia. In this section, I answer the following question: What fraction
of the variation in risk premia can be attributed to the state variable y, a measure of the
composition of the financial sector?
To answer this question and investigate the role of heterogeneity in the financial sector,
I compare the main results of the three-sector model with the ones from an economy with
identical fundamentals but two heterogeneous agents instead: a household sector (C types
identical to the main model) and a representative intermediary sector (I), where I agents
face endogenous margin constraints as in the original model (equation 1.7 with ν = 1).
Most of the parameters in the two-agent representative intermediary model are identical
to the ones in the main model listed in Table 1.1: Household’s risk aversion γC = 15, EIS
for household and the representative intermediary ψC = ψI = 1.2, rate of time preference
ρ = .001, growth rate and volatility of the aggregate endowment µD = .022, σD = .035, and
agents birth and death rates κ = .0154 (exactly as in the original three-sector model). I set
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risk aversion of the representative intermediary sector to γI = 3.3: the wealth-weighted risk
aversion of the financial sector (A and B investors) in the main model (with heterogeneous
intermediaries) evaluated at the stochastic steady state for the two state variables.27 Pop-
ulation share of the representative intermediary sector is set to x¯ = .12: sum of population
shares of two intermediary sectors in the main model, u¯ and v¯ from Table 1.1. Note that
with a representative intermediary, there is only one endogenous state variable x: the wealth
share of the intermediary sector.28
I simulate representative- and heterogeneous-intermediary models for 3,000 quarters
20,000 times and examine the distribution of risk premium volatility.29 As expected, the
model with heterogeneous intermediaries exhibits more variation in risk premia than the
one with a representative financial sector. Since the aggregate intermediary sectors in both
models are (almost) identical, any excess variation in risk premia in the heterogeneous inter-
mediary model has to be due to state variable y. In my calibration, approximately 20% of
the variation in risk premia can be attributed to heterogeneity in the financial sector (state
variable y).30 Therefore, failing to account for heterogeneity among intermediaries can lead
to missing a substantial portion of the variation in risk premia.
27The wealth-weighted risk aversion of the intermediary sector in main three-agent model is γI =(
y
γA
+ 1−yγB
)−1
. Using values for γA = 2.5 and γB = 5.5 from Table 1.1, at the stochastic steady state
yss = 0.56, we get γI,ss = 3.3.
28The wealth share of the financial sector is the key state variable in existing models with a representative
intermediary sector (see He and Krishnamurthy (2013), Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2014), Di Tella (2017),
and Drechsler, Savov, and Schnabl (2018), for example.)
29Figure 1.10 in Appendix 1.10 shows these distributions.
30Notice that the horizontal axis in Figure 1.10 is the standard deviation of the risk premium for the
endowment claim, which has relatively low volatility (3.5% in my calibration) relative to the market (ap-
proximately 16%). Therefore, equity premium volatility implied by the model is about five to six times
larger than that of the endowment claim (approximately 1% for the heterogeneous intermediary model, for
example).
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1.5.4 Implications of Financial Sector’s Balance Sheet Adjustments
As discussed in Section 1.1 and documented in Figures 1.1a and 1.1b, during the height
of the financial crisis, broker-dealers substantially delevered (reduced leverage by approxi-
mately 47% relative the previous quarter), while during the same period, holding companies
increased leverage by 72%. In this section, I measure the impact of this balance sheet
adjustments within intermediaries on risk premia and endogenous risk.
When the least risk averse A types face binding margin constraints, they are forced to
reduce leverage by selling assets. To clear the risky asset market, the more risk averse agents
(B and C types) need to take on a larger portion of the asset than they would in the absence
of constraints. In order to entice them to buy more, the risk premium must increase.
I perform the following exercise: I try to match the aforementioned increase and decrease
in leverage of broker-dealers and holding companies, respectively, by tightening the margin
constraint faced by A types in baseline calibration in Table 1.1. This is consistent with
empirical evidence that the contraction in repo market financing during the recent financial
crisis hit broker-dealers (represented by A agents in the model) particularly hard and forced
them to deleverage (see Gorton and Metrick (2012) and He, Khang, and Krishnamurthy
(2010), for example). As noted earlier in Section 1.5.1, tighter margin constraints leads to
a decrease in total leverage and lower volatility. In order to achieve an increase in volatility
consistent with the empirical evidence, I also make households relatively more risk averse
than intermediaries.
Figure 1.6 presents results of this exercise. Tighter margin constraints is implemented by
an increase in the parameter α. I also increases risk aversion of households relative to the
intermediary sector (lower γI/γC) to obtain an increase in volatility. The top left panel shows
that at model’s stochastic steady state, increasing parameter α by 50% (consistent with the
rise in repo-haircuts index during the 2008 crisis from Gorton and Metrick (2012)’s Fig. 4)
and reducing γI/γC by 26% (from 0.61 to 0.45), results in approximately 48% decline in A
types’ leverage. This deleveraging is very close to what broker-dealers experienced during
the crisis.
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To clear the risky asset market, the risk premium must increase enough to entice more
risk averse agents to take on a larger supply of the asset than before the shock. More
risk averse holding companies increase leverage as a result of dealers’ deleveraging (the top
right and middle left panels): B type leverage rises by 79% and households’ holding of the
risky asset remain relatively unchanged (see the middle left panel of Figure 1.6). As the
middle right and bottom left panels of Figure 1.6 show, this dealer deleveraging results in an
approximately 55% increase in the risk premium and Sharpe ratio a 5% rise in endogenous
volatility.
More importantly, asset reallocations between intermediaries do not impact the aggregate
wealth share of the financial sector, and thus do no affect risk premia and volatility in a
model featuring representative intermediaries. My model with a heterogeneous financial
sector captures the implications of these balance sheet adjustments for equilibrium objects.
1.5.5 Empirical Predictions of the Model
In this section I present two main empirical predictions of the model which I test in the
data: (1) The composition of the financial sector, captured in the state variable y, negatively
predicts returns, and (2) shocks to this measure of composition is priced in the cross-section
of assets with a positive price of risk
State variables load Positively on aggregate shocks. Figure 1.7 presents the diffu-
sions of state variables x and y (σx and σy in equation 1.16 and 1.17) in the equilibrium
with state-dependent margin constraint. From equation 1.16, σx always remains positive.
Since, in my calibration, σy is also positive in the entire state space, both state variables are
procyclical : following a negative dZ shock, both state variables go down.
The empirical prediction of the model is that state variables negatively predict future
excess returns. In particular, times when the more aggressive intermediaries are relatively
more impaired in the financial sector (i.e., when state variable y is low), coincide with high
marginal utility states when the risk premia is high.
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Price of Risk is decreasing in x and y. The left (right) panel of Figure 1.8 plots the
Sharpe ratio of the risky asset as a function of state variable x (y) for three different values
of the other state variable: Its unconditional mean, and its unconditional mean ±3 standard
deviations. We see that the Sharpe ratio is decreasing in both sate variables x and y. In
Assets that pay
The empirical prediction of the model is that shocks to state variables are priced in the
cross-section of expected returns with a positive price of risk. In particular, asset that pay
well when the more aggressive intermediaries are relatively more impaired in the financial
sector (i.e., when state variable y is low), are valuable hedges and demand lower excess
returns.
1.5.6 Reconciling Empirical Evidence in AEM and HKM
In this section, I argue that my model featuring heterogeneous intermediaries and leverage
constraints can reconcile the conflicting cross-sectional asset pricing evidence, recently doc-
umented in AEM and HKM.31 As mentioned earlier, AEM and HKM find opposite signs
for the price of intermediary leverage shocks in the cross-section of asset returns and thus
conflicting cyclical dynamics of the intermediary leverage.32
Importantly, in reaching these seemingly contradictory results, AEM and HKM measure
intermediary leverage in different parts of the financial sector: Broker-dealers and bank
holding companies, respectively. AEM use shocks to book leverage of broker-dealers to
construct an intermediary stochastic discount factor (SDF) and show that it prices equity
31He, Kelly, and Manela (2017) present a simple, one-period model in their appendix which was originally
suggested by Alexi Savov in a conference discussion of the paper. The model can reconcile the contradiction
between HKM’s results and the ones documented in AEM. This static framework, however, is unable to
capture implications of balance sheet adjustments within the financial sector for risk premium, the price of
risk, and volatility discussed above.
32As mentioned above, the data for security brokers-dealers are from Table L.130 of the Financial Accounts
of the United States (Flow of Funds). The underlying source for this data comes from FOCUS and FOGS
quarterly reports filed with the SEC by these broker-dealers in isolation from other parts of their holding
companies which are not publicly available. Data for publicly-traded holding companies of primary dealers
are from CRSP/Compustat and Datastream. For a more detailed description of data sources, see Appendix
1.11.
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and bond portfolios with a positive price of risk implying procyclical intermediary leverage.
HKM, on the other hand, find that shocks to leverage of bank holding companies for the
New York Fed’s primary dealers price the cross-section of returns for many asset classes with
a negative price of risk. In contrast to AEM, HKM’s negative price of risk suggests that
intermediary leverage is countercyclical.
A direct implication of the opposite flows and leverage dynamics within the financial
sector in my model with heterogeneous intermediaries is that measuring the price of risk for
shocks to leverage of different intermediaries will result in opposite signs. Thus, these seem-
ingly contradictory asset pricing results can be reconciled in a model where the intermediary
sector is modeled as two heterogeneous sectors facing financial constraints. Moreover, in
Section 1.6, I will show that the composition of the financial sector plays an important role
for time-series predictability and also has significant explanatory power for the cross-section
of expected returns.33
1.6 Empirical Implications of the Model
In this section, I study empirical implications of the model discussed in Section 1.5.5 and
show that the composition of the intermediary sector, measured by the wealth share of
broker-dealers in the financial sector, matters for time-series return predictability and is also
priced in the cross-section of expected returns. I focus on asset pricing implications of the
model with time-varying margin constraints (ν = 1 in equation 1.7). I show that consistent
with model’s predictions, an empirical measure of the state variable y, which measures the
composition of the financial sector, has strong forecasting power for returns on various asset
classes beyond factors already established in the literature to predict returns. Moreover,
innovation in this wealth distribution prices the cross-section of equity and bond portfolios.
33It is important to note that the intermediary leverage is endogenous, and the fact that shocks to leverage
are priced does not necessarily mean that intermediaries are the marginal investors. It could well mean that
leverage is proxy for aggregate risk aversion. See Santos and Veronesi (2016) and Haddad and Muir (2018)
for more details.
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1.6.1 Measuring Heterogeneity in the Intermediary Sector
The price of risk in my model is time-varying and depends on wealth share of the financial
sector, state variable x, as well as, broker-dealers’ wealth share in the intermediary sector,
state variable y in the model. Since financial sector’s wealth share, x, is the key state
variable in many existing models with a representative intermediary sector, in this section,
I emphasize the importance of wealth distribution within the intermediary sector, captured
by state variable y, for forecasting future returns.34
Since risk premium is decreasing in y (see Figure 1.8 in the Appendix), an asset that pays
well when y is low is less risky. Thus, my model predicts that a higher wealth share for BDs
in the financial sector forecasts higher prices and thus, negatively predicts future returns.
In the data, I compute wealth share of the financial sector as the ratio of their market
equity of to the total market value of firms in the CRSP universe:
xdatat =
Market capitalization of the financial sectort
Total market capitalization of the CRSP universet
. (1.29)
I use monthly equity data from CRSP to compute xdata. The financial sector is identified as
firms in the CRSP universe for whom the first two digits of the header standard industry
classification (SIC) code equals 60 through 67.35
Since I don’t have access to market data for broker-dealers, model’s second state variable,
y (wealth share of broker-dealers in the financial sector), is computed as the ratio of BD’s
book equity to the sum of BHC and BD book equities from the Flow of Funds Tables L.130
34Adrian, Moench, and Shin (2014) study return predictability in representative intermediary models and
show book leverage of broker-dealers negatively forecasts future equity and bond returns. He, Kelly, and
Manela (2017) also run time-series predictive regressions and show the squared reciprocal of capital ratio
for bank holding companies of NY Fed’s primary dealers positively predicts future returns for many asset
classes.
35This definition of the financial sector has been commonly used in the literature. See Giglio, Kelly, and
Pruitt (2016) and Acharya, Pedersen, Philippon, and Richardson (2017), for example.
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and L.131:
ydatat =
Book equity of BDst
Book equity of BHCst + Book equity of BDst
, (1.30)
where equity is computed by subtracting total liabilities (excluding miscellaneous liabilities)
from total financial assets.36 For a detailed description of the data, see Appendix 1.11.
Table 1.2 reports the mean, standard deviation, and autocorrelation of the state variables
in the data, both in levels and innovations. The factors are autocorrelated in levels but not
in changes.
Figure 1.9 shows the time-series of xdata and ydata using the CRSP and Flow of Funds
data confirming the dramatic growth of the sector from 1980 to the onset of the recent
financial crisis. Consistent with the model, xdata and ydata are both procyclical : innovations
in xdata and ydata are both positively correlated with the innovations in the real GDP with
correlation coefficients of 0.24 (t-stat of 2.05) and 0.21 (t-stat of 2.99), respectively.37
1.6.2 Intermediary Heterogeneity and Time-Series Predictability
The risk premium in my model is time-varying due to its association with wealth share of the
financial sector, state variable x, as well as, broker-dealers’ wealth share in the intermediary
sector, state variable y in the model. As a result, expected returns are time-varying in
the model and are predictable using lagged state variables as predictors. Since financial
sector’s wealth share, x, is the key state variable in existing models with a representative
intermediary sector, in this section, I emphasize the importance of wealth distribution within
36In unreported results, using 49 Fama-French industry definitions, I identify publicly-traded broker-dealers
as all US firms in the CRSP universe with standard industry classification (SIC) codes 6211 (Security brokers,
dealers & flotation companies) or 6221 (commodity contracts brokers & dealers). I then equivalently define
state variable y using market data as ydata,mktt =
Market cap of dealerst
Market cap of the financial sectort
. During the sample period
(1971Q1-2010Q4), time series of ydata,mkt is highly positively correlated with ydata computed from book
values (in equation 1.30) with correlation coefficient of 0.55 (t-stat of 8.88). Prior to 2010, book and market
series are even more strongly positively correlated (correlation coefficient of 0.68 with t-stat of 11.74). Post
2010, however, the two series become negatively correlated with coefficient of −0.5 (t-stat of −2.92).
37It is worth pointing out that the decline in ydata post 2009 is because two of the largest broker-dealers
(Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley) became bank holding companies in 2009Q1. Two other broker dealers
were also acquired by bank holding companies: J.P. Morgan purchased Bear Sterns and Merrill Lynch became
part of Bank of America.
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the intermediary sector, captured by state variable y, for forecasting future returns.38
Due to the presence of a single aggregate dividend shock, the two state variables are
very positively correlated in the model. As a result, one might be concerned about multi-
collinearity when both x and y are included as forecasting variables in predictive regressions.
However, the model with occasionally binding margin constraints exhibits highly nonlinear
dynamics. In particular, running predictive regressions unconditionally using very long sam-
ple of simulated data in the model (I used 300-year long sample and 20,000 simulations),
results in negative and significant coefficients on both state variables x and y.
As discussed above, state variable y is procyclical (see Figure 1.7 in Appendix 1.10.2):
Times when the more aggressive intermediary is relatively more impaired in the financial
sector, i.e. when y is low, coincide with high marginal utility states where the risk premia is
high. As such, my model predicts that a higher wealth share for BDs in the financial sector
forecasts higher prices (lower returns) thus, negatively predicting future returns. To test
this hypothesis, I regress one-year-ahead holding period excess return (from quarter t+ 1 to
t + 4) for asset i on the lagged wealth share of BDs in the financial sector, ydata defined in
equation (1.30), and controls:
Rit+1→t+4 − rft = γi0 + γiy yt + γiCtrl Ctrlt + εit+1→t+4 (1.31)
where Ri−rf is the average excess return on asset i, and Ctrl represents the vector of control
variables that are known in the literature to forecast returns. I use the following control
variables: wealth share of the aggregate financial sector (x from the model), fluctuations
in the aggregate consumption-wealth ratio (cay variable) defined in Lettau and Ludvigson
(2001), real price-dividend (PD) and cyclically adjusted price-earnings (CAPE) ratios from
Robert Shiller’s website, and variance risk premium (VRP) from Bollerslev, Tauchen, and
38Adrian, Moench, and Shin (2014) study return predictability in representative intermediary models and
show book leverage of broker-dealers negatively forecasts future equity and bond returns. He, Kelly, and
Manela (2017) also run time-series predictive regressions and show the squared reciprocal of capital ratio
for bank holding companies of NY Fed’s primary dealers positively predicts future returns for many asset
classes.
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Zhou (2009).
The model predicts a negative and significant coefficients γiy: Times when wealth share
of broker-dealers in the financial sector is high are associated with low marginal utility
states where asset prices are high and future expected returns are low. As test assets, I use
value- and equally-weighted CRSP portfolios, mean excess return of 25 size/book-to-market
and 10 momentum portfolios from Ken French’s data library, as well as, an equally-weighted
portfolio of assets within each non-equity class studied in HKM available form Asaf Manela’s
website.39 The sample is quarterly starts in 1970Q1 and ends in 2017Q4 for equity portfolios
and in 2012Q4 for non-equity assets (limited by data availability).
Table 1.3 presents results of the univariate predictive regressions in (1.31), with state
variable y as the only predictor, for different test assets mentioned above. In Column (1),
where the dependent variable is the market excess return, I can directly verify model’s
prediction that state variable y should negatively predict future aggregate risk premia: An
increase in the measure of the composition of the financial sector (state variable y) of 1
percentage point in deviation from its mean decreases the expected excess return by 1.16
percentage points (per quarter). Consistent with model predictions, we observe negative
and significant γˆy for Market, size/book-to-market, momentum, sovereign bonds, and options
portfolios. For most asset classes γˆy is negative, as expected: this measure of the composition
of the financial sector negatively forecast future returns.40
To examine whether forecasting relationships are stable over time, and an investor could
have profited from observing the predictor variable y, I follow Goyal and Welch (2008) and
Campbell and Thompson (2008) to evaluate the out-of-sample performance of the predictive
39Non-equity assets in HKM are mostly from previous studies. See Appendix 1.11 and He, Kelly, and
Manela (2017) for more details on test assets.
40The predictor variable yt is very persistent with AR(1) coefficient around 0.96 in quarterly data. I verify
(in unreported regressions) that the absolute value of the regression coefficient γˆy and the R
2 both rise with
the forecast horizon (see Cochrane (2005)’s Chapter 20 for more details). The estimates in Tables 1.3-1.7
are corrected for the Stambaugh (1999) bias. Moreover, if I use growth rate of variable y (I used one- and
five-year growth rates) as predictors, I still observe negative and significant coefficients γy.
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regressions. I compute an out-of-sample R2 statistic (R2OOS) as:
R2OOS = 1−
∑T
t=1 (rt − rˆt)2∑T
t=1 (rt − r¯t)2
,
where rˆt is the fitted value from a predictive regression estimated through period t−1, and r¯t
is the historical average return estimated through period t− 1. The R2OOS for market excess
return, Column (1) of Table 1.3, is approximately 4%. To assess the economic significance of
return predictability, I use Campbell and Thompson (2008)’s simple metric: The increase in
expected returns of a one-period mean-variance (MV) investor from observing the predictor
variable y. A quarterly out-of-sample R2 of 4% leads to an increase in expected returns of
approximately 3% per year for a MV agents with a risk-aversion coefficient of 5.
Table 1.4 provides results of the predictive regression in (1.31) adding several control
variables mentioned above to regressions in Table 1.3.41 In Column (1), as a benchmark,
I report the forecasting regression for the market risk premium using only aforementioned
control variables as predictors. In Column (2), I add dealer wealth share in the financial
sector, y, as an additional predictor. Comparing Columns (1) and (2), it is particularly
important to point out that the composition of the financial sector, captured in wealth
distribution y, leads an additional 15 percentage points predictive power for future market
excess returns over variables already known in the literature to forecast returns: The R2
of the predictive regression on the market excess return goes from 0.28 to 0.43 when y is
included in the regression in Column (2) of Table 1.4.42 It similarly reports negative and
significant γˆy for Market, size/book-to-market, momentum, sovereign bonds, and options
portfolios.
In Appendix 1.12, I provide additional robustness checks for the time-series predictability
regressions above. I first show that the predictive regression results are robust to excluding
41The sample is now shorter and starts in 1990Q1 due to data availability for Bollerslev, Tauchen, and
Zhou (2009)’s variance risk premium, one of the control variables used in return forecasting regression in
equation (1.31).
42In one-quarter ahead predictive regressions, the incremental R2 increases by 5 percentages points (from
0.22 to 0.27) when intermediary composition variable y is added to the regression.
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the Great Recession (years 2007 to 2009) from the sample. So, it is not just the financial crisis
that drives this predictability results. I also rerun the forecasting regression in Table 1.4 by
adding AEM’s broker-dealer leverage ratio, HKM’s intermediary capital ratio for different
asset classes. Adding these additional predictors, however, does not change the sign and
significance of the coefficient γˆy.
In summary, in this section, I provided strong empirical evidence that the composition
of the financial sector, captured by state variable y, matters for prices, beyond the health
of the aggregate financial sector: It has strong predictive power for excess return on many
assets beyond variables from representative intermediary asset pricing models, as well as,
the ones already known in the literature to predict return.
1.6.3 Intermediary Heterogeneity and the Cross-Section of Asset Returns
As mentioned above, the model with heterogeneous financial intermediaries can reconcile
seemingly contradictory evidence for the sign of estimated price of risk for intermediary
leverage shocks documented in AEM and HKM. In this section, I explore the implications
of a heterogeneous financial sector for the cross-section of returns.
As shown in Figure 1.2 (and also in the bottom right panel of Figure 1.13 in Ap-
pendix 1.10.2), risk premium on the endowment claim is decreasing in both state variables x
and y.43 This suggests assets that pay poorly when: (i) the financial sector is less capitalized
(i.e. when x is low), and/or (ii) wealth share of broker-dealers in the financial sector is small
(i.e. when y is low), are riskier and should command higher expected returns. I emphasize
that point (ii) can only be made in a model with heterogeneous financial intermediaries.
1.6.3.1 Cross-sectional Asset Pricing Tests
Similar to He, Kelly, and Manela (2017), I construct the growth rate to dealers’ wealth share
in the financial sector, denoted y∆t , as follows. I estimate a shock to dealer wealth share in
43This is true even in the absence of margin constraints as shown in the bottom right panel of Figure 1.12.
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levels, ςt, as an AR(1) innovation in the regression: yt = φ0 +φyt−1 +ηt. I then convert these
innovations to a growth rate by dividing them by the lagged wealth share:
HIFac = y∆t =
ηt
yt−1
(1.32)
I call this wealth share growth rate the heterogeneous-intermediary factor (HIFac) and
use it to perform cross-sectional asset pricing tests. For each asset i, I first estimate betas
from time-series regressions of portfolio excess returns on the risk factors:
Rei,t = ai + β
′
i,f ft + ϑi,t, i = 1, . . . , N, (1.33)
where f represents the K×1 vector of risk factors. I consider four cases: (1) ft = HIFact, (2)
ft = [HIFact MktRFt]
′, (3) ft = [HIFact AEMt]
′, and (4) ft = [HIFact HKMt MktRFt]
′,
where AEM is the broker-dealer leverage factor from Adrian, Etula, and Muir (2014), HKM
is the intermediary capital risk factor from He, Kelly, and Manela (2017), and MktRF
represents the market risk premium. For comparison, I also report the pricing performance
of AEM and HKM factors.
Next, in order to estimate factor risk prices, λf , I run a cross-sectional regression of
average excess returns on the estimated risk exposures βˆi,f :
E
[
Rei,t
]
= αi + βˆ
′
i,fλf + ζi, i = 1, . . . , N, (1.34)
As mentioned above, the model predicts a positive and significant sign for the estimated
price of risk λHiFac.
I test the ability of the heterogeneous intermediary factor in pricing the cross-section
of 55 equity and bond portfolios: The test assets are 25 size and book-to-market and 10
momentum portfolios from Ken French’s website, 10 maturity-sorted US government bond
portfolios from CRSP’s Fama Bond dataset with maturities up to five years in six month
intervals, and 10 US corporate bond portfolios sorted on yield spreads from Nozawa (2017)
obtained from Asaf Manela’s website. I choose equity and bond portfolios as test assets due
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to the availability of longer time-series than others such as options and CDS. Since I use
many test assets beyond size and book-to-market portfolios, my model avoids the typical
criticisms of asset pricing tests discussed in Lewellen, Nagel, and Shanken (2010).
Table 1.5 presents the main asset pricing results. Below estimated risk prices I report
Shanken (1992) t-statistics that corrects for estimation error in betas and cross-correlations. I
also report Fama and MacBeth (1973) t-statistics by running period-by-period cross-sectional
regressions and computing standard errors of the time-series average of λs. I report cross-
sectional R2 and the mean absolute pricing error (MAPE), calculated as 1
N
∑ |ζ| where N
is the number of test assets, as measures of model fit. I also report a χ2(N − K) statistic
(K is te number of factors) that tests if the pricing errors are jointly zero.
Column 1 of Table 1.5 reports the results of heterogeneous intermediary factor as a single
pricing factor. The estimated price of risk is positive, which means assets that pay well in
states with a low broker-dealer wealth share in the financial sector (i.e. assets with low betas
on yt) are valuable hedges and have lower expected returns in equilibrium. This risk price
estimate confirms the procyclicality of broker-dealer wealth share yt documented in Figure
1.9. The adjusted R2 is 61% while the total MAPE is only 1.86%. The single-factor model
can explains 62% of the variation in average returns in these cross-sections, with an average
absolute pricing error around 1.8% per annum. Figure 1.11 in the Appendix, visually shows
the HIFac’s pricing performance in the cross-section of equity and bond returns by plotting
realized versus predicted returns.
For robustness and comparison with recent empirical work, in Columns 2–6, I add addi-
tional pricing factors. In Column 2, I include market risk premium, MktRF, as an additional
factor. However, the price of risk for MktRF is not statistically significant and in terms of
almost all test statistics, the two-factor model is nearly identical to the single-factor model
in Column 1. The market adds essentially no explanatory power to the intermediary hetero-
geneity factor.
In Columns 3 and 5, for reference, I present performances of the pricing factors in AEM
and HKM, respectively. AEM use a leverage factor defined as the seasonally adjusted growth
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rate in broker–dealer book leverage level from Flow of Funds. A shown in Column 3, for the
test assets mentioned above, HIFac outperforms AEM with 38% lower MAPE (1.83% versus
AEM’s 2.96%) and 56% higher cross-sectional R2 (61% compared to 39% in AEM).44
In HKM, the pricing factors are the market risk premium (MktRF) and shocks to inter-
mediary capital ratio defined as the ratio of total market equity to total market assets (book
debt plus market equity) for New York Fed’s primary dealer holding companies. A shown
in Column 5, my model with a single pricing factor performs almost as well as HKM’s two
factor model with nearly identical MAPE (1.83% vs. 1.89% for HKM) and cross-sectional
R2 (61% vs. HKM’s 63%).
In Column 4, I add leverage factor from AEM to evaluate a model with two pricing
factors: HIFac and AEM. Addition of AEM’s leverage factor does not make price of HIFac
risk insignificant or change its sign. This even raises the cross-sectional R2 to 72%. Finally, in
Column 6, I add two pricing factors from HKM: MktRF and shocks to intermediary capital
ratio. Again, λHIFac remains positive and significant. Note that since HIFac is positively
corrected with both HKM and AEM factors, it is not surprising that λHIFac has weaker
statistical significance in the presence of these additional factors.45
In summary, The results in Table 1.5 demonstrates that heterogeneity in the financial
sectors has explanatory power for the cross-section of expected returns even in the presence
of representative intermediary asset pricing factors presented in AEM and HKM.
44The pricing performance of AEM reported in their Table III and shown in Figure 1 of their paper, is
substantially better than the one reported in Column 3 of Table 1.5 (their reported MAPE is only 1.31% and
R2 = 0.77). This difference can stem from two possible sources: (i) In 2015, the Federal Reserve substantially
revised and updated Flow of Funds historical data for security broker-dealers, changing the way assets and
liabilities were counted. They specifically changed their handling of using gross vs net repo. For more detail,
see Z.1 Financial Accounts Technical Q&As. (ii) The test assets used in this chapter are different from
AEM’s. I have the same 35 equity portfolios (25 size/book-to-market and 10 momentum portfolios) but use
both Treasury and corporate bonds from Nozawa (2017), while AEM only use 6 Treasury bonds sorted by
maturity from CRSP.
45HIFac has positive correlation of 13% and 9% with AEM’s leverage and HKM’s capital risk factors,
respectively.
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1.6.3.2 Sorted Portfolios on Exposures to Heterogeneous Intermediary Factor
The positive price of risk associated with shocks to wealth share of dealers in the financial
sector means assets that pay more in states with a low dealer wealth share (i.e. assets with
low betas on yt shocks) are viewed as hedges thus have lower expected returns in equilibrium.
To empirically verify the positive price of risk for innovations in the wealth share of
dealers in the financial sector, I sort stocks based on their exposures to these shocks and
form portfolios by quintiles on a 10-year trailing window. I consider all common stocks (share
codes 10 and 11) in the CRSP universe from Amex, NASDAQ, and NYSE (exchange codes
1,2, and 3). For every stock i at quarter t, I regress its quarterly excess return on constant
and innovations in the heterogeneous intermediary factor (HIFac), defined in equation (1.32):
Rei,t = αi + βi,HIFac HIFact + ξi,t (1.35)
The coefficient βi,HIFac measures the exposure of firm i’s stock to the factor’s innovations. I
then sort stocks into quintiles every quarter according to their βi,HIFac.
Consistent with model’s implications, when sorted on βHIFac, average risk premia are
increasing from the portfolio of low-beta stocks to the high-beta quintile. In the Appendix,
I report the average returns of the beta-sorted portfolios in Table 1.8, along with return
volatilities, average book-to-market ratio, average market cap, and alphas from CAPM and
Fama-French three-factor models. Excess returns are monotonically increasing from quintile
one to five and the top portfolio earns an approximately 5% premium over the lowest quintile.
In Appendix 1.12, I further verify the results above are robust to double-sorting with asset
pricing factors from recent models with representative intermediaries.
This exercise demonstrates that the heterogeneity in the financial sector is an important
risk factor and has pricing information above and beyond representative intermediary asset
pricing factors in AEM and HKM: even within portfolios sorted based on AEM or HKM
factor betas, I see a monotonic progression in returns from low- to high-HIFac beta portfolios.
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1.6.4 Additional Robustness Checks
In Appendix 1.12, I project the heterogeneous intermediary factor (HIFac) onto the space of
traded returns to form a factor-mimicking portfolio that mimics the HIFac. To further verify
that this heterogeneity an important source of risk, I evaluate the heterogeneous intermediary
factor-mimicking portfolio (HIMP) relative to the mimicking portfolios for representative
intermediary factors in AEM and HKM. I show that the mimicking portfolios for these
representative intermediary factors cannot fully span the HIMP and there is more to be
captured by the heterogeneity within the financial sector. This exercise confirms my earlier
results: the heterogeneity in the financial sector is an important risk factor and has pricing
information above and beyond representative intermediary asset pricing factors in AEM and
HKM.
1.7 Conclusion
This chapter studies the asset pricing implications of heterogeneity among financial interme-
diaries. Evidence on large balance sheet adjustments within the intermediary sector during
the Great Recession is at odds with existing models featuring representative intermediaries.
To explain and study the implications of these massive asset reallocations within the financial
sector, in this chapter, I present a model with two main ingredients: intermediaries hetero-
geneous in their aggressiveness, and occasionally binding leverage constraints. Heterogeneity
in intermediaries’ risk appetite and margin constraints are both necessary in matching and
understanding reallocations within the financial sector.
My model implies that a dealer deleveraging episode, comparable in magnitudes to the
one observed during the recent financial crisis, leads to an approximately 55% increase in
the risk premia and a 5% increase in endogenous volatility. In contrast, since balance sheet
adjustments among different intermediaries does not affect the wealth share of the aggregate
financial sector, in models with representative intermediaries these asset reallocations have
no impact on asset prices and risk premia.
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I show that the composition of the financial sector accounts for a substantial portion of
the variation in risk premia in the model. With an independent and identically distributed
aggregate endowment, the variation in expected returns is entirely due to intermediation
frictions captured by both the health of the overall financial sector as well as its composition.
I show that the wealth distribution among intermediaries, a measure of the composition of
the financial sector, accounts for approximately 20% incremental variation in risk premia
over a representative intermediary model.
The model also generates opposite cyclical dynamics for leverage of the two intermediary
sectors, reconciling empirical evidence that has previously seemed contradictory through the
lens of representative intermediary asset pricing models of AEM and HKM. To construct the
SDF, AEM and HKM measure marginal utilities of different financial intermediaries: security
broker-dealers, and bank holding companies, respectively. Given the economic mechanism
of my model, it does not seem surprising that they arrive at conflicting asset pricing results.
I examine the empirical implications of the model for time-series predictability and the
cross-section of returns. Consistent with the model, wealth share of broker-dealers in the
financial sector, a measure of heterogeneity among intermediaries, strongly and negatively
forecasts future excess returns on many assets. In particular, it leads to additional predictive
power for market risk premium beyond many established forecasting variables in the litera-
ture. I also show that using only shocks to the relative wealth share of broker-dealers in the
financial sector, explains the cross-section of equity and bond returns about as well or better
than existing intermediary asset pricing models. I further document that including aggregate
intermediary leverage as a second asset pricing factor increases cross-sectional fit by at least
10 percentages points, depending on whether the factor is the leverage of broker-dealers or
bank holding companies.
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1.8 Appendix 1: Proof of Propositions
Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. State variable x is the wealth share of financial sector: xt =
WA+WB
W
and state variable
y is wealth share of type A agents in the financial sector: yt =
WA
WA+WB
, where W,WA, and
WB are the aggregate wealth, wealth of A, and B agents, respectively.
Dynamics of xt: From equation (1.5), W
A has the following law of motion
dWA
WA
=
(
r + wAs (µ− r)− cA
)
dt+ wAs σ dZ,
and WB has the similar law of motion.
The law of motion for the numerator, WA +WB, will be
d
(
WA +WB
)
WA +WB
=
[
r +
(
ywAs + (1− y)wBs
)
(µ− r)− (ycA + (1− y)cB)
]
dt
+
(
ywAs + (1− y)wBs
)
σdZt
Define wealth share of agents A and B as u ≡ WA/W = xy, and v ≡ WB/W = x(1−y),
respectively.46 Since the aggregate wealth is W = WA + WB + WC , the law of motion for
the denominator is
dW
W
=
r + (xywAs + x(1− y)wBs + (1− x)wCs )︸ ︷︷ ︸
=1 (by stock market-clearing)
(µ− r)− (xycA + x(1− y)cB + (1− x)cC)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=F (by goods market-clearing)
 dt
+
xywAs + x(1− y)wBs + (1− x)wCs︸ ︷︷ ︸
=1
σ dZt
= [r + (µ− r)− F ] dt+ σ dZt
46Agent C’s wealth share will then be 1− u− v.
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From Ito’s lemma for ratio of two stochastic processes,
dx
x
= κ(x¯− x)dt+ [(ywAs + (1− y)wBs − 1) (µ− r − σ2)− ycA − (1− y)cB + F ] dt
+
(
ywAs + (1− y)wBs − 1
)
σ dZt
Thus from the dynamics of x in equation (1.12) we have
µx =
(
ywAs + (1− y)wBs − 1
)
(µ− r − σ2)− ycA − (1− y)cB + F
σx =
(
ywAs + (1− y)wBs − 1
)
σ
Dynamics of yt: The numerator of y is W
A, and its denominator is
(
WA +WB
)
which its
law of motion is calculated above. So from Ito’s lemma for a ratio, we get
dy
y
= κ(y¯ − y)dt+ (1− y) [(wAs − wBs ) (µ− r)− cA + cB − (ywAs + (1− y)wBs ) (wAs − wBs )σ2] dt
+ (1− y) (wAs − wBs )σ dZt
Thus from the dynamics of y in equation (1.13) we have
µy =
(
wAs − wBs
)
(µ− r)− cA + cB −
(
ywAs + (1− y)wBs
) (
wAs − wBs
)
σ2
σy =
(
wAs − wBs
)
σ
Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. Since σx and σy are finite, we trivially get
lim
x→0
x σx = 0, ∀y and lim
y→0
y(1− y)σy = lim
y→1
y(1− y)σy = 0, ∀x.
We only need to show lim
x→1
x σx = 0 ∀y. The market clearing condition for the risky asset
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when x→ 1 becomes ywAs + (1− y)wBs = 1.
So, from the expression for σx in equation (1.16), we have:
x σx = x
[
ywAs + (1− y)wBs − 1
]
σ
which goes to zero as x→ 1 for all y from the stock market-clearing.
Proof of Proposition 3
Proof. We can write agent i’s optimization problem in equation (1.8) as
0 = max
ci,wis
{fi (ci,t, Vi,t) dt+ Et [dVi,t]}
Using Ito’s lemma we have
Et[dVi] = Vi,WiEt[dWi]+
1
2
Vi,WiWiEt
[
dW 2i
]
+Vi,JiEt[dJi]+
1
2
Vi,JiJiEt
[
dJ2i
]
+Vi,WiJiEt[dWidJi]
where Vi,Wi and Vi,WiWi are the first and second partial derivatives of Vi with respect to Wi
(similarly for Vi,Ji , Vi,JiJi , and Vi,WiJi .) Also posit the following Ito process for marginal value
of wealth Ji:
dJi
Ji
= µJi,tdt+ σJi,tdZ,
with adapted processes µJi,t = µJi(xt, yt) and σJi,t = σJi(xt, yt). I will drop t subscripts for
notational simplicity.
Using Ito’s lemma, we can find the drift and diffusions µJi and σJi
µJi =
Ji,x
Ji
[κ(x¯− x) + xµx] + Ji,y
Ji
[κ(y¯ − y) + y(1− y)µy]
+
1
2
Ji,xx
Ji
x2σ2x +
Ji,xy
Ji
xy(1− y)σxσy + 1
2
Ji,yy
Ji
y2(1− y)2σ2y (1.36)
σJi =
Ji,x
Ji
xσx +
Ji,y
Ji
y(1− y)σy (1.37)
51
Plugging in the felicity function f(C,U) in (1.3) and the conjecture for value function Vi
in (1.21) into the HJB equation above, using the budget constraint in (1.5) and the law of
motion for Ji in (1.36) and (1.37), and dropping W
1−γi
i J
1−γi
1−ψi
i and dt terms yields
0 = max
ci,wis
1
1− 1/ψi
( ci
J
1/(1−ψi)
i
)1−1/ψi
− (ρ+ κ)
+ [r − ci + κ+ wis(µ− r)− γi2 (wis)2 σ2]
+
(
1
1− ψi
){
Ji,x
Ji
[κ(x¯− x) + xµx] + Ji,y
Ji
[κ(y¯ − y) + y(1− y)µy]
+(1− γi)
(
Ji,x
Ji
xσx +
Ji,y
Ji
y(1− y)σy
)
wisσ
}
+
1
2
(
1
1− ψi
)[(
ψi − γi
1− ψi
)(
Ji,x
Ji
xσx +
Ji,y
Ji
y(1− y)µy
)2
+
Ji,xx
Ji
x2σ2x + 2
Ji,xy
Ji
xy(1− y)σxσy + Ji,yy
Ji
y2(1− y)2σ2y
]
+ λi
(
θ¯t − wis
)
,
where λi is proportional to the Lagrange multiplier on the time-varying margin constraint.
The first-order condition for consumption-wealth ratio and portfolio share will lead to equa-
tions (1.23) and (1.25):
ci = Ji (1.38)
wis =
1
γi
[
µ− r
σ2
+
(
1− γi
1− ψi
)(
Ji,x
Ji
x
σx
σ
+
Ji,y
Ji
y(1− y)σy
σ
)]
− 1
γiσ2
λi (1.39)
When the margin constraint for agent i is slack, λi = 0 and we have
wi,∗s =
µ− r
γiσ2
+
1
γi
(
1− γi
1− ψi
)(
Ji,x
Ji
x
σx
σ
+
Ji,y
Ji
y(1− y)σy
σ
)
When the margin constraint for agent i is binding, λi is strictly positive and w
i,const
s = θ¯t.
Plugging in the wi,consts into (1.39), we get the expression for the multiplier on the time-
varying margin constraint:
λi = (µ− r) +
(
1− γi
1− ψi
)(
Ji,x
Ji
xσx +
Ji,y
Ji
y(1− y)σy
)
σ − γiσ2θ¯t (1.40)
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1.9 Appendix 2: Numerical Procedure
The computation of equilibrium is reduced to solving three second-order PDEs for functions
Ji for i ∈ {A,B,C}.47 I use Chebyshev orthogonal collocation method to solve the model.48
The HJB equation for agent i can be written as the following functional equation:
Hi (Ji) = 0.
I express marginal value of wealth functions JA(x, y), JB(x, y) and JC(x, y) as bivariate
Chebyshev polynomials of order N (I use N = 20), that is, I approximate Ji with tensor
product of Chebyshev polynomials of order N :
Ĵi(x, y) =
N∑
j=0
N∑
k=0
aijkψj(ωj(x))ψk(ωk(y)), i ∈ {A,B,C}. (1.41)
where ψj is the Chebyshev polynomial of degree j = 0, 1, . . . , N , called the basis function,
Ψjk(x, y) = ψj(x)ψk(y) is a tensor product basis, {aijk}Nj,k=1 are unknown coefficients for
agent i, and ωj’s are the Chebyshev nodes (collocation points) defined below.
I then plug in Ĵi into the HJB equation for agent i to form the residual equation:
Ri
(· | ai) = Hi (Ĵi) ,
and find the vector of coefficients ai that makes the residual equation as close to 0 as possible
given some objective function ρ (Ri (· | ai) ,0):
ai = arg min
ai
ρ
(Ri (· | ai) ,0)
47Duffie and Lions (1992) show existence and uniqueness of infinite-horizon stochastic differential utility
by partial differential equation techniques in a Markov diffusion setting.
48For more details, see Judd (1992) and Judd (1998) and Computational Tools & Macroeconomic Applica-
tions, NBER Summer Institute 2011 Methods Lectures, Lawrence Christiano and Jesus Fernandez-Villaverde,
Organizers.
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The most common objective function is a weighted residual given some weight functions
φj : Ω→ Rm:
ρ
(Ri (· | ai) ,0) =

0 if
∫∫
Ω×Ω
φj(x)φk(y)Ri
(· | ai) dx dy = 0, for j, k = 1, . . . , N
1 otherwise
In the pseudo-spectral (or collocation) method, the weight functions are chosen as: φj(x) =
δ(x − xi) where δ is the dirac delta function and xi’s are the collocation points. In the
orthogonal collocation method, which I use to solve the model, the basis functions are a set
of orthogonal Chebyshev polynomials and collocation points are given by the roots of the
N th polynomial.
Chebyshev polynomials of degree n can be easily defined recursively:
ψ0(ω) = 1
ψ1(ω) = x
ψn+1(ω) = 2ωψn(ω)− ψn−1(ω) (1.42)
As mentioned above, the collocation points are the N zeros of the Chebyshev polynomial
of order N, (ψN(ωj) = 0), and are given by the following expression
ωj = cos
(
2j − 1
2n
pi
)
, j = 1, . . . , N.
These roots are clustered quadratically towards ±1. Chebyshev polynomials are defined on
ωi ∈ [−1, 1]. Since the state variables x, y ∈ [0, 1] in my model, I use the linear transformation
xj = (1 + ωj)/2.
49
I calculate the derivatives of these functions as well as the state variable dynamics, agents’
49For a general state space x ∈ [xL, xH ], we use a linear transformation xj = xL + 0.5(xH − xL)(1 + ωj).
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portfolio choice, risky asset return and volatility using the relevant equilibrium expressions.
I then plug these quantities into the HJB equations (1.22) and project the resulting residuals
onto the complete set of Chebyshev polynomials up to order N . I use the built-in MATLAB
function fsolve to find the coefficients of Ji polynomials that make the projected residuals
equal to zero. This results in a highly accurate solution for coefficients in the Ĵi functions
with errors in the order of 10−20.
The numerical algorithm is summarized below.
1. From goods market-clearing conditions and differentiating it with respect to the state
variable, we get expressions for dividend yield F and its derivatives with respect to x
and y.
F = xyJA + x(1− y)JB + (1− x)JC ,
Fx = yJA + (1− y)JB − JC + xyJA,x + x(1− y)JB,x + (1− x)JC,x,
Fy = xJA − xJB + xyJA,y + x(1− y)JB,y + (1− x)JC,y,
Fxx = 2yJA,x + 2(1− y)JB,x − 2JC,x + xyJA,xx + x(1− y)JB,xx + (1− x)JC,xx,
Fyy = 2xJA,y − 2xJB,y + xyJA,yy + x(1− y)JB,yy + (1− x)JC,yy,
Fxy = JA − JB + xJA,x − xJB,x + yJA,y + (1− y)JB,y − JC,y + xyJA,xy
+ x(1− y)JB,xy + (1− x)JC,xy,
where Ji,x and Ji,xx are the first and second partial derivative of Ji with respect to x,
respectively, and similarly for Ji,y, Ji,yy and Ji,xy.
2. Using market-clearing condition for the endowment claim, plugging in the expression
for agent C’s optimal portfolio choice wCs from (1.24), and substituting for (µ− r)/σ2
from the expression for wA,∗s , we will get the first of the two equations that w
A,∗
s and
55
wBs have to satisfy:
1 = xywA,∗s + x(1− y)wBs + (1− x)wCs
= xywA,∗s + x(1− y)wBs
+ (1− x) 1
γC
{
µ− r
σ2
+
(
1− γC
1− ψC
)[
JC,x
JC
x
(
ywA,∗s + (1− y)wBs − 1
)
+
JC,y
JC
y(1− y) (wA,∗s − wBs )]}
= xwA,∗s + yw
B
s + (1− x)
1
γC
{
γAw
A,∗
s −
(
1− γA
1− ψA
)[
JA,x
JA
x
(
ywA,∗s + (1− y)wBs − 1
)
+
JA,y
JA
y(1− y) (wA,∗s − wBs )]
+
(
1− γC
1− ψC
)[
JC,x
JC
x
(
ywA,∗s + (1− y)wBs − 1
)
+
JC,y
JC
y(1− y) (wA,∗s − wBs )]}
To get the second equation, I plug in the expression for (µ− r)/σ2 from A’s optimal
portfolio wA,∗s in the expression for w
B
s :
wBs =
1
γB
[
µ− r
σ2
+
(
1− γB
1− ψB
)(
JB,x
JB
x
(
ywAs + (1− y)wBs − 1
)
+
JB,y
JB
y(1− y)(wAs − wBs )
)]
=
1
γB
[
γAw
A
s −
(
1− γA
1− ψA
)(
JA,x
JA
x
(
ywAs + (1− y)wBs − 1
)
+
JA,y
JA
y(1− y)(wAs − wBs )
)
+
(
1− γB
1− ψB
)(
JB,x
JB
x
(
ywAs + (1− y)wBs − 1
)
+
JB,y
JB
y(1− y)(wAs − wBs )
)]
We can rewrite the systems of equation as
a11w
A,∗
s + a12w
B
s = b1
a21w
A,∗
s + a22w
B
s = b2
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where
a11 = xy + (1− x) 1
γC
[
γA −
(
1− γA
1− ψA
)(
JA,x
JA
xy +
JA,y
JA
y(1− y)
)
+
(
1− γC
1− ψC
)(
JC,x
JC
xy +
JC,y
JC
y(1− y)
)]
,
a12 = x(1− y) + (1− x) 1
γC
[
−
(
1− γA
1− ψA
)(
JA,x
JA
x(1− y)− JA,y
JA
y(1− y)
)
+
(
1− γC
1− ψC
)(
JC,x
Jx
x(1− y)− JC,y
JC
y(1− y)
)]
,
a21 =
1
γB
[
γA −
(
1− γA
1− ψA
)(
JA,x
JA
xy +
JA,y
JA
y(1− y)
)
+
(
1− γB
1− ψB
)(
JB,x
JB
xy +
JB,y
JB
y(1− y)
)]
,
a22 = −1 + 1
γB
[
−
(
1− γA
1− ψA
)(
JA,x
JA
x(1− y) + JA,y
JA
y(1− y)
)
+
(
1− γB
1− ψB
)(
JB,x
JB
x(1− y)− JB,y
JB
y(1− y)
)]
,
b1 = 1 + (1− x) 1
γC
[
−
(
1− γA
1− ψA
)
JA,x
JA
x+
(
1− γC
1− ψC
)
JC,x
JC
x
]
,
b2 =
1
γB
[
−
(
1− γA
1− ψA
)
JA,x
JA
x+
(
1− γB
1− ψB
)
JB,x
JB
x
]
.
The system of equations above can be solved easily to get wA,∗s and w
B
s .
3. Since the return volatility can be written as
σ =
σD
1 +
Fx
F
x [ywAs + (1− y)wBs − 1] +
Fy
F
y(1− y) (wAs − wBs )
, (1.43)
when the margin constrains for agent A bind, from equation (1.7) with ν = 1, we must
have
wA,consts =
1− Fx
F
x+
(
Fx
F
x− Fy
F
y
)
(1− y)wBs
ασD −
[
Fx
F
x+
Fy
F
(1− y)
]
y
(1.44)
So, we have wAs ≤ wA,consts . Then from (1.25) we can find A and B’s portfolio weights
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in the risky asset
wAs = min
(
wA,∗s , w
A,const
s
)
,
where wA,consts is given in equation (1.44).
4. From stock market clearing, we can get C’s optimal portfolio weight
wCs =
1− xy wAs − x(1− y)wBs
1− x
5. Using the expression for the return volatility in equation (1.19) and plugging in ex-
pressions for σx and σy from equations (1.16) and (1.17), the expression for return
volatility is
σ =
σD
1 +
Fx
F
x [ywAs + (1− y)wBs − 1] +
Fy
F
y(1− y) (wAs − wBs )
.
6. Using the expression for σ above, state variable diffusions (σx and σy) can be found
from equations (1.16) and (1.17):
σx =
[
ywAs + (1− y)wBs − 1
]
σ, and σy =
(
wAs − wBs
)
σ.
7. From the expression for wCs , σ, σx, and σy, the expected excess return (risk premium)
on the risky asset is
µ− r = γCwCs σ2 −
(
1− γC
1− ψC
)(
JC,x
JC
xσx +
JC,y
JC
y(1− y)σy
)
σ
8. Using the optimal consumption-wealth ratios ci = Ji, we can then compute drifts of
the state variables µx and µy as
µx =
[
ywAs + (1− y)wBs − 1
]
(µ− r − σ2)− yJA − (1− y)JB + F
µy =
(
wAs − wBs
)
(µ− r)− JA + JB −
[
ywAs + (1− y)wBs
] (
wAs − wBs
)
σ2.
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9. From equation (1.18) the expected return on the risky asset can be calculated
µ = µD + F − Fx
F
[κ(x¯− x) + x(µx + σDσx)]− Fy
F
[κ(y¯ − y) + y(1− y)(µy + σDσy)]
+
[(
Fx
F
)2
− 1
2
Fxx
F
]
x2σ2x +
[(
Fy
F
)2
− 1
2
Fyy
F
]
y2(1− y)2σ2y +
[
2
(
Fx
F
)(
Fy
F
)
− Fxy
F
]
xy(1− y)σxσy.
10. The real interest rate is
r = µ− (µ− r).
11. Plugging expressions above into agent i’s HJB equations in (1.22), we get the residual
functions for agent i:
0 = −(ρ+ κ) + 1
ψi
Ji +
(
1− 1
ψi
)[
r + wis(µ− r)−
γi
2
(
wis
)2
σ2
]
− 1
ψi
{
Ji,x
Ji
[κ(x¯− x) + xµx] + Ji,y
Ji
[κ(y¯ − y) + y(1− y)µy] + (1− γi)
(
Ji,x
Ji
xσx +
Ji,y
Ji
y(1− y)σy
)
wisσ
}
− 1
2ψi
[(
ψi − γi
1− ψi
)(
Ji,x
Ji
xσx +
Ji,y
Ji
y(1− y)µy
)2
+
Ji,xx
Ji
x2σ2x + 2
Ji,xy
Ji
xy(1− y)σxσy + Ji,yy
Ji
y2(1− y)2σ2y
]
.
1.10 Appendix 3: Additional Model Results
1.10.1 Heterogeneous vs. Representative Intermediaries
I simulate representative- and heterogeneous-intermediary models for 3,000 quarters 20,000
times and examine the distribution of risk premium volatility. Figure 1.10 in shows these
distributions. As expected, the model with heterogeneous intermediaries exhibits more vari-
ation in risk premia than the one with a representative financial sector. Since the aggregate
intermediary sectors in both models are (almost) identical, any excess variation in risk premia
in the heterogeneous intermediary model has to be due to state variable y. In my calibration,
approximately 20% of the variation in risk premia can be attributed to heterogeneity in the
financial sector (state variable y). Therefore, failing to account for heterogeneity among
intermediaries can lead to missing a substantial portion of the variation in risk premia.
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1.10.2 Three-Dimensional Plots
Figure 1.12 plots various objects the unconstrained equilibrium, where θ¯t = m¯. All variables
are functions of the two state variables in the model: x (wealth share of agents A and B,
i.e. the financial sector) and y (wealth share of A agents in the financial sector). These are
the same objects plotted in solid blue line in Figures 1.2 and 1.3 but in three dimensions.
Figure 1.13 presents various variables in the equilibrium with time-varying margin con-
straint in the endowment model with θ¯t =
1
ασt
as functions of state variables (xt, yt). These
are the same equilibrium objects plotted in dashed red line in Figures 1.2 and 1.3 but in
three dimensions.
1.11 Appendix 4: Data Sources
Broker-Dealer and Holding Company Data
Balance sheet data for broker-dealers and bank holding companies are from Tables L.130 and
L.131 of Financial Accounts of the United States (Flow of Funds) from Federal Reserves,
respectively. As noted in the description of Table L.130,
Security brokers and dealers are firms that buy and sell securities for a fee, hold an
inventory of securities for resale, or do both. The firms that make up this sector are
those that submit information to the Securities and Exchange Commission on one of
two reporting forms, either the Financial and Operational Combined Uniform Single
Report of Brokers and Dealers (FOCUS) or the Report on Finances and Operations
of Government Securities Brokers and Dealers (FOGS). The major assets of the sec-
tor are collateral repayable from funding corporations in connection with securities
borrowing (included in miscellaneous assets), debt securities and equities held for re-
distribution, customers’ margin accounts, and security repurchase agreements (reverse
repos). Sector operations are financed largely by net transactions with parent com-
panies, customers’ cash accounts, loans for purchasing and carrying securities from
depository institutions, and security repurchase agreements.
Also from Table L.131’s description for holding companies,
. . . the holding companies sector consists of all top-tiered bank holding companies,
savings and loan holding companies, U.S. Intermediate Holding Companies (IHCs),
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and securities holding companies (collectively “holding companies”) that file the Fed-
eral Reserve’s Form FR Y-9LP, Parent Company Only Financial Statements for Large
Holding Companies, FR Y-9SP, Parent Company Only Financial Statements for Small
Holding Companies, or FR 2320, Quarterly Savings and Loan Holding Company Re-
port. Holding companies required to file FR Y-9LP include those with total consol-
idated assets of $1 billion or more or meet other criteria, such as having a material
amount of debt or equity securities outstanding that are registered with the Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission, being engaged in significant nonbanking activity, or
conducting off-balance-sheet activities either directly or through a nonbank subsidiary.
Those holding companies required to file FR Y-9SP have total consolidated assets less
than $1 billion. Form FR 2320 must be filed by top-tier savings and loan holding com-
panies exempt from initially filing the Y-9LP or Y-9SP, because even though they own
a savings and loan institution, that is not their primary line of business. Mutual stock
companies that file the FR 2320 are excluded because they do not hold any assets or
liabilities at the holding company level. The major assets of holding companies, other
than small amounts of loans and securities, are net transactions with their subsidiaries;
this includes equity investments in subsidiaries and associated banks and net balances
due from subsidiaries and related depository institutions. The main source of funding
for the sector is the issuance of corporate bonds and commercial paper.50
Test Assets
Test assets for time-series and cross-sectional asset pricing tests are from two sources: (i)
equity portfolios (25 portfolios formed on size and book-to-market and 10 momentum portfo-
lios) are from Ken French’s Data Library, and (ii) non-equity assets are from HKM obtained
from Asaf Manela’s website and include 10 maturity-sorted US government and 10 corporate
bond portfolios sorted on yield spreads, 6 sovereign bond portfolios based on a two-way sort
on a bond’s covariance with US equity market and bond’s S&P rating, 54 portfolios of S&P
500 index options sorted on moneyness and maturity split by contract type (27 calls and 27
puts), 20 CDS portfolios sorted by spreads using single-name 5-year contracts, 23 commodity
portfolios with at least 25 years of return data, and 12 foreign exchange currency portfolios,
six sorted on interest rate differentials and six sorted on momentum. Except for Treasury
bond portfolios which are from CRSP, non-equity test assets in HKM are from previous
studies.
50The holding companies sector has a large increase in the level of assets and liabilities in the 2009:Q1
because a number of large financial institutions became bank holding companies. These companies (including
Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley, American Express, CIT Group, GMAC, Discover Financial Services, and
IB Finance) had not previously been included in the financial accounts.
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Intermediary Asset Pricing Factors
AEM and HKM factors are from Tyler Muir’s and Asaf Manela’s websites, respectively.
AEM leverage factor is defined as the seasonally adjusted growth rate in broker-dealer book
leverage from Table L.130 of the Flow of Funds, where leverage is defined as total financial
assets divided by total financial assets minus total volatility. The intermediary capital ratio
in HKM is the ratio of total market equity to total market assets (book debt plus market
equity) of primary dealer holding companies of the New York Fed. Shocks to capital ratio
(HKM capital factor) are defined as AR(1) innovations in the capital ratio, scaled by the
lagged capital ratio. Data for publicly-traded holding companies of primary dealers are from
CRSP/Compustat and Datastream. Primary dealers are large and sophisticated institutions
and serve as trading counterparties of the NY Fed in its implementation of monetary policy.
For the current and historical list of primary dealers see this link.
1.12 Appendix 5: Robustness Checks for Empirical Results
1.12.1 Predictive Regressions
Exclude the Great Recession form the Sample
As a robustness check, I remove the Great Recession (years 2007 to 2009) form the sample
and rerun the predictive regressions in equation (1.31) with the market excess return as the
dependent variable. Table 1.6 presents the results. Consistent with the first two columns
of Table 1.4 with the full sample, we also see negative and significant coefficient γy with
additional predictive power over control variables in the sample excluding the 2008 finan-
cial crisis. Importantly, the predictive regression results are robust to excluding the Great
Recession from the sample: It is not just the financial crisis that drives my predictability
results.
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Include Factors from Representative Intermediary-Based Models
As robustness, in Table 1.7, I further examine the predictive power of the composition
of financial intermediaries (captured by state variable y) in the presence of factors from
representative intermediary asset pricing models studied in AEM and HKM. That is, I
include AEM and/or HKM factors in predictive regressions in equation (1.31):
Rit+1→t+4 − rft = γi0 + γiy yt + γiRep Rept + γiCtrl Ctrlt + εt+1→t+4,
where Rep represents the vectors of representative intermediary factors: broker-dealer lever-
age from AEM and BHC capital ratio from HKM. Ctrl represents the vector of control
variables that are known in the literature to forecast returns. I use the following control
variables: wealth share of the aggregate financial sector (x from the model defined in 1.29),
fluctuations in the aggregate consumption-wealth ratio (cay variable) defined in Lettau and
Ludvigson (2001), real price-dividend (PD) and cyclically adjusted price-earnings (CAPE)
ratios from Robert Shiller’s website, and variance risk premium (VRP) from Bollerslev,
Tauchen, and Zhou (2009). For reference, the first column repeats the regression in Column
(1) of Table 1.4. In Column (2), HKM’s intermediary capital ratio (CapRatio) is added
as an additional predictor. We observe that the coefficient on CapRatio is not statistically
significant and the R2 is only slightly increased (from 0.43 to 0.45). Removing y in Column
(3) substantially reduces R2 by 13%, emphasizing the predictive power of my measure of
intermediary heterogeneity beyond CapRatio. In Column (4), AEM’s borker-dealer leverage
(BDLev) is added as an additional predictor. Similarly, the coefficient on BDLev is not
statistically significant and the R2 is only slightly increased (from 0.43 to 0.47). Removing
y in Column (5) however, does not substantially reduce R2 (only by 2% ). Finally, in the
last column, all three predictors are included simultaneously: The coefficient on y remains
negative and highly significant with a large R2 of 0.47. The coefficient is also economically
significant: a 1% decrease in wealth share of dealers in the financial sector predicts a 1.2%
(quarterly, 4.8% annualized) increase in market risk premium over the next four quarters. As
before, I include several control variables that are known in the literature to forecast returns:
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Wealth share of the aggregate financial sector (x from the model defined in 1.29), fluctuations
in the aggregate consumption-wealth ratio (cay variable) defined in Lettau and Ludvigson
(2001), real price-dividend (PD) and cyclically adjusted price-earnings (CAPE) ratios from
Robert Shiller’s website, and variance risk premium (VRP) from Bollerslev, Tauchen, and
Zhou (2009).
1.12.2 Cross-Sectional Asset Pricing Tests
HIFac’s Pricing Performance
Figure 1.11 visually shows the HIFac’s pricing performance: The top panel plots the an-
nualized realized against the predicted excess returns for the 55 equity and bond portfolios
when HIFac is the only pricing factor (Column (1) in Table 1.5). Most of the portfolios line
up closely to the 45-degree line. The bottom panel is similar to the top panel when HIFac
and AEM are used as pricing factors, corresponding to Column (4) in Table 1.5. The model
slightly outperforms the one in panel (a) as shown in above.
One-Way Sorted CRSP Portfolios
To empirically verify the positive price of risk for innovations in the wealth share of dealers in
the financial sector, I sort stocks based on their exposures to these shocks and form portfolios
by quintiles on a 10-year trailing window. I consider all common stocks (share codes 10 and
11) in the CRSP universe from Amex, NASDAQ, and NYSE (exchange codes 1,2, and 3). For
every stock i at quarter t, I regress its quarterly excess return on constant and innovations
in the heterogeneous intermediary factor (HIFac), defined in equation (1.32):
Rei,t = αi + βi,HIFac HIFact + ξi,t
The coefficient βi,HIFac measures the exposure of firm i’s stock to the factor’s innovations. I
then sort stocks into quintiles every quarter according to their βi,HIFac.
The average returns of the beta-sorted portfolios are reported in Table 1.8, along with
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return volatilities, average book-to-market ratio, average market cap, and alphas from CAPM
and Fama-French three-factor model. Consistent with model’s implications, when sorted on
βHIFac, average risk premia are increasing from the portfolio of low-beta stocks to the high-
beta quintile. Excess returns are monotonically increasing from quintile one to five and the
top portfolio earns an approximately 5% premium over the lowest quintile.
Two-Way Sorted CRSP Portfolios
In this section, I verify the results above are robust to double-sorting with asset pricing fac-
tors from recent models with representative intermediaries. In this exercise, I independently
double-sort CRSP stocks into three-by-three portfolios on their exposures to the heteroge-
neous intermediary factor (HIFac) and either AEM or HKM representative intermediary
asset pricing factors. Table 1.9 reports returns for double-sorted portfolios on exposures
to HIFac and AEM and HKM betas. The return spread on HIFac-beta-sorted portfolios is
4.34% and 3.14% per year among stocks with low exposures to the AEM leverage and HKM
capital factors, respectively.
This exercise demonstrates that the heterogeneity in the financial sector is an important
risk factor and has pricing information above and beyond representative intermediary asset
pricing factors in AEM and HKM: even within portfolios sorted based on AEM or HKM
factor betas, I see a monotonic progression in returns from low- to high-HIFac beta portfolios.
The Heterogeneous Intermediary Factor-Mimicking Portfolio
As emphasized above, the main argument of the paper is that the heterogeneity in the
intermediary sector has important implication for asset prices. To conduct additional ro-
bustness tests, in this section, I project the heterogeneous intermediary factor (HIFac) onto
the space of traded returns to form a factor-mimicking portfolio that mimics the HIFac. To
further verify that this heterogeneity an important source of risk, I evaluate the heteroge-
neous intermediary factor-mimicking portfolio (HIMP) relative to the mimicking portfolios
for representative intermediary factors in AEM and HKM. I show that the mimicking port-
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folios for these representative intermediary factors cannot fully span the HIMP and there is
more to be captured by the heterogeneity within the financial sector.
This approach also allows me to run tests using higher frequency data and longer time
series. Moreover, since the mimicking portfolio is a traded excess return, I can evaluate
the model by testing alphas in the time-series regression without the need to estimate the
cross-section risk prices.
Construction of HIMP To construct mimicking portfolio of the heterogeneous interme-
diary factor (HIFac), I follow AEM and project this factor, onto the space of excess returns
by running the following regression:
HIFact = aHI + b
′
HI [BL,BM,BH, SL, SM, SH,Mom,Bond]t + %t, (1.45)
where HIFac is the heterogeneous intermediary factor defined in equation (1.32), andBL,BM,BH, SL, SM, SH
are, respectively, the excess returns of the six Fama-French portfolios on size (Small and Big)
and book-to-market (Low, Medium, and High), and Mom is the momentum factor, obtained
from Ken French’s data library. Bond is the first principal component (PC) of excess re-
turns on six Treasury bond portfolios sorted by maturity from CRSP. The heterogeneous
intermediary mimicking portfolio (HIMP) is then given by
HIMPt = b˜
′
HI [BL,BM,BH, SL, SM, SH,Mom,Bond]t , (1.46)
where b˜HI =
b′HI∑
bHI
= [−0.34, 0.20,−1.04,−0.09, 0.41, 1.64, 1.04,−0.83] positively loading on
the momentum factor.
HIMP vs. Mimicking Portfolios for AEM and HKM Factors To further verify
that my heterogeneous intermediary factor captures sources of risk beyond the factors from
representative intermediary asset pricing models, in this section I evaluate the performance of
HIMP with mimicking portfolios for AEM and HKM factors. I similarly construct mimicking
portfolios for AEM’s broker-dealer leverage and HKM’s holding company capital factors
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using quarterly data for the two factors from Tyler Muir’s and Asaf Manela’s websites,
respectively.51 The mimicking portfolio for the heterogeneous intermediary factor has Sharpe
ratio of 0.45 over the sample period (1970Q1 to 2017Q3), much higher than Sharpe ratios
for AEM and HKM factor-mimicking portfolios (0.21 and 0.27, respectively).
To evaluate the importance of heterogeneity in the financial sector above an beyond
representative intermediary factors, I regress HIFac on mimicking portfolios for AEM and
HKM factors in the following regression:
HIMPt = αMP + β
′
FMP FMPt + t, (1.47)
where FMP is either the mimicking portfolio for broker-dealer leverage factor from AEM
(AEM MP), or the mimicking portfolio for capital factor for primary dealers’ holding com-
panies from HKM (HKM MP), or both AEM MP and HKM MP. Notice the mimicking
portfolios are traded excess returns, thus I can evaluate the model by testing alphas in the
time-series regression without the need to estimate the cross-section risk prices. If HIMP is
fully “explained” by AEM MP, HKM MP, or both, I expect to see small and insignificant
αMP in the regression above. I find the opposite to be true, however.
Table 1.10 presents the results. In Columns 1 and 2, I run univariate regression where the
dependent variables are AEM MP and HKM MP, respectively. In both cases the intercept,
αMP is statistically significant at 1% level and the R
2 of the regressions are relatively low
at 0.14 and 0.32, respectively. In Column 3, I added value-weighted return from CRSP
(MktRF) to HKM MP as independent variables which leads to very similar results to Column
3. In Column 4, I add both AEM and HKM factor-mimicking portfolios as right-hand-side
variables in equation (1.47). We observe a large and significant αMP and relatively small R
2.
Adding MktRF in Column 5 to the regression in Column 4, further strengthen the results.
As a robustness check, I build factor-mimicking portfolios by projecting them instead onto
the Fama-French three factors, the momentum factor, and the first PC of bond portfolios,
51The loadings for AEM and HKM factor-mimicking portfolios are b˜AEM =
[−0.98, 0.50,−0.03,−0.26, 0.96, 0.05, 0.16, 0.59] and b˜HKM = [0.30, 0.03, 0.58,−0.06,−0.16, 0.25, 0.09,−0.03].
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and repeat the regressions in Table 1.10. I arrive at very similar results: time-series alphas
are large and significantly different from zero with low R2 in all regressions. See Table 1.11
in Appendix 1.12.
This exercise confirms my earlier results: the heterogeneity in the financial sector is an
important risk factor and has pricing information above and beyond representative interme-
diary asset pricing factors in AEM and HKM.
Alternative Projections for Factor-Mimicking Portfolios (FMPs) In this section,
I repeat the exercise in Section 1.12.2 with an alternative set of returns. I construct a
mimicking portfolio for the heterogeneous intermediary factor (HIFac) by projecting it onto
the space of excess returns running the following regression:
HIFact = aHI + b
′
HI [MktRF, SMB,HML,Mom,Bond]t + %t, (1.48)
where HIFac is the heterogeneous intermediary factor defined in equation (1.32), MktRF,
SMB, and HML are the Fama-French three factors, Mom is the momentum factor, and
Bond is the first principal component (PC) of excess returns on six Treasury bond portfolios
sorted by maturity from CRSP. The heterogeneous intermediary mimicking portfolio (HIMP)
is then given by
HIMPt = b˜
′
HI [MktRF, SMB,HML,Mom,Bond]t , (1.49)
where b˜HI =
b′HI∑
bHI
= [0.19, 0.51, 0.22, 0.29,−0.22] positively loading on the momentum factor.
I similarly construct mimicking portfolios for AEM’s broker-dealer leverage and HKM’s
holding company capital factors using quarterly data for the two factors from Tyler Muir’s
and Asaf Manela’s websites, respectively. The mimicking portfolio for the heterogeneous
intermediary factor has Sharpe ratio of 0.43 over the sample period (1970Q1 to 2017Q3),
much higher than Sharpe ratios for AEM and HKM factor-mimicking portfolios (0.24 and
0.28, respectively).
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To evaluate the importance of heterogeneity in the financial sector above an beyond
representative intermediary factors, I regress HIFac on mimicking portfolios for AEM and
HKM factors in the following regression:
HIMPt = αMP + β
′
FMP FMPt + t, (1.50)
where FMP is either the mimicking portfolio for broker-dealer leverage factor from AEM
(AEM MP), or the mimicking portfolio for capital factor for primary dealers’ holding compa-
nies from HKM (HKM MP), or both AEM MP and HKM MP. If HIMP is fully “explained”
by AEM MP, HKM MP, or both, I expect to see small and insignificant αMP in the regres-
sion above. I find the opposite to be hold in the data, however. Table 1.11 presents the
results. Time-series alphas are positive and significant at 1% level in all columns similar to
the regressions in Table 1.10.
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1.13 Appendix 6: Tables and Figures
Table 1.1. Parameter values for the endowment economy model
This tables reports parameter values used in calibrating the model. The parameters are calibrated to
quarterly data.
Description Symbol Value
Preference Parameters
Risk aversion of type A γA 2.5
Risk aversion of type B γB 5.5
Risk aversion of type C γC 15
EIS of type A ψA 1.5
EIS of type B ψB 1.5
EIS of type C ψC 1.5
Rate of time preference ρ 0.001
Endowment and Demography
Endowment growth rate µD 0.022
Endowment volatility σD 0.035
Agents birth/death rate κ 0.015
Population share of type A u¯ 0.05
Population share of type B v¯ 0.07
Margin Constraint
Constant leverage constraint m¯ 4
Tightness of the dynamic margin constraint α 10
Table 1.2. State variables statistics
This table reports statistics for empirical proxies for model’s two state variables in level and changes (Innov.).
AC(j) represent jth autocorrelation. Data is quarterly from 1970Q1 to 2017Q4.
xdata ydata
Level Innov. Level Innov.
Mean 0.141 0.000 0.191 0.000
Standard Deviation 0.037 0.007 0.068 0.018
AC(1) 0.966 0.003 0.958 −0.185
AC(2) 0.933 0.046 0.930 0.087
AC(3) 0.899 0.105 0.896 −0.087
AC(4) 0.861 0.004 0.870 −0.075
AC(5) 0.825 −0.025 0.851 0.071
Table 1.3. Predictive regressions: yt.
This table provides results for one-year ahead predictive regressions according to Rit+1→t+4 − rft = γ0 +
γiy yt + ε
i
t+1→t+4, using lagged equity share of broker-dealers in the financial sector, the empirical proxy
for state variable y defined in equation (1.30) which captures the composition of the financial sector, as
the predictor of interest. The dependent variables are excess holding period returns from quarter t + 1
to quarter t + 4 on the CRSP value-weighted portfolio (Mktt+1), mean excess return on 25 Fama-French
size and book-to-market (FF25t+1), 10 momentum (Momt+1) portfolios, 10 maturity-sorted US government
and 10 US corporate bond portfolios sorted on yield spreads (US bondst+1), mean excess returns on six
sovereign bonds (Sov. bondst+1), 54 portfolios of S&P 500 index options sorted on moneyness and maturity
(Optionst+1), 20 CDS portfolios sorted by spreads (CDSt+1), 23 commodity (Commod.t+1), and 12 foreign
exchange (FXt+1) portfolios. Size/book-to-market and momentum portfolios and the risk-free rate data
are from Ken French’s website. Data on sovereign bonds, options, CDS, commodities, and FX portfolios
are from He, Kelly, and Manela (2017). The sample quarterly from 1974Q2 to 2017Q2 for market, FF25
and momentum portfolios, and to 2012Q4 for HKM assets. Hodrick (1992) standard errors are reported in
parentheses to adjust for the fact that overlapping quarterly observations are used to forecast annual returns.
Dependent variable:
Mkt FF25 Mom US bonds Sov. bonds Options CDS Commod. FX
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
ydatat −1.16∗∗∗ −0.98∗∗∗ −0.77∗∗ −0.11 −1.09∗∗ −1.57∗∗ −0.04 −0.40 0.37
(0.38) (0.28) (0.33) (0.14) (0.46) (0.61) (0.13) (0.45) (0.31)
Const 0.39∗∗∗ 0.34∗∗∗ 0.27∗∗∗ 0.09∗∗ 0.39∗∗∗ 0.46∗∗∗ 0.03 0.14 −0.08
(0.08) (0.05) (0.06) (0.04) (0.11) (0.14) (0.03) (0.11) (0.08)
Obs 173 173 173 152 62 100 44 102 132
R2 0.10 0.11 0.08 0.01 0.15 0.12 0.005 0.01 0.05
Adj R2 0.09 0.11 0.07 0.01 0.14 0.11 −0.02 0.003 0.05
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table 1.4. Predictive regressions: yt and Controls.
This table provides results for one-year ahead predictive regressions according to Rit+1→t+4 − rft = γ0 +
γiy yt+γ
i
Ctrl Ctrlt+ε
i
t+1→t+4, using lagged equity share of broker-dealers in the financial sector, the empirical
proxy for state variable y defined in equation (1.30) which captures the composition of the financial sector,
as the predictor of interest. Ctrl represents the vector of control variables that are known in the literature to
forecast returns. I use the following control variables: wealth share of the aggregate financial sector (x from
the model defined in 1.29), cay variable from Lettau and Ludvigson (2001), real price-dividend (PD) and
cyclically adjusted price-earnings (CAPE) ratios from Robert Shiller’s website, and variance risk premium
(VRP) from Bollerslev, Tauchen, and Zhou (2009). The dependent variables are excess holding period returns
from quarter t+ 1 to quarter t+ 4 on the CRSP value-weighted portfolio (Mktt+1), mean excess return on
25 Fama-French size and book-to-market (FF25t+1), 10 momentum (Momt+1) portfolios, 10 maturity-sorted
US government and 10 US corporate bond portfolios sorted on yield spreads (US bondst+1), mean excess
returns on six sovereign bonds (Sov. bondst+1), 54 portfolios of S&P 500 index options sorted on moneyness
and maturity (Optionst+1), 20 CDS portfolios sorted by spreads (CDSt+1), 23 commodity (Commod.t+1),
and 12 foreign exchange (FXt+1) portfolios. Size/book-to-market and momentum portfolios and the risk-
free rate data are from Ken French’s website. Data on sovereign bonds, options, CDS, commodities, and
FX portfolios are from He, Kelly, and Manela (2017). The sample quarterly from 1990Q1 to 2017Q3 for
market, FF25 and momentum portfolios, and to 2012Q4 for HKM assets. Hodrick (1992) standard errors
are reported in parentheses to adjust for the fact that overlapping quarterly observations are used to forecast
annual returns.
Dependent variable:
Mkt FF25 FFmom US bonds Sov. bonds Options CDS Commod. FX
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
yt −1.77∗∗∗ −1.72∗∗∗ −1.80∗∗∗ 0.43∗∗∗ −0.27 −2.14∗∗∗ −0.18 −1.15 0.44
(0.46) (0.51) (0.45) (0.18) (0.64) (0.74) (0.16) (0.74) (0.40)
Const 0.04 −0.01 0.23 0.14 0.14∗∗∗ 0.54∗∗∗ 0.03 0.001 −0.06 −0.09
(0.19) (0.13) (0.15) (0.14) (0.03) (0.11) (0.10) (0.03) (0.13) (0.07)
Ctrls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs 109 109 109 109 88 62 84 44 88 76
R2 0.31 0.46 0.31 0.44 0.35 0.26 0.57 0.38 0.16 0.41
Adj R2 0.28 0.43 0.27 0.40 0.30 0.18 0.54 0.28 0.10 0.36
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table 1.5. Cross-sectional asset pricing tests
This table presents pricing results for the 25 size/book-to-market, 10 momentum, 10 maturity-sorted Trea-
sury bond portfolios from CRSP with maturities in six month intervals up to five years, and 10 US corporate
bond portfolios sorted on yield spreads from Nozawa (2017). The table reports the prices of risk and test
diagnostics, including mean absolute pricing errors (MAPEs), and adjusted R2s, and a χ2 statistic and
p-value that tests whether the pricing errors are jointly zero. Shanken (1992)-corrected and Fama and
MacBeth (1973) t-statistics (t-Shanken and t-FM, respectively) are reported in parentheses. Heterogeneous
intermediary factor (HIFac) is defined as the AR(1) innovations in the wealth share of dealers, scaled by
their lagged wealth share according to equation (1.32). The AEM leverage factor (AEMLevFac) is defined as
the seasonally-adjusted growth rate in broker-dealer leverage from Table L.130 of the Flow of Funds. HKM
capital factor (HKMFac) is the shock to intermediary capital ratio in He, Kelly, and Manela (2017), defined
as the ratio of total market equity to total market assets (book debt plus market equity) for bank holding
companies of New York Fed’s primary dealer counterparties. MktRF is the excess return on CRSP value-
weighted portfolio from Ken French’s website. The sample is quarterly from 1970Q1 to 2017Q4. Returns
and risk premia are reported in percentage per year (quarterly percentages multiplied by four).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
HIFac 38.27∗ 57.35∗∗ 34.87∗ 52.47∗
t-Shanken (1.83) (2.11) (1.78) (1.74)
t-FM (2.24) (3.11) (2.02) (2.82)
MktRF 3.86 6.93∗ 4.61
t-Shanken (1.20) (1.97) (1.38)
t-FM (1.27) (2.20) (1.52)
AEMLevFac 32.50∗∗∗ 21.66∗∗
t-Shanken (2.68) (2.42)
t-FM (3.73) (3.14)
HKMFac 12.55∗∗ 11.80∗∗
t-Shanken (2.57) (2.12)
t-FM (3.96) (3.68)
Intercept 3.47∗∗∗ 4.14∗∗∗ 5.32∗∗ 3.01∗∗ 2.77∗ 3.99∗∗∗
t-Shanken (2.92) (2.90) (2.03) (2.32) (1.84) (2.38)
t-FM (3.62) (4.32) (2.68) (3.11) (2.90) (4.19)
Observations 55 55 55 55 55 55
Adjusted R2 0.61 0.61 0.39 0.72 0.63 0.69
MAPE, % 1.83 1.84 2.96 1.58 1.89 1.67
χ2(N −K) 195.39 133.53 151.78 167.17 121.35 95.34
p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table 1.6. Predictive regressions: Excluding the Great Recession
This table provides results for one-year ahead predictive regressions according to Rit+1→t+4 − rft = γi0 +
γiy yt+γ
i
Ctrl Ctrlt+ε
i
t+1→t+4, using lagged equity share of broker-dealers in the financial sector, y
data
t defined
in (1.30). Ctrl represents the vector of control variables that are known in the literature to forecast returns. I
use the following control variables: wealth share of the aggregate financial sector (x from the model defined in
1.29), cay variable from Lettau and Ludvigson (2001), real price-dividend (PD) and cyclically adjusted price-
earnings ratios (CAPE) from Robert Shiller’s website, and variance risk premium (VRP) from Bollerslev,
Tauchen, and Zhou (2009). The dependent variables are excess holding period returns from quarter t + 1
to quarter t + 4 on the CRSP value-weighted portfolio (Mktt+1), mean excess return on 25 Fama-French
size and book-to-market (FF25t+1), 10 momentum (Momt+1) portfolios, 10 maturity-sorted US government
and 10 US corporate bond portfolios sorted on yield spreads (US bondst+1), mean excess returns on six
sovereign bonds (Sov. bondst+1), 54 portfolios of S&P 500 index options sorted on moneyness and maturity
(Optionst+1), 20 CDS portfolios sorted by spreads (CDSt+1), 23 commodity (Commod.t+1), and 12 foreign
exchange (FXt+1) portfolios. Size/book-to-market and momentum portfolios and the risk-free rate data
are from Ken French’s website. Data on sovereign bonds, options, CDS, commodities, and FX portfolios
are from He, Kelly, and Manela (2017). Broker-Dealer leverage is calculated using data from Table L.130
of Flow of Funds and is defined: Total Financial Assets/(Total Financial Assets − Total Liabilities). The
sample is quarterly from 1974Q1 to 2017Q3 for market, FF25 and momentum portfolios, and to 2012Q4 for
HKM assets. The Great Recession (years 2007–2009) is excluded form the sample. Regression coefficients
on BDLev are multiplied by 100. Hodrick (1992) standard errors are reported in parentheses to adjust for
the fact that overlapping quarterly observations are used to forecast annual returns.
Dependent variable:
Mkt
(1) (2)
yt −1.06∗∗∗
(0.34)
Constant −0.12 −0.13
(0.14) (0.10)
Controls Yes Yes
Observations 97 97
R2 0.48 0.54
Adjusted R2 0.45 0.51
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table 1.7. Predictive regressions for the market excess return: Robustness
This table provides results for one-year ahead predictive regressions using lagged equity share of broker-
dealers in the financial sector, the empirical proxy for state variable y defined in equation (1.30) which
captures the composition of the financial sector, as well as intermediary equity capital ratio (from HKM)
and leverage of broker-dealers (from AEM) as predictors of interest. I use the same control variables
as in Table 1.4: wealth share of the aggregate financial sector (x from the model defined in 1.29),
cay variable from Lettau and Ludvigson (2001), real price-dividend (PD) and cyclically adjusted price-
earnings (CAPE) ratios from Robert Shiller’s website, and variance risk premium (VRP) from Bollerslev,
Tauchen, and Zhou (2009). The dependent variable is excess holding period returns from quarter t + 1
to quarter t + 4 on the CRSP value-weighted portfolio (Mktt+1). The sample quarterly from 1974Q1 to
2017Q3. Broker-Dealer leverage is calculated using data from Table L.130 of Flow of Funds and is defined:
Total Financial Assets/(Total Financial Assets − Total Liabilities). The capital ratio for New York Fed’s
primary dealer holding companies are downloaded from Asaf Manela’s website. Hodrick (1992) standard
errors are reported in parentheses to adjust for the fact that overlapping quarterly observations are used to
forecast annual returns.
Dependent variable: Mktt+1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
yt −1.80∗∗∗ −1.98∗∗∗ −0.97∗ −1.19∗∗∗
(0.43) (0.48) (0.51) (0.43)
CapRatiot 3.31 1.22 1.68
(3.58) (4.58) (2.25)
BDLevt −1.35 −1.98∗∗∗ −1.13∗
(0.85) (0.56) (0.59)
Constant 0.01 0.18 0.10 0.05 0.09 0.13
(0.13) (0.26) (0.38) (0.15) (0.17) (0.22)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 109 109 109 109 109 109
R2 0.46 0.49 0.32 0.51 0.48 0.51
Adjusted R2 0.43 0.45 0.28 0.47 0.45 0.47
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table 1.8. One-way sorted CRSP portfolios on exposures to the heterogeneous intermediary
factor
This table reports average excess returns, alphas, volatility, average book-to-market ratio, and average
market capitalization for portfolios formed on their exposure to shocks to dealer wealth share in the financial
sector. Shocks to dealer wealth share (HIFac) are defined as AR(1) innovations in the wealth share, scaled
by the lagged wealth share as shown in equation (1.32). Data is quarterly from 1970Q1 to 2017Q3. Returns,
volatilities, and alphas are annualized.
L H HML
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Average Excess Return (%) 11.66 11.53 12.81 14.34 16.65 4.98
Volatility (%) 19.69 19.08 21.76 26.41 35.53 26.72
βHIFac −0.20 0.33 0.69 1.19 2.21 2.41
t-stat −0.89 1.50 2.77 4.07 5.89 10.67
αCAPM 4.77 4.33 4.56 4.75 4.44 −0.32
t-stat 3.40 3.90 3.63 2.84 1.57 −0.10
αFF3 3.89 2.88 3.36 3.98 4.02 0.14
t-stat 3.14 4.21 5.45 5.04 2.24 0.05
Average Market Cap ($bn) 5.28 3.66 2.40 1.97 0.89 –
Table 1.9. Two-way sorted CRSP portfolios
This table reports average excess returns for portfolios independently double-sorted on their exposure to
shocks to dealer wealth share in the financial sector (HIFac) and beta to the AEM leverage factor (AEM
LevFac), as well as, double-sorted portfolios on HIFac beta and HKM capital ratio factor (HKM CapFac)
beta. Shocks to dealer wealth share (HIFac) are defined as AR(1) innovations in the wealth share, scaled
by the lagged wealth share as shown in equation (1.32). AEM leverage and HKM capital factors are from
Tyler Muir’s and Asaf Manela’s websites, respectively. Returns are annualized in percentage points. Data
is quarterly from 1970Q1 to 2017Q3.
HIFac
AEM LevFac (1) (2) (3) (3)−(1) t-stat
(1) 12.85 14.05 17.19 4.34 1.49
(2) 11.47 12.75 14.63 3.16 1.25
(3) 11.42 12.19 14.67 3.24 1.25
(3)−(1) −1.43 −1.86 −2.54 – –
t-stat −0.65 −0.85 −0.91 – –
HIFac
HKM CapFac (1) (2) (3) (3)−(1) t-stat
(1) 10.05 11.39 13.19 3.14 1.20
(2) 11.91 12.48 14.82 2.91 1.28
(3) 14.75 15.17 17.74 2.99 1.13
(3)−(1) 4.70 3.78 4.55 – –
t-stat 1.48 1.30 1.48 – –
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Table 1.10. The heterogeneous intermediary mimicking portfolio (HIMP): Comparing
models
This table presents time-series regression results of heterogeneous intermediary mimicking portfolio (HIMP)
on mimicking portfolios for the representative intermediary factors in AEM and HKM according to: HIMPt =
αMP + β
′
FMP FMPt + t, where FMP is either the mimicking portfolio for broker-dealer leverage factor from
AEM (AEM MP), or the mimicking portfolio for capital factor for primary dealers’ holding companies from
HKM (HKM MP), or both AEM MP and HKM MP. The factor-mimicking portfolios are constructed by
projecting the heterogeneous intermediary, AEM’s leverage, and HKM’s capital factors unto the space of
equity and bond returns according to equations (1.45) and (1.46). The sample is quarterly from 1970Q1 to
2017Q3. Standard errors are in parentheses.
Dependent variable: HIMP
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
αMP 5.03
∗∗∗ 4.03∗∗∗ 4.14∗∗∗ 3.74∗∗∗ 3.91∗∗∗
(0.94) (0.85) (0.85) (0.83) (0.83)
AEM MP 0.72∗∗∗ 0.37∗∗∗ 0.49∗∗∗
(0.13) (0.12) (0.13)
HKM MP 0.94∗∗∗ 0.68∗∗ 0.82∗∗∗ 0.15
(0.10) (0.27) (0.10) (0.30)
MktRF 0.27 0.65∗∗
(0.26) (0.27)
Observations 191 191 191 191 191
R2 0.14 0.32 0.33 0.35 0.37
Adjusted R2 0.14 0.32 0.32 0.35 0.36
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table 1.11. The heterogeneous intermediary mimicking portfolio (HIMP): Comparing
models with alternative projections
This table presents time-series regression results of heterogeneous intermediary mimicking portfolio (HIMP)
on mimicking portfolios for the representative intermediary factors in AEM and HKM according to: HIMPt =
αMP + β
′
FMP FMPt + t, where FMP is either the mimicking portfolio for broker-dealer leverage factor from
AEM (AEM MP), or the mimicking portfolio for capital factor for primary dealers’ holding companies from
HKM (HKM MP), or both AEM MP and HKM MP. The factor-mimicking portfolios are constructed by
projecting the heterogeneous intermediary, AEM’s leverage, and HKM’s capital factors unto the space of
equity and bond returns according to equations (1.45) and (1.46). The sample is quarterly from 1970Q1 to
2017Q3. Standard errors are in parentheses.
Dependent variable: HIMP
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
αMP 1.21
∗∗∗ 0.96∗∗∗ 0.95∗∗∗ 0.88∗∗∗ 0.92∗∗∗
(0.25) (0.22) (0.23) (0.22) (0.22)
AEM MP 0.55∗∗∗ 0.23∗∗ 0.32∗∗∗
(0.09) (0.09) (0.11)
HKM MP 0.38∗∗∗ 0.39∗∗∗ 0.34∗∗∗ 0.13
(0.04) (0.11) (0.04) (0.14)
MktRF −0.01 0.13
(0.07) (0.08)
Observations 191 191 191 191 191
R2 0.16 0.35 0.35 0.38 0.38
Adjusted R2 0.15 0.35 0.35 0.37 0.37
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
78
10
20
30
40
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020
A
ss
et
s/
E
q
u
it
y
BDs
BHCs
(a) Intermediary leverage
-1.0
-0.5
0.0
0.5
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
$
tr
il
li
on
Brokers-Dealers
Commercial Banks
(b) Change in total financial assets
Figure 1.1. Leverage and change in assets of different financial intermediaries
Panel (a) presents time-series of leverage for different financial intermediaries: security broker-dealers (BDs)
and bank holding companies (BHCs). Leverage for broker-dealers (solid blue line) is defined as the ratio
total financial assets to total equity (total financial assets minus total liabilities) from Table L.130 of the
Flow of Funds. BHC leverage (dashed red line) is defined as the ratio of total market assets (book debt plus
market equity) to total market equity constructed for publicly-traded holding companies of the NY Fed’s
primary dealer counterparties using CRSP/Compustat and Datastream, where market equity is outstanding
shares times stock price and book debt is total assets minus common equity. Panel (b) presents quarterly
change in total financial assets for BDs and Private Depository Institutions (DIs). BDs’ (solid blue line)
and DIs’ (dashed red line) total financial assets are from Tables L.130 and L.110 of the Financial Accounts
of the United States (Flow of Funds), respectively. Data is quarterly from 1970Q1 to 2017Q4. The vertical
shaded bars indicate NBER recessions.
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Figure 1.2. Risk premia, the price of risk, valuation, and volatility
This figure presents price-dividend ratio 1/F , return volatility σ, Sharpe ratio and risk premium on the
endowment claim in constrained and unconstrained equilibria as functions of state variable x (wealth share
of the financial sector i.e. type A and B agents) under the benchmark parameters in Table 1.1. Each quantity
is plotted against state variable xt while the value of the second state variable yt (wealth share of type A
investors, i.e. broker-dealers, in the financial sector) is fixed at 0.56 (its value at the stochastic steady state).
The solid blue line corresponds to the unconstrained economy, the dash-dotted purple line corresponds to
the economy with a constant portfolio constraint (θ¯t = m¯), and the dashed red line corresponds to the
the economy with a Value-at-Risk (VaR)-type margin constraint (θ¯t =
1
ασt
). Three-dimensional plots are
provided in Appendix 1.10.2.
80
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
x
A’s Portfolio Weight wAs
unconst.
constant const.
margin const.
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
x
B’s Portfolio Weight wBs
unconst.
constant const.
margin const.
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
x
C’s Portfolio Weight wCs
unconst.
constant const.
margin const.
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
1.8
2
2.2
2.4
2.6
2.8
3
x
Real Interest Rate r (%)
unconst.
constant const.
margin const.
Figure 1.3. Optimal portfolios and the risk-free rate
This figure presents portfolio weights of each type of agent wAs , w
B
s , and w
C
s as well as the real interest rate
rt in constrained and unconstrained equilibria as functions of state variable x (wealth share of the financial
sector i.e. A and B agents) under the benchmark parameters in Table 1.1. Each quantity is plotted against
state variable xt while the value of the second state variable yt (wealth share of type A investors in the
financial sector) is fixed at 0.56 (its value at the stochastic steady state). The solid blue line corresponds
to the unconstrained economy, the dash-dotted purple line corresponds to the economy with a constant
portfolio constraint (θ¯t = m¯), and the dashed red line corresponds to the the economy with a Value-at-Risk
(VaR)-type margin constraint (θ¯t =
1
ασt
). Three-dimensional plots are provided in Appendix 1.10.2.
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Figure 1.4. Dynamics of the endogenous state variables
This figure presents dynamics of the state variables x and y (wealth share of the financial sector i.e. A
and B agents, and wealth share of type A investors in the financial sector, respectively) in constrained and
unconstrained equilibria under the benchmark parameters in Table 1.1. Drift and volatility of state variable
x (i.e. µx, σx) are plotted as functions of x while the value of the state variable y is fixed at 0.56. Drift
and volatility of state variable y (i.e. µy, σy) are plotted as functions of y while the value of the state
variable x is fixed at 0.25. The solid blue line corresponds to the unconstrained economy, the dash-dotted
purple line corresponds to the economy with a constant portfolio constraint (θ¯t = m¯), and the dashed
red line corresponds to the the economy with a Value-at-Risk (VaR)-type margin constraint (θ¯t =
1
ασt
).
Three-dimensional plots are provided in Appendix 1.10.2.
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Figure 1.5. Cyclical properties of intermediary leverage
This figure presents optimal intermediary leverage in the unconstrained and constrained equilibria under
parameters listed in Table 1.1. The left panel plots leverage of the financial sector (equation 1.28) in the
unconstrained equilibrium (dashed red line) and the model with time-varying margin constraints, θ¯t =
1
ασt
(solid blue line). The right panel plots intermediary leverage in the main model with endogenous margin
constraints. The solid blue line corresponds to leverage of the financial sector (wFSs ), the dashed red line
presents broker-dealers’ leverage (wAs ), and the dash-dotted purple line corresponds to leverage of bank
holding companies (wBs ). Each quantity is plotted against state variable xt (wealth share of the financial
sector i.e. A and B agents) while the value of the second state variable yt (wealth share of type A investors
in the financial sector) is held fixed at 0.56 (its stochastic steady state value).
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Figure 1.6. Asset reallocation within the financial sector
This figure presents portfolio weights for dealers, holding companies, and households (A,B, and C types,
respectively), as well as, the risk premium and Sharpe ratio of the risky claim on the aggregate endowment,
and the volatility of the risky asset return in the baseline model (solid blue line) and a model with tighter
margin constraints and less risk averse financial sector (dashed red line). The changes in tightness of the
margin constraint (parameter α) and relative risk aversion of the financial and household sectors (γI/γC) are
such that leverage of A (B) types is reduced (increased) by approximately 47% (72%): changes documented
during the Great Recession in Figure 1.1a. Each quantity is plotted against state variable x (wealth share
of the financial sector i.e. A and B agents) while value of the state variable y (wealth share of dealers i.e.
type A investors in the financial sector) is fixed at 0.56, its value at the stochastic steady state. Parameters
for the baseline model are presented in Table 1.1.
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Figure 1.7. State variable diffusions
This figure presents the diffusions of state variables x and y (σx and σy, respectively) in the economy with
time-varying margin constraints as functions of state variable x (wealth share of the financial sector i.e.
type A and B agents) and yt (wealth share of type A agents in the financial sector) under the benchmark
parameters in Table 1.1.
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Figure 1.8. Price of risk
This figure presents the Sharpe ratio of the risk asset in the economy with time-varying margin constraints
as functions of state variable x (wealth share of the financial sector i.e. type A and B agents) and yt (wealth
share of type A agents in the financial sector) under the benchmark parameters in Table 1.1.
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Figure 1.9. State variables x and y in the data
This figure presents the three-month moving average of monthly wealth share of the financial sector, xdata,
and quarterly book equity share of the broker-dealers in the financial sector, ydata, defined in equations
(1.29) and (1.30), respectively. Financial sector is identified as firms in the CRSP universe for whom the
first two digits of the header SIC code (HSICCD in CRSP) equals 60–67. Book equity for BDs and BHCs
are computed from the Flow of Funds Tables L.130 and L.131. Sample period is from 1970 to 2017. The
vertical shaded bars indicate NBER recessions.
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Figure 1.10. Heterogeneous and representative intermediaries
This figure presents distribution of risk premia volatility in models with representative (red) and heteroge-
neous (blue) intermediaries. I simulate each model 20,000 times for 3,000 quarters. Notice that horizontal axis
is the volatility of the risk premium for the endowment claim, which has relatively low volatility (σD = 3.5%)
relative to the market (approximately 16%). Therefore, equity premium volatility implied by the model is
about five to six times larger than that of the endowment claim (approximately 1% for the heterogeneous
intermediary model, for example).
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Figure 1.11. Realized versus predicted mean returns: Heterogeneous intermediary factor
This figure presents the realized mean excess returns of 35 equity portfolios (25 size and book-to-market-
sorted portfolios and 10 momentum-sorted portfolios) and 10 Treasury bond portfolios (sorted by maturity),
and 10 US corporate bond portfolios (sorted by yield spread) against the mean excess returns predicted by the
single heterogeneous intermediary risk factor when only the heterogeneous intermediary factor (HIFac) (panel
a) and HIFac and AEM factors (panel b) are used as pricing factor, respectively. The sample is quarterly
from 1970Q1 to 2017Q4. Returns are reported in percent per year (quarterly percentages multiplied by
four).
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Figure 1.12. Equilibrium in the unconstrained economy
This figure presents price-dividend ratio 1/F , return volatility σ, Sharpe ratio and risk premium on the
endowment claim, optimal portfolio weights of each type of agent (wAs , w
B
s , and w
C
s ) as well as the real
interest rate rt and the drift and diffusion of state variables x and y (µx, σx, µy, and σy, respectively) in the
frictionless economy as functions of state variable x (wealth share of the financial sector i.e. type A and B
agents) and yt (wealth share of type A agents in the financial sector) under the benchmark parameters in
Table 1.1.
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Figure 1.13. Equilibrium in the economy with time-varying margin constraints
This figure presents price-dividend ratio 1/F , return volatility σ, Sharpe ratio and risk premium on the
endowment claim, optimal portfolio weights of each type of agent (wAs , w
B
s , and w
C
s ) as well as the real
interest rate rt and the drift and diffusion of state variables x and y (µx, σx, µy, and σy, respectively) in the
economy with time-varying margin constraints as functions of state variable x (wealth share of the financial
sector i.e. type A and B agents) and yt (wealth share of type A agents in the financial sector) under the
benchmark parameters in Table 1.1.
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CHAPTER 2
Student Loans, Marginal Costs, and Markups:
Estimates from the PLUS Program
(with William Mann)
The growth of student loans to finance college attendance, and the effects of that debt burden
on later life decisions, have led to great interest in how financial aid shapes the market for
higher education.1 A growing body of research supports the “Bennett Hypothesis” that
financial aid leads to higher college prices (e.g. Lucca, Nadauld, and Shen (2018)). The
usual interpretation is that colleges, not students, are the main beneficiaries of financial aid.
However, this interpretation implicitly assumes significant market power in higher education,
which to date has not been shown. In this work, we provide the first empirical evidence that
market power is the underlying mechanism behind the Bennett Hypothesis.
To motivate our analysis, we present novel facts about private colleges’ expenditures,
which are not as frequently studied as their enrollment and tuition. While tuition revenues
have grown in recent years, colleges have spent those revenues almost as quickly, such that
average instruction-related spending per student is close to average tuition revenue through-
out the years in our sample. This paints a very different picture than the usual interpretation
of the Bennett Hypothesis: If the cost of enrolling a student is close to the price that student
pays, then colleges do not unduly benefit from financial aid. In fact, the Bennett Hypothesis
in this setting could imply that financial aid inefficiently benefits students, not colleges.2
1Student debt outstanding totaled $1.34 trillion as of the first quarter of 2017 (Federal Reserve Bank
of New York, Research and Statistics Group (2017)). For examples of the real effects of student loans on
household investment, see Fos, Liberman, and Yannelis (2017) on postgraduate education, and Krishnan
and Wang (2018) on entrepreneurship.
2This situation is known as advantageous selection. Because market power and advantageous selection
97
However, these figures only capture average costs. To assess market power, one requires
estimates of marginal costs. The main focus of this chapter is to estimate marginal costs
at private colleges using an empirical strategy that addresses the simultaneity of enrollment
and expenditures. This approach yields a very different conclusion: Marginal costs are
much smaller than tuition charges at the typical private college. Our finding supports the
common (often implicit) view that the Bennett Hypothesis arises from market power, not
advantageous selection. On the other hand, it contrasts the only prior evidence on markups
in higher education, from Epple, Romano, and Sieg (2006).
Our strategy is to study an inward demand shock that occurred due to the abrupt re-
moval of an important loan program from many students in 2011. The program in question
is the Parent Loans to Undergraduate Students (PLUS) program, which has been largely
overlooked in academic research on student aid, even though it accounts for over 15% of fed-
eral student borrowing.3 Unlike the more widely-studied Stafford loan programs, the PLUS
program imposes effectively no borrowing limit.4 This unique feature makes the PLUS pro-
gram a deep source of tuition revenue, and a potentially powerful setting to observe effects
of aid availability on college pricing. We show that only the PLUS program has exhibited
growth in average loan amounts in recent years, matching the 4% average annual tuition
increase in our sample of private colleges.
In October 2011, the Department of Education completed the consolidation of the Fed-
eral Family Education Loan (FFEL) program with the newer Direct Loan (DL) program.
It discovered that PLUS loans under the two programs had used different definitions of
“adverse credit history,” a disqualifying condition. Needing to harmonize the language, the
Department chose the stricter FFEL definition. This redefinition was expected to have min-
can both generate pass-through effects like the Bennett Hypothesis, one requires further analysis (as in our
study) to disentangle them. In a related example, Cabral, Geruso, and Mahoney (2018) document subsidy
pass-through effects in the Medicare Advantage program, then disentangle market power from advantageous
selection as the explanation.
3To our knowledge, the only other paper on PLUS loans is Bhole (2017), who shows that graduate PLUS
loans crowd out the private market. Our analysis focuses on undergraduate PLUS loans.
4The only limit is the cost of attendance, which is at the college’s discretion.
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imal real effect, but in fact it disqualified many parents who previously would have been
able to borrow. Analysts have suggested that PLUS denial rates doubled, and many colleges
blamed the change for enrollment declines, revenue shortfalls, and budget cuts.
To validate the 2011 credit standards tightening as an inward demand shock, we obtain
Department of Education data on enrollments, financial aid, and expenditures for private US
colleges offering federal loans. We calculate the fraction of financial aid recipients that came
from low-income families as of 2010, and use this fraction as our cross-sectional measure of
treatment exposure. After the standards tightening, PLUS loan volume fell by about 31%
in relative terms for private colleges with an above-median fraction of low-income students.
Enrollment and tuition revenue also fell, confirming that the standards tightening represented
an inward demand shift for enrollment at these schools.
We find evidence of the Bennett Hypothesis in response to this shock: The growth
rate in tuition charges slowed, in relative terms, at colleges more affected by the standards
tightening. This evidence implies that the PLUS program increased the price paid to attend
affected colleges. Our finding complements prior studies, in that we study a decrease rather
than an increase in financial aid. It also holds both for advertised tuition and for average
tuition revenue per student (which accounts for tuition discounts and scholarships).
The main goal of our analysis is to investigate the underlying causes of the Bennett
Hypothesis. We do this by estimating the marginal costs of enrolling the affected students
relative to the prices they paid. To that end, we exploit data on colleges’ total expenditures.
We regress total expenditures on enrollment, instrumenting enrollment with the tightening of
credit standards for PLUS loans. This yields an instrumental-variables estimate of marginal
cost. Under perfect competition, even a non-profit college would not be able to charge above
marginal cost, so a positive markup is evidence of market power.
As expected, we find that the standards tightening caused a decrease in college spending,
with the largest effects in the instructional expense category. However, the implied mean
(median) marginal cost per student was only $8,700 ($5,300). This is far below advertised
tuition and fees of $21,800 ($20,600), and also below the effective price of $15,500 ($11,800),
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defined as the price net of scholarships and discounts. We thus estimate that the average
Lerner index for disqualified students was 0.7, far above the typical values even for high-end
luxury goods.5 We conclude that markups were large at private colleges in our sample.
We next explore the cross-sectional distribution of estimated markups to refine this ar-
gument. First, we predict that for-profit schools take greater advantage of their pricing
power than do non-profits, and therefore have larger markups, due to their explicitly profit-
maximizing objective function. Second, we predict that the presence of public colleges should
be associated with smaller markups at private colleges, as this competition should erode pri-
vate colleges’ market power. We find evidence consistent with both implications: Markups
are higher at for-profit schools, and lower in states with a high number of public schools.
In sum, we find that the pass-through effect captured by the Bennett Hypothesis is
explained by market power at incumbent colleges. This conclusion is important for several
reasons. First, one cannot analyze welfare effects of student loans based only on the Bennett
Hypothesis, without supporting evidence such as ours on its underlying causes. As we
describe in the next section, a subsidy pass-through effect, on its own, is equally consistent
both with college enrollment being inefficiently low, and with its being inefficiently high.
Second, our conclusion has not been documented before. Indeed, as we explain in the next
section, it contrasts the only prior evidence on markups in higher education. Third, our
cross-sectional analysis provides guidance as to where the intended effects of financial aid
are most likely to be blunted by market power.
Our work contributes to a growing literature on the real effects of student loans. Several
prior studies document the Bennett Hypothesis at work, mostly using the Stafford or Pell
Grant programs. For example, Lucca, Nadauld, and Shen (2018) find that expansions of
these programs led to higher tuition charges, and L. J. Turner (2017) and Singell and Stone
(2007) find that a large fraction of Pell dollars is captured through higher tuition or smaller
discounts. Beyond these specific programs, Long (2004) finds that colleges captured about
30% of the Georgia HOPE scholarship, and N. Turner (2012) find larger effects for education
5The Lerner index is a measure of market power, defined as the markup over marginal cost as a fraction
of price. The highest value estimated in a sample of cars in Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (1995) is 0.3.
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tax credits.
An important strand of this literature studies for-profit colleges specifically: Cellini and
Goldin (2014) report that they charge more for the same degrees when eligible for federal
student aid. Eaton, Howell, and Yannelis (2018) find that they achieve greater profits by
scaling up after being acquired by private-equity funds, consistent with our finding that they
take advantage of their market power by charging very large markups.
Other papers take a structural approach. Epple, Romano, and Sieg (2006) estimate a
model of college admissions, and find markups of less than 3%, a much smaller magnitude
than ours. Gordon and Hedlund (2016) use the same framework to argue that colleges face
large fixed costs. Other structural papers include Fu (2014), Lau (2015), and Fillmore (2016).
Because the tightening of PLUS credit standards involved a redefinition of the term
“adverse credit history,” our study also contributes to a growing literature in household
finance documenting the real impact of credit histories. Examples include Gonza´lez-Uribe
and Osorio (2014), Bos and Nakamura (2014), Bos, Breza, and Liberman (2018), Liberman
(2016), Garmaise and Natividad (2017), and Musto (2004).
However, we cannot assess the optimality of a student’s decision to borrow (see Card
(2001) for a review of the returns-to-schooling literature), nor the impact of student loans on
later life outcomes (see Cox (2017) for a study of refinancing behavior, and Fos, Liberman,
and Yannelis (2017) and Krishnan and Wang (2018) for evidence that student loans constrain
later investment).
2.1 Expenditures and costs in higher education
Despite widespread attention to the revenues colleges obtain from tuition and financial aid,
there is little analysis of how colleges spend those revenues. This absence is surprising, as
one cannot fully understand the implications of findings like the Bennett Hypothesis without
characterizing quantities like markups, which requires data on expenditures and costs. In
this section, we use IPEDS data to summarize recent patterns in these quantities.
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In Figure 2.1, we plot aggregate revenues and expenditures at private colleges in the
United States. The black line shows that aggregate revenues in higher education have trended
upwards over time, although the series exhibits a large degree of volatility due to the impor-
tance of endowment income for a few colleges that have very large endowments. The dashed
line shows that colleges do not simply save these funds, but rather spend them at the same
pace: Aggregate expenditures have risen at roughly the same rate as aggregate revenues.
Moreover, they appear to be rather inflexible, rising at a stable pace even when they far
exceed aggregate revenues during the downturn of 2007-2008.
Total revenues includes endowment income, which is not closely tied to tuition charges
or financial aid. Similarly, total expenditures includes research-related expenditures, which
are not closely tied to student education. These distinctions are especially important at
the colleges with the largest operating budgets in the sample. To focus more closely on the
issues raised by the Bennett Hypothesis, the lower two lines in Figure 2.1 plot aggregate
tuition and fee revenue, and aggregate student-related expenses (defined as “instructional”
plus “student service” expenses). These categories are more likely to respond to financial
aid increases.
The upward trends in tuition revenue and student expenses are both quite stable com-
pared to the total revenue series at the top of the figure. Moreover, they do not immediately
suggest that colleges are pocketing large amounts of surplus from the growth in financial
aid. While aggregate tuition revenue grows steadily throughout the sample period, consis-
tent with prior research, spending on instruction and student services rises almost as quickly.
Of course, the time period covered in the figure has also seen a large expansion in enroll-
ment. To provide a more precise view of these patterns, Figure 2.2 plots the same information
on a per-student basis: For each college and award year, we scale the values of the series in
Figure 2.1 by that college’s full-time-equivalent (FTE) student body.6 We winsorize these
ratios at the 1% and 99% level in the pooled panel, then average them for each award year
in the sample, and plot the resulting averages in Figure 2.2.
6A full-time equivalent is a standard enrollment measure, defined as 30 credit-hours of instruction.
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Average tuition revenue per FTE rises from about $12,000 to about $17,000 from the
beginning to the end of the sample, an increase of roughly 3% per year. This increase is
consistent with the Bennett Hypothesis, and evidence like this has been widely examined
in the literature on higher education. However, average expenditures on instruction and
student services nearly keep pace with this increase, a pattern that has not been as widely
appreciated. Towards the beginning of the sample they are nearly equal, and towards the
end the gap between them is only about $1000, or 6% of average tuition revenue per student.
Based on these patterns, we conclude that the usual interpretation of the Bennett Hy-
pothesis – that it reflects an inefficient distortion away from students and towards colleges –
is not immediately obvious. Formally, this conclusion can only hold if the market for higher
education is fairly uncompetitive, such that colleges can set large markups (can charge far
above the marginal cost of enrolling students). Based on Figure 2.2, one might instead be
led to conclude that college has gotten more expensive simply because educating students
has gotten more expensive.
This would entirely change the interpretation of the Bennett Hypothesis: If anything, it
would suggest that colleges enroll too many students, not too few, following a pattern of
advantageous selection. In fact, this would be consistent with the only existing empirical
analysis on markups in higher education of which we are aware: Epple, Romano, and Sieg
(2006) estimate a model of higher education and find that markups are only 2% to 3%
of tuition charges, suggesting that higher education is actually quite competitive. In their
counterfactual analysis, a small change in price leads to a dramatic reshuﬄing of students
across schools, consistent with the effects of advantageous selection.
However, the structural estimation in that prior paper was not primarily focused on
identification of the cost function. Its cost parameters came from an OLS regression of
expenditures on a quadratic function of enrollment. Both that approach, and our simpler
plots in Figure 2.2, suffer from the inability to distinguish average from marginal costs, due
to the simultaneity of quantities and costs.
In short, data on college expenditures is helpful but insufficient to disentangle the com-
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peting explanations behind the Bennett Hypothesis. The second necessary ingredient is an
empirical strategy that can convincingly identify the marginal costs of enrolling students in
college. Starting in the next section, we describe such a strategy, then use its results to shed
light on the issues raised in this section.
2.2 Demand shock: The PLUS standards tightening
2.2.1 The PLUS program
The Parent Loans for Undergraduate Students (PLUS) program provides loans to parents
of dependent undergraduate students who are unable to cover the cost of college attendance
even after exhausting other forms of federal aid. Approximately 13% of parents of full-time
dependent undergraduate students have taken out PLUS loans, with an average amount of
$13,000 a year (Johnson, Bruch, and Gill (2015)). Figure 2.3 shows that aggregate borrowing
has been roughly constant in dollar terms, and increasing as a fraction of total federal loan
borrowing, representing over 15% by the end of the 2014–2015 academic year.
Uniquely among federal student loan programs, the PLUS program imposes no aggregate
borrowing limit, and the only annual borrowing limit is the cost of attendance reported by
the institution, less any other financial aid received.7 Thus, there is effectively no limit on the
intensive margin of credit for parents who qualify for PLUS loans. For this reason, the PLUS
program is a particularly likely mechanism for student aid subsidies to affect college pricing.
Figure 2.4 shows that the average amount borrowed under the PLUS program (conditional
on positive) increased steadily during 2010–2014, while average borrowing under subsidized
and unsubsidized Stafford programs stayed roughly constant at these programs’ borrowing
limits. The growth rate in aggregate borrowing in the figure matches the 4% average growth
rate of tuition charges in our sample of private colleges during the same time period.
7See Fishman (2014). In contrast, Stafford subsidized and unsubsidized loans to dependent undergraduate
students have (combined) annual borrowing limits ranging between $5,500 to $7,500, and aggregate limits
of $31,000. Students whose parents fail to qualify for PLUS loans are eligible for an additional $4,000 to
$5,000 of annual unsubsidized borrowing, and an additional $26,500 in aggregate borrowing, but still cannot
automatically borrow up to the full cost of attendance as with PLUS loans.
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However, and again unlike other forms of aid, PLUS loans are limited along the extensive
margin. Despite being non-dischargeable in bankruptcy (like other student loans), PLUS
loans are in the parents’ names and cannot be transferred to the student beneficiary. For
this reason, PLUS loans are not made to parents with an “adverse credit history.” Our
natural experiment centers on a redefinition of this term that happened in 2011.
2.2.2 The 2011 tightening of PLUS credit standards
The redefinition stemmed from the 2010 consolidation of the older Federal Family Education
Loan (FFEL) program with the newer Direct Loan (DL) program. In October 2011 the
Department of Education began applying for all PLUS borrowers a strict credit standard that
had previously applied only under FFEL. The main difference was an expanded definition of
the term “adverse credit history” that included having unpaid debt in collection, or having
written-off student loans in the previous five years. The change took effect without any
public announcement from the Department of Education (Nelson (2012)).
A Washington Post article described the effects:
At the time, federal officials considered the matter routine. They tightened the
screening process for loan applications to ensure that certain kinds of unpaid debts
were considered in a review of a parent’s credit record. That made it more likely that
some applicants would be deemed to have an “adverse credit history” and therefore
ineligible.
Acting Deputy Education Secretary Jim Shelton said the action was taken by “mid-
dle management” officials in an effort to fix what they saw as “a glitch in the system.”
He said that top officials did not review the decision before it was implemented, but
that the department stood by it as consistent with laws and regulations.
Anderson (2013)
Data support the view that this was a significant event: Using data from the 2007–2008
National Postsecondary Student Aid Study (NPSAS), Kantrowitz (2009) suggests that prior
to consolidation, PLUS loan denial rates were 42% in the FFEL program but only 21%
in the DL program. Goldrick-Rab, Kelchen, and Houle (2014) suggest that PLUS denial
rates jumped from 22% to 42% between 2010 and 2012. Media coverage focused especially
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on historically black colleges and universities (HBCUs), which feature high rates of PLUS
borrowing and have little endowment to cushion the blow of lost tuition.8
However, these effects varied greatly across educational institutions. Some were un-
affected by the change while others faced severe problems. Our empirical strategy is to
combine variation in pre-treatment exposure to the standards tightening with panel data on
college charges and enrollments.
2.3 Implementation
2.3.1 Data
The data sources that enable our analysis are both publicly available, and are the standard
sources for empirical work on student loan programs.
Our first data source is the annual Title IV Program Volume Reports, published by the
Department of Education. The name refers to Title IV of the Higher Education Act of 1965,
which authorizes federal student aid programs. The Volume Reports provide the number
of recipients and loan origination volume for each school participating in the Title IV aid,
separated by loan program.
Our second data source is the Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System (IPEDS),
also published by the Department of Education. Every college whose students are eligible
for Title IV aid must annually complete a series of surveys that are published on IPEDS.
The survey components include institutional characteristics, enrollment, student financial
aid, and school finances, among others.
8The UNCF reported that the number of PLUS borrowers at HBCUs dropped by 45% from 2011–2012
to 2012–2013, removing $155 million from college budgets. Howard University blamed the standards change
for a 6 percent drop in enrollment, a $17 million decline in revenues, and a credit downgrade from Moody’s,
while Morehouse College cut its budget by $2.5 million and laid off 50 employees. See “The Parent PLUS
Loan Crisis” on the UNCF website (link); “Change to PLUS loan program hits HBCUs hard,” aired on APM
Marketplace October 28, 2014 and available at http://www.marketplace.org/; and Johnson, Bruch, and Gill
(2015). For-profit colleges also feature high rates of PLUS borrowing that dropped sharply following the
standards tightening (Fishman (2014)).
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Appendix 2.7 discusses the details of merging the IPEDS and Title IV datasets. We note
one detail here: IPEDS data are reported separately for each physical campus, but the Title
IV reports are only available at the coarser level of the college system. To merge the datasets,
we aggregate the IPEDS data across all campuses within a college system. This is largely a
technicality, as 90% of college systems in the sample have only one campus. However, strictly
speaking, all our references to “colleges” or “schools” (which we use interchangeably) are
actually to college systems.
Both datasets are timed by award year. The Department of Education defines an award
year as the school year for which financial aid is used to fund a student’s education. Generally,
this is the 12-month period that begins on July 1 of a given year and ends on June 30 of
the following year. Hence, in all of the following analysis, year t is defined as the award year
beginning on July 1 of calendar year t and ending on June 30 of calendar year t+ 1.
We restrict the sample to private schools, in order to analyze the effects of demand
shocks on pricing and quantities. The objective function and market structure for public
schools are likely be very different from private schools, so we set them aside for the main
analysis. We furthermore require that each school is present in the Title IV data (to observe
their usage of federal aid programs), as well as having non-missing data on enrollment (to
quantify the demand shock), expenses (to estimate marginal costs), and advertised tuition
and realized tuition revenue (to calculate markups). Finally, we also retain only schools
that, after applying the above filters, appear in the data for at least the 2010, 2011, and
2012 award years (one year before and after the standards tightening).
2.3.2 Cross-sectional treatment intensity
To examine the real impact of the 2011 PLUS standards tightening, we sort colleges according
to a proxy for the expected intensity of the effects of this event. Ideally, we would like to
know the ex-ante fraction of students at each college who relied on PLUS loans to finance
their attendance, and whose parents would have qualified under the old credit history regime
but not under the new one. This would require a student-level match between college choice,
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financial aid, and parents’ credit histories, which to our knowledge does not exist anywhere—
even in confidential or administrative data at colleges or government agencies.
Instead, we construct a college-level proxy for student credit constraints based on the
IPEDS data. Our proxy is a ratio, frac low income, that measures the fraction of students
at the school who come from low-income backgrounds. We interpret this as a proxy for the
importance of financial constraints to an individual student, as low-income students are less
likely to have resources or credit to finance their eduction outside of the PLUS program.
To construct frac low income, we consult the campus-specific IPEDS Student Financial
Aid form, which is available between 2008 and 2013. This form reports the number of newly-
enrolled undergraduates that received any federal student aid under Title IV, referred to as
“Group 4,” and further breaks down this number into brackets of annual household income,
of which the lowest two brackets are $0-$30,0000 and $30,000-$48,000. For each campus, we
record both the total number of Group 4 students, and the number that come from these
two brackets. We sum both these numbers across each campus in a college system, then
calculate their ratio as our value of frac low income.
Our empirical approach is to see if a high value of this ratio as of 2010 – before the credit
standards tightening – predicts a relative decline in PLUS loan usage and enrollment there-
after, controlling for school fixed effects. In the motivating figures, we will divide the sample
into two bins by values of frac low incomei,2010, so this is a difference-in-difference, where
the above-median schools are referred to as “treated” and the below-median as “untreated”
(really, more-treated and less-treated). In the instrumental-variables estimation of marginal
costs and markups, we will exploit continuous variation in frac low incomei,2010.
2.3.3 Characteristics of sample schools
Table 2.1 displays summary statistics for private schools in our sample as of the 2010–2011
award year. For the average school in our sample in 2010, following the Title IV data,
total PLUS loan volume was $3.5 million spread among 242 borrowers, implying an average
borrowing of $14,000, close to the $13,000 reported in Johnson, Bruch, and Gill (2015).
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Enrollment is measured in multiple ways in the IPEDS data. The measure on which
we will focus is twelve-month undergraduate headcount, which is defined as the number of
distinct undergraduates who attended during a twelve-month period. Our conclusions are
also robust to an alternative measure, undergraduate full-time equivalents (UFTEs), which
are defined as total credit hours of instruction to undergraduates, divided by 30 (to reflect the
standard 30 credit hours in a full-time load). The first measure has a physical interpretation
as a number of students, while the second approximates the quantity of education “sold.” The
sample averages of these enrollment measures as of 2010 were 3,158 and 2,624 respectively.
Average advertised tuition and fees in our sample in 2010 were $21,000. However, realized
tuition and fee revenue per student was significantly lower, at $15,000, which reflects institu-
tional scholarships and tuition discounts for individual students compared to the advertised
price. We will focus on the smaller value, realized revenue per student, as our concept of
price, which is a conservative approach for our purposes as it leads to smaller estimated
markups. Total tuition and fee revenue was $19 million for the median school in the sample.
Finally, we note that the typical private college is not wealthy and selective, as is some-
times assumed in discussions of higher education. At the median in our sample, the ratio of
endowment dollars to students is only $5,800, and revenue from investment income consti-
tutes only 5% of total revenues. On the other hand, 48% of tuition and fee revenue comes
from federal student loan originations. These figures show that most private colleges rely
heavily on federal loan programs to supply revenue from tuition and fees, so that a decrease
in loan availability should greatly affect their operations, as we will demonstrate. The ex-
treme example is for-profit colleges, which represent 23% of our sample. At the median
for-profit, two-thirds of tuition and fee revenue came from federal loan originations in 2010.
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2.4 Impact of the standards tightening
2.4.1 Graphical analysis
First, we demonstrate visually how the standards tightening constituted a demand shock
for exposed schools. To do this, we sort schools into two bins of 2010 treatment intensity,
according to whether a school’s value of frac low incomei,2010 was above or below the median
value for schools in the same state. We create the cutoffs within-state as the purchasing power
of the income cutoff in frac low incomei,2010 can be very different across regions.
For the graphical analysis in this section, we refer to the above-median subsample as
“treated” and the below-median as “untreated,” and we track these subsamples based on
several outcome variables during 2009–2013. This is analogous to the difference-in-difference
approach taken, for example, in Havnes and Mogstad (2011) in studying the effect of subsi-
dized childcare on maternal employment in Norway.
We first confirm that the standards tightening indeed reduced PLUS loan usage. Figure
2.5 tracks the average log number of PLUS loan recipients per college across the treated
and untreated subsamples, relative to each subsample’s 2010 levels. Prior to 2011, the
two subsamples followed the same upward trend. But in 2011, the average log number of
recipients in the treated subsample fell sharply, and a large disparity opened up between the
two subsamples thereafter.
Since the goal of financial aid is to promote access to college, one would expect a removal
of that aid to decrease attendance. We show that this was the case: In Figure 2.6, the
outcome variable is the log of the school’s undergraduate headcount, again shifted by the
2010 mean value for each subsample. Figure 2.6 shows that enrollment, like PLUS loan
activity in the previous figures, exhibited a steep differential drop across the more- and less-
exposed colleges beginning in 2011 and persisting thereafter. The figure employs both of
the alternative measures of enrollment described in the previous section. Figure 2.7 further
shows that this translated into a substantial decrease in tuition and fee revenue at the treated
schools.
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The Bennett Hypothesis claims that student loan programs increase not only attendance,
but also tuition. If so, the removal of PLUS loans should have led to a decrease in tuition.
Figure 2.8 demonstrates exactly this result. The figure plots realized tuition and fee revenue
divided by undergraduate headcount. This measures the average revenue the school actually
extracts per student, accounting for tuition discounts on advertised tuition and fee charges.
The figure demonstrates that average tuition revenue grew at a similar rate in the treated and
untreated subsamples pre-2010. However, between 2010 and 2012, average tuition revenue
grew much more slowly at the treated schools. Towards the end of the sample, the growth
rates converge again, but the disparity in average tuition revenue persists.
Taken at face value, these results suggest that financial aid programs do indeed allow
colleges to charge higher prices to students. However, there is a subtle distinction between
these findings and the Bennett Hypothesis: Our results do not establish that any individual
student paid a higher price due to the existence of the PLUS program. Due to tuition dis-
counts, in principle every student pays a specific price, not necessarily equal to the advertised
price nor to the average realized price. It could be that the students who failed to enroll due
to the standards tightening would have paid the highest prices before, so the average price
fell simply through a change in the composition of the student body.9
From a policy perspective, there may be nothing inefficient about subsidized loan pro-
grams in this case. Restricting financial aid would decrease the average realized price of
college, but only by preventing attendance among students who pay the most; it would not
benefit any inframarginal students who would enroll regardless. The same issue would apply
to any empirical analysis of the Bennett Hypothesis that focuses only on price effects, in the
absence of detailed data on actual individual charges. These observations call for a different
approach to investigating colleges’ pricing power in the presence of subsidized student loans.
Our focus is instead on estimating the marginal costs of enrolling the students who were
affected by the policy, and the markups that they paid over marginal cost. Estimating cost
9For example, this could be the outcome of the models in Epple, Romano, and Sieg (2006) and related
papers, in which schools offer discounts to some high-achieving students, in order to increase reputation and
attract other students who pay higher rates.
111
functions is fundamental to an empirical analysis of any market, yet it has not received much
attention in research on the market for higher education. The only prior evidence of which
we are aware comes from Epple, Romano, and Sieg (2006) and Epple, Romano, Sarpc¸a, and
Sieg (2017), who estimate colleges’ cost functions via OLS regressions of expenditures on a
quadratic function of enrollment.
To estimate marginal costs, we introduce data from IPEDS on colleges’ expenditures, and
examine how it responded to the credit standards tightening. Following the motivation of this
section, Figures 2.9 and 2.10 present trends in expenditures at the above- and below-median
treatment-exposure schools around the date of the credit standards tightening. Figure 2.9
focuses on total expenses, and Figure 2.10 focuses only on the three largest categories.10
The figures show that spending followed similar growth rates prior to 2011, but declined
at treated schools in relative terms thereafter. However, the magnitude of this effect is
noticeably smaller than the tuition revenue effect in Figure 2.7. This is the intuitive pattern
that we will exploit in estimating markups.
We next turn to a quantitative analysis of all these findings.
2.4.2 Regression analysis
In this section, we quantify the above results in a regression framework. We start by pre-
senting difference-in-difference results that correspond to the figures already presented, then
move to specifications that exploit continuous variation in the treatment-exposure proxy
frac low incomei,2010. We retain only the award years 2010 and 2012 in order to tighten the
identification as much as possible around the credit standards tightening, while excluding
2011 itself, as the standards tightening happened midway through that award year.
We start by estimating the following difference-in-difference specification:
yit = αi + φ× Aftert + γ × Bin 2/2i × Aftert + it (2.1)
10As summarized in Table 2.1, these are instructional, support, and research and service.
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where i indexes schools, t ∈ {2010, 2012}, Aftert is an indicator for t = 2012, and Bin 2/2i
indicates that the school’s value of frac low incomei,2010 was above the median for its state.
The outcome variables yit will be at the school level, and will include PLUS loan volumes,
enrollment, revenues, and average revenue per student.
The causal effect of the credit standards tightening on yit is captured by γ, granted the
assumption that the subsamples would have followed parallel trends in the absence of the
standards tightening, as suggested by the previous figures. School fixed effects are captured
by αi. We cluster standard errors in all tables by school system.
Table 2.2 reports regression results corresponding to Figures 2.5 and 2.6. In Columns 1
and 2, we establish the steep decline of PLUS usage in response to the standards tightening.
Schools with above-median treatment intensity saw approximately a 31% decrease in both
the number and volume of PLUS loans relative to those below-median. Columns 3 and
4 demonstrate, as in Figure 2.6, that undergraduate headcount and UFTEs fell by about
7% and 9% respectively. We will focus on measuring enrollment via headcount in our later
analysis, but both measures yield qualitatively similar results.
Table 2.3 reports further regressions that capture reduced-form effects of the demand
shock illustrated by Figures 2.7, 2.8, and 2.9. Column 1 demonstrates a decrease of roughly
5% in total tuition and fee revenue in response to the standards tightening. Column 2 shows
that advertised tuition and fees per student fell by about $1370 as well, which is suggestive
evidence of the Bennett Hypothesis effect. However, the magnitude may not be meaningful,
as students do not necessarily pay the advertised tuition. Column 3 focuses instead on
realized tuition revenue per student, and shows that this was lower by about $478 at schools
more affected by the credit standards tightening. This represents about 4% of the median
realized tuition and fee revenue per student documented in Table 2.1.
As discussed in the previous section, our main goal is to estimate colleges’ marginal costs
of enrolling the students affected by the standards tightening. Column 4 of Table 2.3 provides
evidence in this direction: It shows that total spending fell by roughly 2.5% in response to
the standards tightening. While precisely estimated (and significantly different from zero),
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this magnitude is noticeably smaller than the effect in Column 1. This is the intuitive basis
for our finding that colleges charged well above marginal cost.
Dividing the sample into two bins is useful for illustrative figures and examining parallel
trends, but the variation in the standards-tightening instrument is potentially much richer.
In Tables 2.4 and 2.5 we exploit this variation more fully, repeating the analysis of Tables
2.2 and 2.3, respectively. The top panel of each table splits the treatment intensity into
four bins instead of two. The lower panel replaces the bin instruments with the continuous
fraction of low-income students that was used to construct them. Across all specifications in
the tables, the effects of the standards tightening on PLUS loan usage, enrollment, charges,
revenues, and expenses are monotonically increasing in the fraction of low-income students
at the college as of 2010. This is encouraging evidence that our instrument convincingly
captures exposure to the demand shock represented by the standards tightening.
For the remainder of the chapter, we will instrument for enrollment using the continuous
treatment proxy frac low incomei,2010, as in the lower panels of these two tables.
2.5 Estimating markups charged to PLUS recipients
2.5.1 Instrumental-variables estimates of costs and markups
Table 2.6 reports instrumental-variables estimation of the marginal effect of enrollment on
colleges’ spending and revenues. All the specifications are in logs to remove scale effects,
and (endogenous) enrollment is measured via the twelve-month student headcount. The
instruments for enrollment in these columns are the interaction between the 2012 indicator
and the continuous treatment exposure measure frac low incomei,2010.
In Columns 1 and 2 of Table 2.6, we focus on quantifying marginal costs. Column 1
estimates the elasticity of total college spending with respect to enrollment: A 10% increase
in enrollment would lead to a 2.8% increase in total spending. Table 2.1 reported a breakdown
of total expenses across the five largest categories in the data. The largest category is
instructional expense, at about one-third of the total. Column 2 shows that this expense
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category mostly drives the proportional adjustment in spending captured by Column 1.
Untabulated results show that all other categories exhibit adjustments that are economically
small and statistically insigificant. As is intuitive, instructional spending seems to be the
primary category of variable costs for colleges in the sample.
In Columns 3 and 4 of Table 2.6, we focus on quantifying marginal revenues, in order
to compare this magnitude with the marginal costs estimated in the first two columns.
Column 3 of Table 2.6 shows elasticity estimates of tuition and fee revenue with respect to
enrollment. However, this does not perfectly capture the effective price paid by students,
as not all student-level sources of revenue are reported with tuition and fees in IPEDS. For
example, some government aid (such as Pell grants) and many types of fees (such as residence
halls, meals, activities, and health services) are reported as revenue in other categories.
Nevertheless, these would be included in the total expense figures in Column 1. Therefore,
to be consistent, in Column 4 we report the elasticity of total revenue with respect to
enrollment, and this effect will be our focus in comparing revenue and cost effects.
We can convert the coefficients from these log-log specifications to dollar terms as follows:
For example, the instrumented marginal effect of headcount on total expenses, reported in
Column 1, is 0.283. The mean (median) ratio of total expense to headcount in the sample
as of 2010 was 29.8 (17.9). Multiplied together, these magnitudes imply a mean (median)
marginal cost of $8,400 ($5,100), much lower than either the advertised tuition of $21,000
($20,000), or realized tuition per student of $15,000 ($11,000), that were reported in Table
2.1. On the other hand, the mean (median) ratio of total revenues to headcount was 38.9
(20.3), so the coefficient in Column 4 implies a marginal effective price (including tuition,
fees, and any other sources of college revenue) of $31,400 ($16,400). The discrepancy between
these numbers is the essential reason that we estimate large markups in higher education.
We can think about these results in terms of the standard Lerner index, which is defined
as the ratio of markup to price. This can be expressed 1− MC
P
, where MC is marginal cost
and P is price. We can write the ratio in this expression as MC
P
= dC/dQ
dR/dQ
= C
R
× d lnC/d lnQ
d lnR/d lnQ
. The
derivatives in these expressions refer to marginal costs and revenues, meaning the changes
in costs and revenues induced by an exogenous change in enrollment— for example, by the
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PLUS loans credit standards tightening that we study. We can therefore substitute in for
these values the estimated coefficients from Columns 1 and 4 of Table 2.6. Finally, in the
data, the median ratio C
R
as of 2010 was 0.86. Altogether, then, our estimates imply a median
Lerner index of 1− 0.86× .283
.808
= 0.699. For comparison, the Lerner index values that Berry,
Levinsohn, and Pakes (1995) estimate for cars range from 0.16 for a Mazda 323 to 0.3 for a
BMW 735i (see their Table VIII). Thus, the markups charged by private colleges to PLUS
loan recipients seem to far exceed those attainable even for high-end luxury cars.
How should we interpret these findings? Intuitively, it may not seem surprising that the
marginal cost of enrolling a student in college is far below the price he or she pays, but
our estimated markups are much larger than the only prior evidence of which we are aware,
from Epple, Romano, and Sieg (2006). One possible interpretation is that colleges can (and
must) charge high markups to recover large fixed costs of operation. This would be a source
of large barriers to entry in higher education. Next, we attempt to gain further insight into
this interpretation.
2.5.2 Heterogeneity in estimated markups
In the final section of our analysis, we show that the identification strategy we pursue is rich
enough to identify cross-sectional variation in private colleges’ markups, yielding valuable
insights about the determinants of colleges’ pricing power.
To do this, we start by returning to the instrumental-variables regressions in Table 2.6.
Suppose we modified the specification in Column 1 of that table by replacing log headcount
with log total revenues as the endogenous variable. The resulting IV coefficient would be
equal to the ratio of the coefficients in columns 1 and 4 of Table 2.6, which is 0.283
0.808
= 0.35.
Recall that this cost-price ratio was the basis for our calculation of markups above. Therefore,
we will use this modified specification as the basis for exploring heterogeneity in markups,
adding interaction terms as appropriate to model that heterogeneity.
We also modify the previous specification by dropping the school fixed effects, in order to
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mitigate the attenuation bias common to fixed-effects specifications.11 When we estimated
average markups in the previous table, we had sufficient statistical power to identify signif-
icant relationships even with these fixed effects. However, when we explore heterogeneity,
power quickly becomes an issue. Therefore, in presenting the main results of this section in
Table 2.7, we will replace the fixed effects with just the main effects of any cross-sectional
explanatory variables in the model, and we will rely for identification on the difference-in-
difference strategy across treated and untreated groups. In Table 2.8, we will further show
that all the results are robust to including state fixed effects.
Our specification for estimating heterogeneity in markups is therefore:
lnCit = λ0 × lnRit + λ1 × lnRit × xi,2010 (2.2)
+ frac low incomei,2010 + Aftert + xi,2010 + it
The cross-sectional xi,2010 represents any dimension along which we examine heterogene-
ity in markups. We treat log total revenue, and its interaction with xi,2010, as endoge-
nous variables. Therefore, we also estimate a first-stage regression in which the terms
lnRit and lnRit × xi,2010 are replaced by the instruments frac low incomei,2010 × Aftert
and frac low incomei,2010 × Aftert × xi,2010.
Note that the first of these two instruments is the same as was used in Table 2.6, and
the analysis here is equivalent to the approach in the prior sections if we drop xi,2010. We
report this benchmark case in the Column 1 of Table 2.7. In this specification, even without
school fixed effects, we obtain the same cost-price ratio of 0.35 as we calculated earlier from
the ratio of the coefficients in Columns 1 and 4 of Table 2.6.
As with Table 2.6, we note that this log-log coefficient is not equal to one minus the
markup charged. The adjustment to this interpretation would involve multiplying by the
ratio
Ci,2010
Ri,2010
, as in the previous section. Since this ratio is less than one for 90% of observations,
markups should generally be larger than one minus the coefficients reported in the table,
11See Angrist and Pischke (2009), page 226.
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which is again consistent with the earlier section. For simplicity, in discussing this table, we
will focus only on the regression cofficients, without working through this translation.
Thus, the coefficient of interest in this section is λ1, which captures how the cost-price
ratio varies in the cross-section with xi,2010, relative the average value of 0.35 that we cal-
culated above based on the coefficients in Table 2.6. This cost-price ratio maps to (one
minus) the Lerner index, following the intuition that was described before. In principle, any
cross-sectional variable of interest could be used for xi,2010. In Table 2.7, we focus on three
choices that are particularly relevant to the market for higher education:
In the first specification, xi,2010 is an indicator for being a for-profit school. The for-profit
sector is known to rely on federal loan programs for revenue (e.g. Cellini and Goldin (2014)),
and compared to non-profit schools, their objective function should make them particularly
aggressive about taking advantage of any pricing power afforded by the availability of PLUS
loans. We therefore expect λ1 < 0, which would mean that for-profit schools have a lower
cost-price ratio (and thus a higher Lerner index) than non-profit schools.
Column 2 in Table 2.7 shows that this is indeed the case. The first row shows that
non-profit schools have a cost-price ratio of 0.844, whereas at for-profit schools this ratio is
0.844 − 0.535 = 0.309. This result confirms that, where for-profit schools serve a greater
fraction of the educational market, one should be more concerned about the possibility that
the surplus created by a subsidized loan program accrues less to students and more to the
incumbent colleges. This result is important in light of research showing that for-profit
schools are a growing segment of the market for higher education,12 but to our knowledge
this is the first evidence quantifying the size of the markup in the for-profit education sector.
In our second specification, xi,2010 is the number of bachelor’s-granting public schools
in the same state as a given school, calculated from the IPEDS data. Our hypothesis
here is that the markup charged by a private school reflects, at least partially, a barrier to
entry. Competition from public schools should then lower the markup that can be charged in
equilibrium by a private school, so we expect that λ1 > 0. If this effect is quantitatively large,
12See Cellini and N. Turner (2016) and Cellini and Goldin (2014), for example.
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this suggests a natural policy—opening public schools and providing education directly—
that can serve as a substitute for simply expanding loan programs, and that would increase
students’ share of the surplus from any subsidized loans that are provided.
This insight is explored in Column 3 of Table 2.7. We fix the number of public schools
in the state as of 2010, and we also demean and standardize it across the sample. Thus,
the coefficient in the first row, which corresponds to λ0 in specification (2.2) above, can be
interpreted as the cost-price ratio of the average school in the sample. This average is 0.364,
close to the value of 0.35 obtained based on the prior tables.
The coefficient of 0.092 in the third row of Column 3 corresponds to λ1 in specification
(2.2). This magnitude shows that, relative to the sample average, private colleges in states
with more public schools exhibit a higher cost-price ratio, which translates to a lower markup
and Lerner index. Again, to our knowledge, this is the first quasi-experimental evidence
that the presence of public schools can reduce the prices charged by public schools. This
spillover effect constitutes a potential benefit of subsidizing higher education by opening
public schools, as opposed to subsidized loans to attend incumbent private schools.
In the final specification in Table 2.7, we consider an alternative approach to captur-
ing this spillover: Rather than the number of public schools in IPEDS, we use the 2010
higher-education appropriations (HEA) in the state government’s budget.13 This provides
a continuous measure of the state’s support for public schools, which should lower private-
college markups and lead to λ1 > 0 by the same mechanism as described above. As above,
we fix HEA as of 2010, and demean and standardize it in the regression. Consistent with the
prior tables, the average cost-price ratio is estimated to be 0.355 in Column 4. Meanwhile,
the interaction term in the fourth row demonstrates, as in Column 3, that greater govern-
ment support for higher education is associated with a higher ratio and therefore a lower
markup.
As a robustness check for these findings, in Table 2.8, we repeat all the same specifications,
13Data on higher-education appropriations come from the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities (CBPP),
as recorded in the annual Grapevine report from Illinois State University. HEA is not available for schools
in the District of Columbia or Puerto Rico, so we drop these schools throughout Tables 2.7 and 2.8.
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but add fixed effects for the state in which the school is located, and cluster all standard
errors by state. The magnitudes of all the effects are virtually unchanged from Table 2.7,
and all of them remain statistically and economically significant.
We draw several conclusions from the analysis in this section:
First, markups appear to be both large and heterogeneous in higher education. Het-
erogeneity in markups means that the incidence of a subsidy to consumers, and thus the
optimal design of subsidies for college attendance, may also be different across different col-
leges and regions. This basic insight is important, in light of the fact that federal financial
aid programs are currently implemented with the same rules for all colleges and students.
A one-size-fits-all approach may have very different efficiency implications depending on the
schools that are in the choice set of any individual student.
Second, for-profit schools appear able to extract a relatively larger margin from their
attendees, suggesting that there are large barriers to entry even for this seemingly-less-
selective segment of the higher education market. Possible sources of these barriers to entry
include a track record of job placements, which would take time for an entrant to build; or
geographic segmentation, if for-profit schools locate in areas without many other educational
options. In any case, the findings lend support to concerns that the efficiency of student loans
may be falling over time as for-profit schools constitute an increasing share of the education
market.
Third, greater support for higher education from state government is associated with
lower markups charged by private colleges in that state. This last finding suggests a novel
policy implication: Where markups are large, so that students receive relatively little of the
surplus from a subsidized loan program, opening a public school instead of expanding student
aid may shift the market towards a more competitive structure. This approach would reflect
the classic logic of Hotelling (1938), who pointed out that subsidizing fixed costs in indus-
tries with declining average costs would increase efficiency by driving prices down towards
marginal cost. Opening a public school is effectively paying the fixed cost of a new entrant.
In contrast, student loan subsidies scale with the size of college enrollment, thus constituting
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a subsidy to variable instead of fixed costs. In the presence of large markups, such a subsidy
mainly benefits producers (colleges), arguably leading to many of the inefficiencies identified
in the modern empirical literature on the Bennett Hypothesis.
2.6 Conclusion
We present novel evidence for concerns about the incidence of student aid, based not on pass-
through effects of aid programs on college tuition (which are the focus of prior papers), but
rather on quasi-experimental estimates of low marginal costs and high markups. We exploit
variation in aid programs as an identification strategy: Based on a 2011 tightening of credit
standards for PLUS loans, we estimate that affected colleges faced relatively small marginal
costs, and therefore their tuition charges reflected large markups. One interpretation of this
finding is that the fixed costs of operating a college are large, which both enables and requires
colleges to charge large markups and “recover” those fixed costs.
Moreover, we find important cross-sectional heterogeneity: Markups are higher at for-
profit schools, and at schools in states with fewer public schools and less support for higher
education. This heterogeneity demonstrates that financial aid, which is usually implemented
as a flat subsidy to all consumers, can have heterogeneous impacts and incidence across dif-
ferent regions. Finally, the large average markup that we estimate suggests that a simple
subsidy to consumers may not necessarily be the ideal financial aid design, and that policy-
makers should instead target barriers to competition in the form of large fixed costs.
Our results provide novel evidence for concerns about the incidence of student loan pro-
grams, such as the Bennett Hypothesis. Colleges seem to have, and to exploit, large pricing
power, even outside of elite schools that are relatively unaffected by our natural experiment,
and especially within the for-profit sector. Our results also suggest some settings where
these concerns are likely to be greater, and potential alternative policies to subsidizing loan
programs in the presence of these concerns.
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2.7 Appendix 1: Aggregating and merging IPEDS and Title IV
The IPEDS institutional identifier is the UnitID variable. The Office of Postsecondary
Education ID (OPEID) is the 8-digit unique identifier for the Title IV data. OPEID is also
included in IPEDS. The first 6 digits of the OPEID variable identify a school system for
financial aid purposes. Schools with OPEID ending in 00 are either independent entities or
are the primary reporting institution for the Title IV program. For example, the primary
reporting institution for the University of Washington system is the Seattle campus which
has the OPEID of 00379800. The other two campuses, in Tacoma and Bothell, have OPEIDs
that do not end in 00 but they share the same first 6 digit OPEIDs (003798) with the main
Seattle campus. There are several instances where each individual campus of the same
university system reports Title IV data separately. For example, each of the ten campuses
in the University of California system has an OPEID ending in 00 and appears as a separate
entity in the Title IV data.
Since the Title IV data is only available at the system level, we use the first 6 digits of
the OPEID variable to merge IPEDS and Title IV datasets. In order to merge with Title
IV, we also need to aggregate the institutional-level IPEDS data to create variables at the
system level. For the indicator variables, we take the maximum across colleges in the same
school system to create the aggregate variables. These variables indicate, for example, if
the school is a HBCU, if it offers various degrees (bachelors, masters, doctorate, etc.), if it
is public/private, for-profit/non-profit, etc. For variables such as tuitions and fees, grants,
enrollment, school revenues and expenses, etc., we sum across the campuses within the same
school system to generate the aggregate system-level variables. See the discussion in Kelchen
(2014) for dealing with issues in merging IPEDS with Title IV.
The office of Federal Student Aid delivers aid to students through loan, grant, and work-
study programs. The Title IV Program Volume Reports provide the number of recipients
and volume by loan program for each school participating in the Title IV programs. The
data is available annually from award year 1999–2000 to 2005–2006. From 2006–2007 award
year onward, the data are reported quarterly and we use cumulative measures through Q4.
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Prior to the award year 2009–2010, the Title IV data include information on both FFEL
and DL programs. As mentioned above, after the elimination of the FFEL program in 2010,
only the DL program is available to borrowers. Thus from award year 2010–2011 onward,
the Title IV Reports only include the volume and number of recipients for the DL program.
The annual data are available from award year 1999–2000 to 2005–2006.
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2.8 Appendix 2: Tables and Figures
Table 2.1. Summary statistics
Summary statistics for sample school systems as of the 2010-2011 award year. Source: IPEDS/Title IV.
Median Mean SD
PLUS Loan Volume ($1, 000) 1365.21 3458.86 7301.12
PLUS Loan Recipients 134.00 241.71 416.55
Frac of aid recipients less than $48k income (frac low income) 0.49 0.55 0.26
Fraction of students receiving PLUS loans 0.10 0.11 0.09
Undergraduate 12-month headcount 1594.00 3158.55 7381.92
Undergraduate FTEs 1384.07 2624.83 5443.84
Advertised tuition and fees 20026.00 21017.88 9364.06
Total revenues ($1, 000) 33369.30 136631.88 559414.14
Tuition and fee revenue ($1, 000) 18990.93 46547.65 97831.82
Tuition and fee revenue per student 11426.29 14989.87 28607.18
Total expenses ($1, 000) 27517.02 100324.65 378479.41
Instructional expense ($1, 000) 9269.79 32886.63 115883.60
Support expense ($1, 000) 13309.81 33490.52 86760.05
Research and service expense ($1, 000) 0.00 11395.20 80908.30
Auxiliary enterprises expense ($1, 000) 2955.71 9594.67 30354.85
Net grant aid expense ($1, 000) 0.00 505.96 4666.83
Endowment dollars / headcount 5777.75 43473.30 166676.39
Investment income / total revenue 0.05 0.10 0.14
Tuition and fees / total revenue 0.60 0.60 0.25
Federal student loans / tuition and fees 0.48 0.47 0.23
For-profit 0.00 0.23 0.42
Federal loans / tuition and fees, for-profit only 0.66 0.65 0.19
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Table 2.2. Effect of the credit standards tightening on PLUS loan usage and enrollment
This table reports OLS regression estimates of specification (2.1) for the effect of the credit standards tight-
ening on PLUS loan usage and enrollment. Bin 2/2 is the above-median indicator for frac low incomei,2010.
In Columns 1 and 2, the outcome variables are respectively the number of PLUS loan recipients, and the
volume of PLUS loans disbursed, both in log terms and measured at the level of the school system. In
Columns 3 and 4, the outcomes are respectively undergraduate 12-month headcount and full-time fall un-
dergraduate enrollment. The sample includes the award years 2010 and 2012, for the 1,530 private colleges
with nonmissing data for both of these years. All regressions include year and school system fixed effects, as
described in specification (2.1) in the text. Standard errors are clustered by school system.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Ln(PLUS num) Ln(PLUS vol) Ln(Headcount) Ln(UFTEs)
Bin 2/2 × After −0.311∗∗∗ −0.312∗∗∗ −0.0716∗∗∗ −0.0926∗∗∗
(0.0263) (0.0287) (0.0133) (0.0144)
School FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.356 0.187 0.0240 0.0446
Obs. 2924 2924 3060 3060
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 2.3. Effect of the credit standards tightening on college revenue, pricing, and spending
This table reports OLS regression estimates of specification (2.1) for the effect of the credit stan-
dards tightening on college revenue, pricing, and spending. Bin 2/2 is the above-median indicator for
frac low incomei,2010. In Column 1, the outcome variable is the log of total tuition and fee revenue. In
Column 2, it is advertised undergraduate tuition and fees. In Column 3, it is realized tuition and fee revenue
per unit of undergraduate headcount. Finally, in Column 4, it is the log of total spending. The sample
includes the award years 2010 and 2012, for the 1,530 private colleges with nonmissing data for both of these
years. All regressions include year and school system fixed effects, as described in specification (2.1) in the
text. Standard errors are clustered by school system.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Ln(Tuition rev.) Tuition Rev/student Ln(Expenses)
Bin 2/2 × After −0.0520∗∗∗ −1367.6∗∗∗ −478.4∗∗∗ −0.0253∗∗
(0.0171) (110.5) (158.1) (0.0110)
School FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.0283 0.393 0.0761 0.0855
Obs. 3060 3060 3060 3060
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 2.4. Effect of the credit standards tightening on PLUS loan usage and enrollment:
Alternative approaches to measuring exposure to the standards-tightening treatment
This table repeats the specifications of Table 2.2, but with alternative approaches to measuring expo-
sure to the standards-tightening treatment. In Panel (a), exposure is measured with four separate bins
of frac low incomei,2010, instead of only two as in the prior table. In Panel (b), it is measured with the
continuous value of frac low incomei,2010. The sample includes the award years 2010 and 2012, for the
1,530 private colleges with nonmissing data for both of these years. All regressions include year and school
system fixed effects, as described in specification (2.1) in the text. Standard errors are clustered by school
system.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Ln(PLUS num) Ln(PLUS vol) Ln(Headcount) Ln(UFTEs)
Bin 2/4 × After −0.0790∗∗∗ −0.0840∗∗∗ −0.00324 −0.00806
(0.0220) (0.0247) (0.0131) (0.0128)
Bin 3/4 × After −0.253∗∗∗ −0.267∗∗∗ −0.0338∗∗ −0.0497∗∗∗
(0.0300) (0.0324) (0.0158) (0.0160)
Bin 4/4 × After −0.468∗∗∗ −0.457∗∗∗ −0.116∗∗∗ −0.147∗∗∗
(0.0445) (0.0485) (0.0191) (0.0224)
School FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.373 0.202 0.0362 0.0591
Obs. 2924 2924 3060 3060
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Panel (a)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Ln(PLUS num) Ln(PLUS vol) Ln(Headcount) Ln(UFTEs)
Frac low income2010 × After −0.840∗∗∗ −0.833∗∗∗ −0.141∗∗∗ −0.196∗∗∗
(0.0669) (0.0711) (0.0289) (0.0333)
School FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.409 0.240 0.0243 0.0491
Obs. 2924 2924 3060 3060
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Panel (b)
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Table 2.5. Effect of the credit standards tightening on college revenue, pricing, and spend-
ing: Alternative approaches to measuring exposure to the standards-tightening treatment
This table repeats the specifications of Table 2.3, but with alternative approaches to measuring expo-
sure to the standards-tightening treatment. In Panel (a), exposure is measured with four separate bins
of frac low incomei,2010, instead of only two as in the prior table. In Panel (b), it is measured with the
continuous value of frac low incomei,2010. The sample includes the award years 2010 and 2012, for the
1,530 private colleges with nonmissing data for both of these years. All regressions include year and school
system fixed effects, as described in specification (2.1) in the text. Standard errors are clustered by school
system.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Ln(Tuition rev.) Tuition Rev/student Ln(Expenses)
Bin 2/4 × After −0.0130 −471.4∗∗∗ −492.6∗∗∗ −0.00372
(0.0135) (98.97) (151.3) (0.0116)
Bin 3/4 × After −0.0392∗∗ −1284.3∗∗∗ −732.3∗∗∗ −0.00853
(0.0185) (157.8) (161.2) (0.0128)
Bin 4/4 × After −0.0790∗∗∗ −1933.9∗∗∗ −700.7∗∗ −0.0472∗∗∗
(0.0289) (148.3) (277.0) (0.0161)
School FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.0302 0.404 0.0792 0.0893
Obs. 3060 3060 3060 3060
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Panel (a)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Ln(Tuition rev.) Tuition Rev/student Ln(Expenses)
Frac low income2010 × After −0.0879∗∗ −3407.0∗∗∗ −1126.5∗∗∗ −0.0400∗
(0.0444) (228.7) (406.5) (0.0240)
School FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.0267 0.432 0.0786 0.0844
Obs. 3060 3060 3060 3060
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Panel (b)
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Table 2.6. Effects of enrollment on college expenses and revenue: IV regression
This table reports IV regressions of the effects of enrollment on college expenses and revenue. The sample
includes the award years 2010 and 2012, for the 1,530 private colleges with nonmissing data for both of
these years. Enrollment is measured with the unduplicated twelve-month institutional headcount, and is
instrumented with the interaction between the year-2012 indicator and the continuous treatment exposure
frac low incomei,2010. All regressions include year and school system fixed effects. Standard errors are
clustered by school system.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Ln(Total exp.) Ln(Instrl exp.) Ln(Tuition rev.) Ln(Total rev.)
Ln(Headcount) 0.283∗∗ 0.326∗ 0.621∗∗ 0.808∗∗∗
(0.141) (0.191) (0.268) (0.159)
School FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 3060 3060 3060 3060
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 2.7. Cross-sectional heterogeneity in the estimated markups
This table uses an instrumental-variables strategy to examine cross-sectional heterogeneity in the estimated
markups at private colleges. The sample includes the award years 2010 and 2012, for the 1,502 private colleges
with nonmissing data for both of these years. We exclude schools in the District of Columbia and Puerto
Rico, for which data on higher-education appropriations are not available. The outcome variable in each
column is log total expenses, and the key explanatory variable is log total revenues. A higher (instrumented)
effect of log revenues on log expenses reflects a lower markup and Lerner index. In columns 2, 3, and 4,
we examine interaction effects between log revenues and three cross-sectional variables: an indicator for
being a for-profit school; the number of public schools in a state; and the dollar amount of higher-education
appropriations (HEA) in the state budget, respectively. Let xi,2010 denote any of these three additional
cross-sectional variables. Each is measured as of 2010, demeaned, and standardized. In each column,
Ln(Total revenues)it and Ln(Total revenues)it×xi,2010 are treated as endogenous. The first stage regression
includes the interaction terms frac low incomei,2010×Aftert and frac low incomei,2010×Aftert×xi,2010,
as well as the main effects frac low incomei,2010, xi,2010, and Aftert. Here, frac low incomei,2010 is the
fraction of students with family income less than $48,000 in 2010, and Aftert is an indicator for the year 2012.
In the second stage, we exclude frac low incomei,2010×Aftert and frac low incomei,2010×Aftert×xi,2010,
so that these two terms are the instruments identifying the coefficients on the endogenous terms reported in
the table. (Note that the first of these two instruments is the same instrument used in Table 2.6.) Standard
errors are clustered by school.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Ln(Expenses) Ln(Expenses) Ln(Expenses) Ln(Expenses)
Ln(Total revenues) 0.349∗∗ 0.844∗∗∗ 0.364∗∗ 0.355∗∗
(0.155) (0.123) (0.171) (0.175)
Ln(Tot. rev.) × For-profit −0.535∗∗∗
(0.178)
Ln(Tot. rev.) × # Public 0.0920∗∗
(0.0411)
Ln(Tot. rev.) × HEA 0.0651∗∗
(0.0268)
Other Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 3004 3004 3004 3004
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 2.8. Heterogeneity with state fixed effects
This table repeats the analysis of Table 2.7, but includes fixed effects for the state in which the school is
located. All standard errors are clustered by state.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Ln(Expenses) Ln(Expenses) Ln(Expenses) Ln(Expenses)
Ln(Total revenues) 0.349∗∗ 0.854∗∗∗ 0.366∗∗ 0.355∗∗
(0.171) (0.157) (0.171) (0.175)
Ln(Tot. rev.) × For-profit −0.546∗∗∗
(0.160)
Ln(Tot. rev.) × # Public 0.106∗∗
(0.0466)
Ln(Tot. rev.) × HEA 0.0599∗∗
(0.0254)
Fixed effect State State State State
Other Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 3004 3004 3004 3004
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Figure 2.1. Aggregate revenues and expenses for private colleges
Source: Title IV.
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Figure 2.2. Average revenues and expenses per student for private colleges
Source: Title IV.
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Figure 2.3. Total borrowing through subsidized Stafford, unsubsidized Stafford, and PLUS
programs since 2010
Source: Title IV.
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Figure 2.4. Average borrowing through Stafford and PLUS programs since 2010
Source: Title IV. Averages are calculated by dividing aggregate loan volumes over total number of borrowers
reported across all schools. This figure is similar to one in Cooper (2016).
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Figure 2.5. Number of PLUS loan recipients for treated and untreated school systems
Both series use annual data and are in log scale and shifted by the subsample’s 2010 mean. Schools are
sorted into two bins according to whether a school’s value of frac low incomei,2010 was above the median
value (treated) or below the median value (untreated) for schools in the same state. Source: IPEDS/Title
IV.
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Figure 2.6. Enrollment at treated and untreated schools
Both series are in log scale and shifted by the subsample’s 2010 mean. Schools are sorted into two bins
according to whether a school’s value of frac low incomei,2010 was above the median value (treated) or
below the median value (untreated) for schools in the same state. Two measures of enrollment are used:
Headcount and undergraduate full-time equivalents. Source: IPEDS/Title IV.
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Figure 2.7. Total tuition and fee revenue at treated and untreated private schools
Both series are in log scale and shifted by the subsample’s 2010 mean. Schools are sorted into two bins
according to whether a school’s value of frac low incomei,2010 was above the median value (treated) or
below the median value (untreated) for schools in the same state. Source: IPEDS/Title IV.
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Figure 2.8. Tuition and fee revenue per undergraduate student at treated and untreated
private schools
Both series are shifted by the subsample’s 2010 mean. Schools are sorted into two bins according to whether
a school’s value of frac low incomei,2010 was above the median value (treated) or below the median value
(untreated) for schools in the same state. Source: IPEDS/Title IV.
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Figure 2.9. Total expenditures at treated and untreated private schools
Both series are in log scale and shifted by the subsample’s 2010 mean. Schools are sorted into two bins
according to whether a school’s value of frac low incomei,2010 was above the median value (treated) or
below the median value (untreated) for schools in the same state. Source: IPEDS/Title IV.
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Figure 2.10. Total expenditures at treated and untreated private schools on only the three
largest categories
The three largest expense categories are instructional, support, and research/service, respectively. Both
series are shifted by the subsample’s 2010 mean. Colleges are sorted into two bins according to whether
a school’s value of frac low incomei,2010 was above the median value (treated) or below the median value
(untreated) for schools in the same state. Source: IPEDS/Title IV.
135
2.9 Bibliography
Anderson, N. (2013). Tighter Federal Lending Standards Yield Turmoil for Historically Black
Colleges. The Washington Post.
Angrist, J. and J. Pischke (2009). Mostly Harmless Econometrics: An Empiricist’s Compan-
ion. Princeton University Press.
Berry, S., J. Levinsohn, and A. Pakes (1995). Automobile Prices in Market Equilibrium.
Econometrica 63.4, pp. 841–890.
Bhole, M. (2017). Why do Federal Loans Crowd Out the Private Market? Evidence from
Graduate PLUS Loans. Working Paper.
Bos, M., E. Breza, and A. Liberman (2018). The Labor Market Effects of Credit Market
Information. The Review of Financial Studies 31.6, pp. 2005–2037.
Bos, M. and L. I. Nakamura (2014). Should Defaults be Forgotten? Evidence from Vari-
ation in Removal of Negative Consumer Credit Information. Federal Reserve Bank of
Philadelphia Working Paper No. 12-29/R.
Cabral, M., M. Geruso, and N. Mahoney (2018). Do Larger Health Insurance Subsidies
Benefit Patients or Producers? Evidence from Medicare Advantage. American Economic
Review 108.8, pp. 2048–87.
Card, D. (2001). Estimating the Return to Schooling: Progress on some Persistent Econo-
metric Problems. Econometrica 69.5, pp. 1127–1160.
Cellini, S. R. and C. Goldin (2014). Does Federal Student Aid Raise Tuition? New Evidence
on For-Profit Colleges. American Economic Journal: Economic Policy 6.4, pp. 174–206.
136
Cellini, S. R. and N. Turner (2016). Gainfully Employed? Assessing the Employment and
Earnings of For-Profit College Students Using Administrative Data. Working Paper
22287, National Bureau of Economic Research.
Cooper, P. (2016). The Negatives of PLUS Loans. The Manhattan Institute, Retrieved from
http://economics21.org/html/negatives-plus-loans-1630.html.
Cox, N. M. (2017). Pricing, Selection, and Welfare in the Student Loan Market: Evidence
from Borrower Repayment Decisions. Working Paper.
Eaton, C., S. T. Howell, and C. Yannelis (2018). When Investor Incentives and Consumer
Interests Diverge: Private Equity in Higher Education. Working Paper.
Epple, D., R. Romano, S. Sarpc¸a, and H. Sieg (2017). A General Equilibrium Analysis of
State and Private Colleges and Access to Higher Education in the U.S. Journal of Public
Economics 155, pp. 164–178.
Epple, D., R. Romano, and H. Sieg (2006). Admission, Tuition, and Financial Aid Policies
in the Market for Higher Education. Econometrica 74.4, pp. 885–928.
Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Research and Statistics Group (2017). Quarterly Report
on Household Debt and Credit. https://www.newyorkfed.org/medialibrary/interactives/
householdcredit/data/pdf/HHDC 2017Q1.pdf.
Fillmore, I. (2016). Price Discrimination and Public Policy in the US College Market. Work-
ing Paper.
Fishman, R. (2014). The Parent Trap: Parent PLUS Loans and Intergenerational Borrowing.
New America Education Policy Program 3.
Fos, V., A. Liberman, and C. Yannelis (2017). Debt and Human Capital: Evidence from
Student Loans. Working Paper.
137
Fu, C. (2014). Equilibrium Tuition, Applications, Admission, and Enrollment in the College
Market. Journal of Political Economy 122.2, pp. 225–281.
Garmaise, M. J. and G. Natividad (2017). Consumer Default, Credit Reporting and Bor-
rowing Constraints. The Journal of Finance 72.5, pp. 2331–2368.
Goldrick-Rab, S., R. Kelchen, and J. Houle (2014). The Color of Student Debt: Implications
for Federal Loan Program Reforms for Black Students and Historically Black Colleges
and Universities. Working Paper.
Gonza´lez-Uribe, J. and D. Osorio (2014). Information Sharing and Credit Outcomes: Evi-
dence From a Natural Experiment. Working Paper.
Gordon, G. and A. Hedlund (2016). Accounting for the Rise in College Tuition. Working
Paper 21967, National Bureau of Economic Research.
Havnes, T. and M. Mogstad (2011). Money For Nothing? Universal Child Care and Maternal
Unemployment. Journal of Public Economics 95.11, pp. 1455–1465.
Hotelling, H. (1938). The General Welfare in Relation to Problems of Taxation and of
Railway and Utility Rates. Econometrica 6.3, pp. 242–269.
Johnson, M., J. Bruch, and B. Gill (2015). Changes in Financial Aid and Student En-
rollment at Historically Black Colleges and Universities After the Tightening of PLUS
Credit Standards. ”U.S. Department of Education, Institute of Education Sciences, Na-
tional Center for Education Evaluation and Regional Assistance, Regional Educational
Laboratory Mid-Atlantic, Retrieved from http://ies.ed.gov/ncee/edlabs.
Kantrowitz, M. (2009). Parent PLUS Loan Denial Rates in the FFEL and Direct Loan
Programs. Retrieved from http://www.finaid.org/educators/20090831parentplusdenial.
pdf.
Kelchen, R. (2014). Exploring Trends and Alternative Allocation Strategies for Campus-
Based Financial Aid Programs. Working Paper.
138
Krishnan, K. and P. Wang (2018). The Cost of Financing Education: Can Student Debt
Hinder Entrepreneurship? Management Science. (forthcoming).
Lau, C. V. (2015). The Incidence of Federal Subsidies in For-profit Higher Education. Work-
ing Paper.
Liberman, A. (2016). The value of a good credit reputation: Evidence from credit card
renegotiations”. Journal of Financial Economics 120.3, pp. 644–660.
Long, B. T. (2004). How Do Financial Aid Policies Affect Colleges? The Institutional Impact
of the Georgia HOPE Scholarship. The Journal of Human Resources 39.4, pp. 1045–1066.
Lucca, D. O., T. Nadauld, and K. Shen (2018). Credit Supply and the Rise in College Tuition:
Evidence from the Expansion in Federal Student Aid Programs. The Review of Financial
Studies 32.2, pp. 423–466.
Musto, D. K. (2004). What Happens When Information Leaves a Market? Evidence from
Postbankruptcy Consumers. The Journal of Business 77.4, pp. 725–748.
Nelson, L. A. (2012). Cracking Down on PLUS Loans. Inside Higher Ed. Retrieved from
https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2012/10/12/standards-tightening-federal-plus-
loans.
Singell, L. D. and J. A. Stone (2007). For Whom the Pell Tolls: The Response of University
Tuition to Federal Grants-in-aid. Economics of Education Review 26.3, pp. 285–295.
Turner, L. J. (2017). The Economic Incidence of Federal Student Grant Aid. Working Paper.
Turner, N. (2012). Who Benefits from Student Aid? The Economic Incidence of Tax-based
Federal Student Aid. Economics of Education Review 31.4, pp. 463–481.
139
